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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Collective

bargaining in the

public

education sector has

increasingly become an issue that commands a great deal of attention
from

school

administrators,

teachers,

parents,

students

and

the

With increasing frequency, state legislatures have

general public.

responded to this attention by passing legislation that addresses the
issue of collective bargaining and public school employees.
Illinois joined the ranks of those states with legislation in
this area by passing the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act
(IELRA) in 1983.
Statement of the Problem
The.central problem addressed by this study is the probable
interpretation of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act in the
areas of scope of bargaining, unfair labor practices and unit
organization.

These areas generated the most controversy curing the

legislative debates and the interpretation of the statute in these
areas is of primary concern to teachers and administrators.
Purpose and Significance of the Study
The IELRA establishes a list of mandatorily bargainable
topics.

However,

it

also

provides

that subjects

which directly

impact on the mandatory subjects of bargaining are mandatorily

1

bargainable unless they are inherently managerial rights.

The

determination of the scope of mandatory bargaining is important for
several reasons that are closely interwined.
First,

the

determination

that

a

topic

is

mandatorily

bargainable means that management may not make unilateral decisions
in that area.

Second, if a topic is determined to be mandatorily

bargainable, management's ability to alter policy in that area is
Third, most topics of bargaining involve monetary

restricted.

expenditures either directly or indirectly.

This budget involvement

means that the determination of a topic as a mandatory subject of
bargaining will have an impact on the budgetary process.
The

determination

of

what

constitutes

an

unfair

labor

practice will have a significant impact on how schools are governed.
Administrative

personnel

will

have

to

be

sensitive

to

what

constitutes an unfair labor practice and amend their practices
accordingly.
The determination of what consititutes unfair labor practices
will also affect the collective bargaining process.

Under the IELRA

both management and employee groups may commit unfair labor practices
during the life of the contract and during the bargaining process.
Practices which may have been allowable before the statute are now
proscribed and

this will affect how both parties approach the

bargaining table.
Unit
dealt

with

determination will establish which employees must be
as

a

group.

This

is

2

significant

because

of

the

difficulty of

bargaining with either a single group representing

diverse interests, or conversely, with many groups simultaneously.
This study will provide a basis for understanding how the
Illinois

Educational Labor

Relations

resolution of these questions.

Board

(IELRB)

will

approach

It will also suggest probable

interpretations of the pertinent portions of the IELRA.
Nature of the Study
The nature of the study was a documentary research project.
All of the published reports of the IELRB from January 1, 1984 to
August 1, 1986 were read.

This includes IELRB Opinions and Orders,

Orders, and Recommended Decisions and Orders.
history was read as well.

All of the legislative

This includes floor debates in the

Illinois House of Representatives and Senate on Senate Bill 536 and
House Bill 1530, the Governor's Amendatory Veto Message on House Bill
1530, and listening to the tapes of the Committe Hearings on House
Bill 1530.
Organization of the Study
This study is organized into six chapters as follows:
Chapter 1 contains an introduction, statement of the problem,
purpose and significance of the study,

nature of

the study,

and

organization of the study.
Chapter 2 contains a discussion of the background of the
IELRA and provides an overview of the content of the statute.

3

Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the scope of bargaining
under the National Labor Relations Act, a review of the four tests
for determining whether a topic is a mandatory or permissive subject
of

bargaining,

an

overview of

the

scope

of

bargaining under

the

IELRA, and specific analyses of the bargainablility of teacher
evaluation,

class

size,

conclusions regarding

teaching

assignments

and

curriculum,

and

the scope of mandatory bargaining under

the

IELRA·
Chapter 4 contains a general consideration of unfair labor
practices

under

the

NLRA,

a

discussion of unfair labor practices

under the IELRA with specific examples drawn from reported decisions,
responses

to

six

specific

practices under the

IELRA,

questions

posed

regarding

and conclusions

unfair

labor

regarding unfair

labor

practices under the IELRA.
Chapter 5 contains a discussion of unit determination under
the

NLRA,

an

analysis

determination under

the

decisions

with

dealing

of
IELRA,

the

statutory

framework

for

unit

a discussion and analysis of IELRB

unit

determination,

a

discussion

of

supervisory, managerial and confidential exclusions, a discussion and
analysis of decisions dealing with this area, and conclusions to be
drawn regarding this topic.
Chapter 6 contains a summary of the conclusions drawn in each
chapter,

a discussion of the implications of those conclusions and

recommendations for further study.
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CHAPTER 2
THE BACKGROUND AND CONTENT OF THE ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was formed and
refined in three separate Congressional actions - the Wagner Act of
1935, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Act of
1959.

The Wagner Act was clearly an attempt by Congress to

facilitate

interstate commerce and to foster

removing barriers to the formation of unions.

industrial peace by
The Taft-Hartley Act

and the Landrum-Griffin Act both served to refine the process of
bargaining and the adjudication of disputes under the NLRA as well as
to clarify some provisions of the NLRA.
Section 151, et seq.

The NLRA is found at USC

An in depth historical examination of the NLRA

is to be found in Gorman (1976) and Meltzer (1977).
The important aspect of the NLRA for this discussion is that
it covers only employees of private industry engaged in interstate
commerce, NLRA Section l(b).

This limited coverage is in accord with

Congress' stated purpose in passing the NLRA:
•••• "to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe
the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in
their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly
and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference
by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to
protect the rights of individual employees in their
relations with labor organizations whose activities
af feet conunerce, to define and proscribe practices on
the
part of labor and management which affect
conunerce •••• NLRA Section l(b).
However, this coverage excluded wh:it has grown to become a
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very sizeable segment of the work force, the public sector employees.
Without the protection of the NLRA, public employees did not
have the right for their labor unions to be recognized and they did
not

have

the

right

to

bargain

collectively

on

any

issue.

Specifically, they did not have the right to bargain over issues
dealing with terms

and conditions of employment or the right to

engage in concerted activity in furtherance of those issues.

As a

result of this lack of protection it was unclear whether unions of
public

employees

had

any

status

at

all.

In

fact,

an

early

Connecticut decision, Norwalk Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of Education,
83 A.2d 482 (1951), held that in the absence of statute or regulation
there was no reason why public employees could not organize a union.
However, that court refused to order the employer to recognize the
union

and

stated

that

there

was

no

constitutional

right

to

recognition.
It is against this background that the Illinois Education
Labor Relations Act ( IELRA) was enacted by the General Assembly of
Illinois in the summer of 1983.

Governor James Thompson signed the

bill into law on September 23,

1983 and used his amendatory veto

power to alter its form.

Under the terms of the statute, the full

force and effect of the statute came into being on January 1, 1984.
The

history

leading

interesting in itself.

to

the

passage

last

northern

the

IELRA

is

Illinois, Chicago in particular, has long had

a reputation for being staunchly pro-union.
the

of

industrial

state
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to

However, Illinois was

enact

public

labor

law

legislation.

On the surface,

this appears

somewhat

incongruous,

especially since a carefully crafted labor-management relations bill
for public employees was regularly introduced in the General Assembly
throughout the late nineteen-sixties.

(Scariano, 1984) However, the

bill never received much consideration from the General Assembly.
This puzzled the co-sponsors of the bill,

Anthony Scariano and Abner

Mikva, because the bill was fair to both workers and employers.
Finally, Scariano went to see the Democratic leaders in the
House.

They told him that the "administration" was against the bill.

He went to see then Governor Kerner about the matter.

Kerner told

Scariano that he knew nothing about the bill and had no position on
it.

It occurred to Scariano that when Cook County Democratic leaders

spoke about the administration that they werz referring to the Mayor
Daley.

He visited Mayor Daley and was referred to the deputy Mayor.

The deputy Mayor confirmed that the Mayor was against the bill.
When Scariano pressed for an explanation, he was told, "We
don't want our employees sitting across the table from us demanding
things-they've got to ask and they must give things in return.
can't get anything from them if
(Scariano, p.3.)

they have the

We

right to it."

When Scariano inquired as to what was expected from

the workers he was told, "Campaign contributions, workers in election
campaigns,

endorsements,

etc.

-

we

across the table from us as equals."

just

don't want

them sitting

(Scariano, p.3.)

The exchange reported by Scariano explains why Illinois was
so long in obtaining a public employees labor relations law.
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Giving

the right to public employees to organize and bargain would eliminate
the

control

over

one

of

the

largest

political

assets

of

the

controlling political party.
When the IELRA did come into existence it was the result of a
sustained effort by the Illinois Federation of Teachers (IFT) and the
Illinois

Education

Association

(IEA).

Representative

Greiman's

comments during the debates of May 18, 1983 make it clear how much
input the IEA had in the drafting of the bill.

In that debate, while

discussing Amendment Seven of the bill, (a significant restructuring
of the bill), Greiman made the following remarks:
GREIMAN: "Thank you, Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen
of the House. I did think that I should make one thing
clear. Amendment #7 is the product of a great deal of
effort.
I t is supported by both of the major teacher
organizations in this state, whom had significant input
into the crafting of it.
And in accordance with the
desire of so many people to have labor peace, it was our
effort and it
remains our effort to bring management
into the picture on a meaningful negotiating basis.
Accordingly, I convened, and chaired •••• more or less
chaired a meeting with management people last week.
I
hav~ been getting back some material from them.
Today,
we are proceeding, the managers •••• the four managers of
this Bill, chose to proceed on the Bill, and that do now
and this Bill arriving on the Governor's desk, that it
will ••• that it is written in stone or that it will not
be changed.
And I wanted to make clear to those
organizations who have contacted me, some of whom have
provided me, just yesterday with proposals for changes
of language, certainly that is possible between now and
the moment when this Bill reaches the Governor's desk.
And I didn't want them to believe that there was any act
of bad faith or any act to which would foreclose
consideration of other issues.
I believe that House
Bill 1530 is a significant matter, to be considered a
step forward in employee public •••• employee relations,
and ask that it be adopted."
(House Debates, May 18,
1983, pages 112, 113.)

8

Representative Stuffle' s remarks during the May 26 debates
also make it clear that the IEA and the IFT were consulted at every
step during the development of the bill:

"stiJF"FLE: "Yes, Madam Speaker and Members of the House,
this is, of course, the comprehensive collective
bargaining Bill that covers educational employees in the
public sector in Illinois. And if you might bear with
me for a few moments, I would indicate that the Bill
includes specific election and recognition procedures,
mediation and impasse procedures, as well as injunctive
relief procedures that are available to employees.
I
would point out to you that this comprehensive Bill was
put together through many weeks of effort by the
Speaker, who initiated the Bill.
The Speaker of the
House, Mike Madigan, asked those of us who have
sponsored Bills for public sector educational employee
bargaining over the years to try to sit down, through
his efforts, to try to negotiate and end the stalemates
between the teacher groups. Representative McPike,
and Representative Greiman spent many weeks with the IFT
and the IEA negotiating their differences.
To their
credit, the IFT and the IEA agreed to put aside
long-standing differences, some small, some large, to
put this Bill together under the leadership, as I said,
of Speaker Madigan. Representative Greiman, thereafter,
initiated meetings with management groups in the The
Bill comes today not as a perfect Bill, but I think it's
the closest thing I've seen to it in the over twelve
years that I've worked on this particular Bill and in
the seven I've sponsored. (House Debates, May 26, 1983.
254,5.)
The official statements of the IFT and of the IEA also
claimed that the organizations had a good deal of input into the
drafting of the bill.

All of these uncontested statements created

some obvious concerns on the part of management interests that the
IELRA

as

enacted

would

heavily

favor

the

interests

of

labor.

Certainly, labor was afforded statutory rights that it did not have
in the absence of the statute.
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The

intent of

the legislature in passing this

statute is

clearly expressed in Section 1 of the IELRA:
·POLIC·Y. It is the public policy of this State and the
purpose of this Act to promote orderly and constructive
relationships between all educational employees and
their employers.
Unresolved disputes between the
educational employees and their employers are injurious
to the public, and the General Assembly is therefore
aware that adequate means must be established for
minimizing them· and providing for their resolution.
It
is the purpose of this Act to regulate labor relations
between educational employers and educational employees,
including
the designation of educational
employee
representatives, negotiation of wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment and resolution of disputes
arising under collective bargaining agreements.
The
General Assembly recognizes that substantial differences
exist between educational employees and other public
employees as a result of the uniqueness of the
educational work calendar and educational work duties
and
the
traditional
and
historical
patterns
of
collective bargaining between educational employers and
educational employees and that such differences demand
statutory regulation of collective bargaining between
educational employers and educational employees in a
manner that recognizes these differences.
Recognizing
that harmonious relationships are required between
educational employees and their employers, the General
Assembly had determined that the overall policy may best
be accomplished by (a) granting to educational employees
the
right
to
organize
and
choose
freely
their
representatives; (b) requiring educational employers to
negotiate
and
bargain with employee
organizations
representing educational employees and to enter into
written agreements evidencing the
result of such
bargaining; and (c) establishing procedures to provide
for the protection of the rights of the educational
employee, the educational employer and the public.
Thus,

the legislature took notice of the public policy of

promoting peace between educational employers.
of

the unique nature and needs of

employers.
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It also took notice

public education employees

and

The

legislative

history

reveals

some

of

interesting

In Governor Thompson's

motivations for the passage of the bill.
prefatory remarks

other

the veto message he

referred

to collective

bargaining as a "fundamental right." (Thompson, 1983, p.2)

Within a

legal context a fundamental right is the most basic of all rights and
cannot be violated by the state.

This is very strong language for a

right that is to be conferred by statute and demonstrates the high
priority placed on the passage of the bill by the Governor.
It

is

of

particular

interest

legislative purpose was added
Thompson.

that

part

of

the

stated

by the amendatory veto of Governor

The portion of this section that was added are the two

sentences beginning wit~ the words "It is the purpose of this
Act ......

and

ending

with

"in

a

differences." (Thompson, 1983, p. 2)

manner

that

recognizes

these

It is this addition that took

legislative notice of the unique nature of educational employees and
employers.
and

not

The fact that this notice was added by amendatory veto
in

the

text

of

bill

might

imply

that

the

teacher

organizations were not particularly anxious for this notice to be
taken.
Another statement made by Representative Stuffle during the
May 26 debaces expressed a reason for the introduction and passage of
the bill.
"We live in the 20th Century, and we need to face 20th
Century realities. The Bill is not capitulating to
labor, but it's an effort to provide a true and
systematic method of resolving impasses, of limiting
strikes, not promoting them, of eliminating decades of
strife in this state •••• It's time we settle our
11

differences across the bargaining table.
It's time we
settle them there, not in the streets, that we realize
educational people ought to be and are people, are
taxpayers, and ought to be first class citizens."
(Stuffle, 1983, p.255.)
The implications from this passage are that bargaining

~n

the

education sector was archaic, that educational personnel were treated
as though they were not people and that educational personnel had
been treated as second class citizens.

If those were the beliefs of

Representative Stuffle then the motivation in introducing the bill
was not simply to "promote orderly and constructive relationships
between all educational employees and their employers."
Any statute requires the careful reading by the individual
wishing to understand the statute.

However, general provisions of

the statute must be discussed to provide a framework for the ensuing
study.
Section 2 of the IELRA provides definitions for specialized
terms within the IELRA.

Many of those terms will be discugsed within

other chapters but some of them must be discussed here to provide a
general understanding.
Subsection

(a)

provides

the

definition

of

"Educational

employer":
(a) "Educational employer" or "employer" means
the
governing body of a public school district, combination
of public school districts, including the governing body
of joint agreements of any type formed by 2 or more
school districts public community college district or
State college or university, and any State agency whose
major function is providing education services. (IELRA,
Section 2(a))
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This

is a broad definition and was provided expressly to

include joint agreements.
Subsection

(b)

defines

an

educational

employee

as

any

individual employed full or part time by an educational employer.
This provides broad coverage but that coverage is narrowed by the
exclusion
employees,

of

"supervisors,

student

and

managerial,

confidential,

part-time academic employees

short
of

term

community

colleges ...... (IELRA, Section 2(b)).
Section 3 establishes employee rights and Section 4 provides
for employer rights.

These sections will be discussed in the chapter

dealing with scope of bargaining.
Section

5

establishes

Relations Board ( IELRB).

the

Illinois

Educational

Labor

It is composed of three members, no more

than two from the same political party, appointed by the Governor
with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The section provides that

members must have at least five years of experience directly related
to

labor

and

employment

relations

in

representing

educational

employers or educational employees in collective bargaining matters.
The section gives broad powers to the IELRB in order to carry
out 'the objectives of the IELRA.
witnesses,

subpoena

the

The IELRB may ...... subpoena

production of

books,

papers,

records and

documents which may be needed as evidence on any matter under inquiry
and may administer oaths and affirmations."
Section S(h)

(IELRA, Section S(g))

gives the IELRB the power to make rules and

regulations pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act.
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The IELRB

has created those rules and regulations.

at 80 111. Adm.

Code Sections

They are found

Specific rules and

1100-1130.

regulations will be discussed in appropriate chapters.
section 6 provides
Education

Labor

for the establishment of

Mediation

This

Roster.

is

the

Illinois

necessary

because

mediation is one of the prerequisites before a teacher organization
can file a notice of intent to strike.
Section 7 establishes the process and guidelines the IELRB is
to

follow

section

when

will

considering

be

discussed

concerning
more

unit

fully

in

determination.

This

the

unit

chapter

on

determination.
Section 8 provides for the election and certification process
of the exclusive bargaining representative.
Section

9

requires

the

IELRB

to

establish

rules

and

regulations governing " •••• the appropriateness of bargaining units,
representation
procedures
employers."

elections,

employee

petition

for

recognition

and

for voluntary recognition of employee organizations by
(IELRA, Section 9)

This is a particularly important

provision because it requires the IELRB to enunciate the standards to
be used in determining appropriateness.

The regulations that have

been promulgated in this area will be discussed in the chapter on
unit determination.
Section 10 establishes the duty to bargain in good faith
within parameters established by the section.

This section will be

explored more fully in the chapter on the scope of bargaining.
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Section 11 allows non-member fair share payments to be
included in a negotiated contract.

The fair share cannot include any

fees for contributions related to the election or support of any
candidate for political office.

The section also allows an employee

objecting to fair share on a religious basis to pay his fair share to
8

non-religious charitable organization agreed upon by the employee

and the exclusive representative.
Section 12 establishes the impasse procedures to be followed.
Basically, if the parties have not reached an agreement by 90 days
before the scheduled start of the coming school year, the parties
must notify the IELRB of the status of the negotiations.

If a

reasonable period of negotiations has passed, and it is within 45
days of the scheduled beginning of the school year, either party may
petition the IELRB to begin mediation.
to initiate mediation on its own motion.

The IELRB also has the power
If settlement has not been

reached within 15 days of the scheduled start of the school year the
IELRB is required to invoke mediation.
Section 13 establishes five conditions that must be satisfied
before educational employees may engage in a strike.

The conditions

are:
Educational employees shall not engage in a strike
except under the following conditions:
(a) they are represented by an exclusive bargaining
representative;
(b) mediation has been used without success;
(c) at least 5 days have elapsed after a notice of
intent to strike has been given by the exclusive
bargaining representative to the educational employer,
the regional superintendent and the Illinois Educational
Labor Relations Board;
15

(d) the collective bargaining agreement between the
educational employer and educational employees, if any,
has expired; and,
and
the
exclusive
bargaining
( e)
the
employer
not
mutually
submitted
the
representative
have
(IELRA, Section
unresolved issues to arbitration.
13(a)-13(3))
All five of the conditions must be met before employees may
legally engage in a strike.

The section also allows the employer to

seek an injunction if the strike presents a clear and present danger
to the health or safety of the public.

An unfair labor practice or

other evidence of unclean hands by the employer is a defense to such
an action.
Section 14 lists
employees

that

will

be

the action by educational employers
considered

unfair labor practices.

and
This

section will be considered in the chapter on unfair labor practices.
Section 15 establishes the procedures to be followed when an
employee or employer
committed.

believes

an unfair

labor practice has

been

This section provides that after a charge has been filed

the IELRA will investigate the charge to determine i f the charge
states an issue of law or fact.

If the IELRA finds that the charge

meets that requirement the IELRB is to issue and serve a complaint
upon the party charged and hold a hearing on the charges.

Both

parties are entitled to have an attorney present at the hearing and
the IELRB may seek a court order to compel the attendance of the
parties.
If the IELRB finds

that the charged party has committed an

unfair labor practice the IELRB may issue an order requiring the

16

practice to cease.

The IELRB may take additional affirmative action

including requiring periodic reports to demonstrate compliance with
the order.
practice

The detailed mechanics of processing an unfair labor

charge

are

contained

within the

Rules

and

Regulations.

Those details will be discussed in the chapter on unfair labor
practices.
Section 16 provides that a charging party or any person
aggrieved by a final decision of the IELRB has the right to seek
judicial review in the Appellate Court of the judicial district in
which the IELRB maintains its principal office.

Currently, that is

the First District.
This section also gives the IELRB the right to seek judicial
relief if any person has violated a final order of the IELRB.

If the

Court grants the relief and a party violates the Court order the
Court is empowered by this section to treat the violation as civil
contempt.
Section 17 establishes that the IELRA will prevail and
control if there is a conflict between it and any other law,
executive order or administrative regulation.
Section 18 establishes that the provisions of the Open
Meetings

Act

will

not

be

applicable

negotiations and grievance arbitrations

to

collective

bargaining

conducted pursuant to the

IELRA.
A careful reading of the IELRA reveals that the areas most
likely to yield disputes between employers and employees are scope of

17

bargaining

issues,

unit

determination

practices.

A chapter will be devoted to each of these areas.
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issues,

and

unfair

labor

CHAPTER 3
SCOPE OF BARGAINING
INTRODUCTION
The phrase, scope of bargaining, refers to the range of
issues which will be bargained between employer and employees.

The

scope of bargaining provided by the National Labor Relations Act,
(NLRA) is found in Section 8(d) of the NLRA.

It requires the

employer and representative of the employees to meet "at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment •••• "

This language is precisely

the same as that found in Section 10 of the IELRA.
Although the IELRB is not bound by the National Labor
Relation Board's (NLRB) interpretation of the identical provision in
the NLRA, it is clear that the IELRB will lock to the decisions of
the NLRB for guidance.

See, e.g. Lake Zurich School District No. 95,

Case

Decision

No.

84-CA-0003,

of

IELRB,

1

PERI

1031

(1984).

Therefore, the approach of the NLRB to scope of bargaining will be
discussed.

Following that discussion, there will be a general

treatment of different states' approach to scope of bargaining
issues, the IELRA 's application to scope questions in general and
then specific treatment of four issues involving the scope of
bargaining.
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In the landmark case of NLRB v Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
corp.,

356 U.S.

division

of

342 ( 1958), the Supreme Court established the

bargaining

topics

permissive, and illegal.

into

three

categories

-

mandatory,

Mandatory topics lawfully regulate wages,

hours and other terms and conditions of employment and must be
bargained in good faith.
position until
position.

However, either party may insist on its

impasse and may use economic force

Permissive

topics

deal

with subjects

to support its

other

than wages,

hours and terms and conditions of employment and may be included in
the contra<;:t: on a voluntary basis.

Illegal contractual provisions

are those which are prohibited by statute or public policy.

Those

provisions so prohibited may not be included within a labor contract
even if both parties voluntarily agree

to

them.

The

Borg-Warner

approach has been widely accepted by states with similar statutory
language and will probably be followed by the IELRB.
The NLRB has broadly construed the meaning of wages under the
NLRA.

Provisions classified as wages, and thus mandatory subjects of

bargaining,

have

included

merit

or

incentive

pay

(NLRB

v.

Katz,

1962), pay for sick leave (NLRB v. Katz, 1962), pay differentials for
workers of different shifts (NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse
Co~,

1966),

paid holidays and vacations

1942), group health insurance (W.W.
overtime pay (NLRB v.

Tom Johnson·,
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(Singer Mfg.

Cross and Co. v.

Co. v.

NLRB~

NLRB,

1949),

1965), bonuses if they are

remuneration for work done (NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co.,

1952),

food prices and services where the employer provides an on site
cafeteria for employees (Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 1979), remuneration
of bargaining unit members for time spent actually negotiating
(Axelson, Inc. v. NLRB, 1979), and pension plans (Allied Chemical and
Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass

Co~,

1971).

This long list

gives some indication of how broadly the NLRB has construed the term
'wages'.
The NLRB has also provided a broad construction of what
constitutes 'hours' within the meaning of the NLRA.

The number of

hours to be worked in each day, the particular hours to be worked in
each day and the particular days to be worked in each week have been
deemed to be 'hours' for the purposes of the NLRA (Local 189, Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea

Co~,

1965).

The NLRB has also expanded the number of items which are
included within the phrase "other conditions of employment."
list

of

items

includes

company

rules

and hiring practices

The
(S.S.

Kresge Co. v. NLRB), the rental rate of company housing, (American
Smelting & Refining Co. v. NLRB), safety rules (NLRB v. Miller
Brewing

Co~),

employee work loads (Gallenkamp Stores Co. v. NLRB),

effects of plant relocation (NLRB v. Die Supply Corp.), contracting
out of work (Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v.
grievance procedures (Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB).

NLRB), and

However, even with

that broad construction, the Supreme Court has recognized that some
parameters have to be established for the scope of bargaining under
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the phrase "conditions of employment."
Justice Stewart, in his concurrence in Fibreboard, attempted
to articulate those limits:
in common parlance, the conditions of a person's
employment are most obviously the various physical
dimensions of his working environment •••• In many of
these areas the impact of a particular management
decision upon job security may be extremely indirect and
uncertain and this alone may be sufficient reason to
conclude that such decisions are not 'with respect to
•••• conditions of employment.' •••• Nothing the Court
holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to
bargain
collectively
regarding
such
managerial
decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial
control. (Fibreboard at 223)
Justice Stewart noted that

there are some managerial rights, not

listed in the statute, that should not be labeled as subjects of
mandatory bargaining.
Currently, the test used by the NLRB to determine whether a
management decision is subject to bargaining under the NLRA is based
on the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. First National Maintenance
That test is whether the subject

Corp., 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
proposed

for

discussion

is

amenable

to

resolution

through

the

bargaining process.
This brief overview of the scope of bargaining under the NLRA
yields a perspective as to how broadly the NLRB has construed that
scope.

It must be cautioned, however, that the decisions of the

NLRB, decisions of federal courts on review, and decisions of other
state agencies are not binding on the IELRB although the IELRB may
take

into

consideration

those

decisions
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it

finds

relevant

and

(Lake Zurich School

persuasive to the case it is considering.

-

District No.

95~)

It must be noted that the NLRA is dealing with

private sector labor disputes, does not have the equivalent of the

strong management rights provision in Section 4 of the IELRA
is

not

drafted

to

accomodate

and

the unique considerations of public

education employees.

Tests

Four
permissive
Ritter's

for--Determining

article,

"The

Duty

Relations Acts," delineates
relations

boards

and

Whether

to

four

courts

a -Subject-

Bargain

·1s· .Mandatory·

Under

Education

or

Labor

tests used by state public labor

for

determining whether

a

particular

issue is a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining.

The four

tests are the minimal relations test, the significant relations test,
the primary relations test and the balancing test.
The minimal relations test is the easiest test to satisfy.
Essentially, it classifies a subject as mandatory i f it in any way
impinges

on

wages,

hours

Under this standard,

or

terms

and

conditions

of

employment.

nearly any management decision would become a

subject of mandatory bargaining.

This test is articulated and

applied in State College Educ. Ass'n. v. Pennsylvania Lab. Rel. Bd~,
337 A.2d 262 (1975).
The significant
satisfy.
wages,

relations

test

is

also

relatively easy to

It requires a significant relation between the subject and

hours

or

terms

and

conditions
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of employment.

It does not

require the balancing of the employer's interests or rights.

This

test is articulated and applied in Clark County School Dist. v. Locai
Gov't. Employee Management Relations Bd., 530 P.2d 114 (1974).
The primary relations test is more difficult to satisfy and
gives more deference to the concept of managerial rights.

It will be

satisfied only if the subject primarily relates to or affects wages,
hours or terms of conditions of employment.

A topic can have a

significant relation but not have a primary relation so the primary
relations standard is higher.
in City of

Beloit

v.

This test is articulated and applied

Wisconsin Employment

Relations

Comm'n,

242

N.W.2d 231 (1976).
The balancing test is different than the other three because
it explicitly recognizes that each side may have interests and
attempts to balance those interests.

By definition, the balancing

test must be applied on a case by case basis.
test

is

that it does

biases the outcome.

The advantage of this

not begin with a conclusive priority which
This test is articulated and applied in

~

County Bargaining Council v. Centennial School District, 685 P.2d 452
(1983).

Scope of bargaining under the.IELRA

Section 10 of the IELRA imposes the affirmative duty to
bargain on

the public employer and the exclusive

Section lO(a) requires them to:
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representative.

meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment, and to execute a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached by such obligation
provided that such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession. (IELRA, 1984)
The portion of this section dealing with the scope of
bargaining is
conditions

of

wages,

the phrase
employment."

'Wages'

hours,
is

and other terms and

fairly

straightforward.

'Wages' include salary, fringe benefits and cash bonuses.
also fairly straightforward.

'Hours' is

'Hours' is the duration of time that

the employee must spend toiling for the employer before the employee
can receive the wages and benefits.
employment'

however,

is

difficult

to

'Terms and conditions of

. ..

interpret

because

virtually

anything within the education work world could be construed as a term
or condition of employment.

However, The Act does limit the scope

somewhat in Section lO(b) and requires some specific items in
Sections lO(c) and (d).
Section lO(b) limits the scope of bargaining by labeling some
subjects of bargaining as illegal.

It states that the parties "

shall not effect or implement a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement if the implementation of that provision would be in
violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with any statute
or statutes enacted by The General Assembly of

Illinois"

1984).

provisions

The

section

does

allow

contractual

supplement Illinois state statutes pertaining to wages,
other terms and conditions of employment.
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( IELRA,
which

hours and

However, if the provisions

have the effect of "... negating, abrogating, replacing, reducing,
diminishing or limiting in any way ••• " employee rights under such
statutes, those provisions will be void and unenforceable.

However,

permissible provisions of the collective bargaining agreement will
still be valid and enforceable. (IELRA, 1984)

In short, even if the

parties agree, they may not, in any way, replace or limit employee
rights and benefits under statutes dealing with wages, hours and
employment conditions.
Sections lO(c)

and (d) have specific items which must be
First, the contract must include a

included in the contract.
grievance

resolution

procedure that applies

within the bargaining unit.
binding

arbitration

of

to all

the employees

The grievance procedure must provide for

disputes

concerning

the

administration or

interpretation of the agreement.
Second,

the

agreement

must

contain

appropriate

prohibiting strikes for the life of the agreement.
was

This provision

included so the stated purpose of the IELRA "

orderly

and

employees

and

constructive
their

relationships

employers .....

could

between
be

language

all

effected

to promote
educational
(Section

1,

IELRA, 1984).
The final affirmative requirement ia that the agreement must
be reduced to writing and signed by both parties.
The expansive language of the scope of bargaining under
Section lO(a) is somewhat limited by the language of Section 4 under
the heading of Employer Rights.

The limitation imposed is:
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Employers shall not be required to bargain over matters
of inherent managerial policy, which shall include such
areas of discretion or policy as the functions of the
employer, standards of services, its overall budget, the
organizational structure and selection of new employees
and direction of employees. (Section 4 of IELRA, 1984)
There is nothing within the wording of the statute to
indicate that the listing of the managerial policies is exhaustive.
The

policies

listed

are

definitely

managerial

rights,

other

managerial policies may be determined as inherent rights through the
interpretations of the IELRB.
However, even as employers are granted relief from bargaining
over matters

of inherent managerial policy,

bargain over the impact of policy decisions.

they are required to
Section 4 states that

employers:
Shall be required to bargain collectively with regard to'
policy matters directly affecting wages, hours and terms
and conditions of employment as well as the impact
thereon upon request by employee representatives.
(Section 4 of IELRA, 1984)
First, it should be noted that impact bargaining is only
required if the employee representative requests it.
request may well

be forgot ten or ignored,

Because an oral

it is likely that the

requests for impact bargaining will be put in written form.
Second, there is no guidance within the statute as to the
meaning of the requirement imposed.
length of

the

school

day,

while

It is clear that increasing the
arguably an inherent managerial

right, has a direct effect on the hours worked by the employee and is
a mandatory subject of bargaining.

It is not nearly as clear whether
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the elimination of interscholastic sports

is a change in working

conditions.
When read together, Sections 10 and 4 create an uneasy
tension.

Section 10 clearly requires that the employer bargain over

wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
On the other hand, Section 4 relieves the employer from the
obligation to bargain over matters of inherent managerial policy.
However, that relief does not extend to inherent managerial policies
directly

affecting

wages,

hours

and

terms

and

conditions

of

employment or from the impact of policy decisions on wages, hours and
terms and conditions of employment.
Arguably,
those areas.

any managerial decision will have an impact on

Was that the intent of the legislature?

legislature intend that a line be drawn at some point?

Or did the
To answer

these questions, it is instructive to look at the legislative record.
The Employer Rights provision did not appear in the draft
form of House Bill 1530 (later to become known as IELRA).
it

was

not

inserted

into

the

bill

amendatory veto on September 23, 1983.

until

Governor

In fact,
Thompson's

The language of the provision

is nearly identical to the Management Rights provision of the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, known in bill terms as Senate
Bi 11 536.
inclusion
sentence

The only differences in language are the titles and the
of
of

the
the

phrase

"examination

Senate

Bill

536,

techniques"
Section

4.

in

the

first

Therefore,

a

consideration of the legislative record must begin with an analysis
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of the debates concerning the scope of bargaining under Senate Bill
536°

Before the addition of the "Management Rights" language to
senate Bill 536, an important exchange took place on May 2 7, 1983
between Senator Collins,

one of

the Senate sponsors, and Senator

Keats regarding the scope of bargaining:
SENATOR KEATS:
Would the ••• would the labor board under this
legislation consider the
same
factors
as
those
considered by the NLRB in its ••• determinations; such
as, determinations of whether a subject of bargaining is
mandatory or ••• permissive in nature?
Senator Collins.
SENATOR COLLINS:
Yes.
(Senate Debate on S.B. 536, May 27, 1983)
At that point, then, the sponsors of the bill believed that
the scope of

bargaining would

be

patterned after the guidelines

established by the NLRB, as discussed earlier in this chapter.
bill was sent
added.

to

the House,

the Management Rights

The bill was referred back to the Senate.

The

provision was

On June 30, 1983

there was more interaction between Senators Collins and Karpiel to
clarify

the

meaning

of

the

Management

Rights

provision:

SENATOR COLLINS:
Yes, thank you, Mr. President and members of the Senate.
Senate Bill 536, I'm sure as you know, creates the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act. This bill has gone
to the House and has been amended, and I feel that the
final product of this bill is designed to protect the
rights of both public employers and employees and it
provides for orderly procedures for implementation and
the administration of the Act. This bill is the product
of about six months of concentrated effort of various
segments of labor, public employees, public employers,
mayors, attorneys, Chicago, industry
commerce and
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industry and many lawyers across this State. And I
personally feel that it is a workable product and that
we should concur.
The House amended this bill • • • I t
added back the management right sections that we had
previously had in the drafting of the bill •••
SENATOR KEATS:
So, if you don't mind, I'm just going to ask three
questions and the sponsor has been kind enough to •••
give some thought to these answers. Does the management
rights clause not included in Section 4 of Senate Bill
536 set forth those matters not subject to bargaining
under this Act with the intention of preserving as
management rights all areas of discretion or policy
affecting the functions of the employer?
Senator Collins.
SENATOR COLLINS:
~es.
Amendatory binding Statute /sic/ is not extended
to any of the areas of employment subject to management
discretion or policy making ••• (Senate Debate on S.B.
536, June 30, 1983)
This exchange clearly indicates that at least one sponsor saw
the Management Rights provision as one that would protect management
discretion, not subject it to mandatory bargaining.
The final

exchange on the Management

Senate Bill 536 took place on November 2, 1983.

Rights provision of
In this exchange,

Senator Greiman, another sponsor of the bill responded to questions
by Senator Karpiel:
f<AR.i?IEL:
"Representative, could you answer ••• Is there a Section
in this Bill on management rights?"
GREIMAN:
"Absolutely. Absolutely."

KARPIEL:
"Could you tell me what they include?"
GREIMAN:
"Sure. Section ••• I think it's Section IV, but we' 11
1 o o k precise 1 y at it •
0 ka y •
Section IV is two
paragraphs and it precisely sets out the rights of the
management."

KARPIEL:
"I don't have the Bill in front of me, Representative.
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Could you tell me what some of those are?"

GREIMAN:
" ••• I will give you a synopsis of it. 'Employers shall
not be required to bargain over matters of inherent
managerial policy'.
And then it suggests a number of
items which are discretionary as to that policy and deal
with the function of the employers and the standards of
service. It is quite clear."

GREIMAN:
"The management rights are quite clear.
They are
explicit. They are based on a history of the National
Labor Relations Act.
They are based on a history of
labor relations in this state, and they are some 25
lines in this Bill. And they are quite ,clear as to what
the rights of management, and they are quite awesome."
(Senate Debate on S.B. 536, November 2, 1983)
This

interaction

retain powerful

rights

clearly
in

the

reflects

bargaining

that

management

process.

It

should

certainly

indicates that the scope of bargaining is to be no broader than the
scope

under

the

NLRB,

perhaps

it

is

to

be

narrower

since

practitioners do not consider management rights to be 'awesome' under
the NLRB.
There is only one specific discussion in the legislative
history of the Employer Rights provision of IELRA.

It came after the

Governor's amendatory veto and is contained in an exchange between
Senators Buzbee and Bruce on November 2, 1983.

Senator Buzbee asked

a general question about the scope of bargaining under the IELRA and
Bruce res ponded:
SENATOR BRUCE:
Senator Buzbee, we do have a long history in the State
of Illinois, and historically, the scope of bargaining
has been very broad and this bill will not change that.
In fact, within Section 4 of the Act, it states that
"employers shall be required to bargain collectively
with regard to any matter concerning wages, hours or
conditions of employment about which they have bargained
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for and agreed to in a collective bargaining agreement
prior to the effective date of this Act." In addition
to that, the preceding paragraph puts that language in
that they shall, in fact, if they have not already
bargained, bargain over wages, hours, terms, and
conditions of employment as well as the impact thereon
upon request by employee representatives. So, in fact,
it will give the bargaining rights over wages, hours,
terms and conditions, other things mentioned in the bill
which would include, already, class size, textbook •••
selection, evaluation procedures and like ••• like things
presently in collective bargaining agreements and
presently being bargained."
This response is significant because he does not refer to the
phrase

...

policy matters directly affecting ••• " contained within

the second sentence nor attempt to broaden the traditional scope of
bargaining.

This

traditional

scope

of

bargaining,

it should be

remembered, is shaped by decisions of the NLRB.
As dis cussed earlier, the Employer Rights provision of the
IELRA was

inserted

by Governor

Thompson's

Amendatory Veto.

The

message that accompanied that action on September 23, 1983 recognized
the unique needs of schools in the area of management rights and
reflected a desire to strengthen the law in order to protect those
rights.
• • • I believe that several changes need to be made in
the legislation to create a workable and fair system
that balances the rights of educational employees with
unique managerial problems that beset educational
employers and the taxpayers who ultimately pay the bill.
(Veto Message, page 1).
The history of the IELRA makes it clear that the statute is a
result of long and concerted effort.
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It is also clear that the

statute, as enacted,

is designed to meet the unique needs of the

educational employer and employee.

Having completed the discussion

of the legislative history, decisions of the Illinois Education Labor
Relations

Board

(IELRB)

and

its

Hearing

Officers

will

now

be

considered.
There are four cases which provide some indication as to how
The cases are Heyworth School

the statute will be interpreted.

District No. 3, Case No. 84-CA-0044-S, Hearing Officer's Recommended
Decision and Ord·:r; Berkeley School District No. 87, Case No.
84-CA-0056-C,

Opinion and Order;

Carbondale Comrnuni ty High School

District No. 165, Case No. 84-CA-0057-S Opinion and Order; and
Community Unit School District No.4, Case No. 84-CA-0015-S, Hearing
Officer's Recommended Decision and Order.
Heyworth was· an early case under IELRA, the charge being made
on

September

5,

1984.

It

was

the

first

to

deal

with

the

interpretation of "hours" under the statute and is instructive for
that purpose.

Briefly, the following facts lead to the charge that

the school board was refusing to bargain over a mandatory topic.
Prior to June 6, 1984 there had never been an employee
organization within

the school dlstrict.

The Heyworth Education

Association was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative
of

the teachers on June 6,

1984.

The bargaining representative

requested that collective bargaining begin on June 19, 1984 and the
first bargaining session was held on July 26, 1984.

On July 25, 1984

the school district announced that the working day of the teachers
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The School District's

bad been increased by 15 minutes each day.

bargaining representative did not discuss the change at the July 26
On July 26, the school district informed the

bargaining session.
employees'

bargaining

representative

that

all

employees

in

the

bargaining unit would be required to attend faculty meetings one day
each month from 3:50 until 4:30.
In the hearing, the employee's representative maintained that
the unilateral change in the hours was an unlawful act because the
particular hours of employment in a day was clearly within the realm
of wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment.
The school district, looking to Section 4 of the IELRA,
argued that the change in the work day was a managerial prerogative
it

because
fundamental

to

the

concern[ ed]
existence,

a

matter

direction

of
and

educational

policy

control of a

school

" (Heyworth, p.2)

system

The Hearing Officer rejected

the

reasoning of

the School

District.
The length of an employee's work day as well as his
starting and quitting time are mandatory subjects of
bargaining, unless the phrase "hours and other terms and
conditions of employment" is devoid of meaning, it must
necessarily refer to the length of an employee's work
day and his starting and quitting time. (Heyworth, page

2).
This is an unequivocal statement about what must be bargained
in terms of hours.

The Hearing Officer went on to attempt an initial

clarification of Section 4:
Matters "fundamental" to the operation of a school
district are those matters historically recognized as
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falling outside an employee's concern, such as an
employer's budget, the nature of the service the
employer provides and its basic structure.
• •• There
can be few items of more fundamental concern to an
employee than his hours of labor and his starting and
quitting times. (Heyworth, p. 3).
The Hearing Officer found that the school district had
engaged in an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain over a
mandatory topic of bargaining.

As the remedy, he ordered the school

district to return to status quo, to cease and desist the practice,
and to provide back pay for those employee's who performed extra work
associated with the school district's unilateral change.
Heyworth stands for two important propositions.

First, any

change in the length of the work day, the starting time or the
quitting time is a mandatory topic of bargaining.

Second, the IELRB,

or at least this Hearing Officer, is going to be very hesitant about
using the provisions of Section 4 to narrQw the traditional scope of
bargaining.
Berkeley is an Opinion and Order by the full IELRB.
it

serves

as

precedent

for

future

unless modified by judicial action.

As

such,

decisions by Hearing Officers
The Opinion and Order, issued on

May 30, 1986 is one of great significance as declared by the

IELF~,

"the issue is one of first impression for this Board and presents, as
one of the parties noted, the basic and fundamental issue as to the
proper interpretation of Section 4 of the Act."

(Berkeley, p.10).

The facts of the case, briefly are as follows.

The school

district began to consider the possibility of changing from an
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interscholastic athletic
school year 1981-82.

program to an intramural program in the

Among the reasons for considered change were

the school district's desire that more students participate in the
athletic

program

and

for

reduced

costs

for

transportation

and

referees.
During the 1983-84 school year the school district began to
consider the change even more seriously and developed proposals for
the school board to consider.

The school board voted to implement

the change effective school year 1984-85 on June 25, 1984.
The

school

board,

in

accordance

with

its

collective

bargaining agreement, sent a copy of its minutes to the president of
the

teachers'

association with the following

statement about

the

change:
That
the
Board
approved
the
change
from
an
interscholastic athletic program to an intramural
athletic program in the Middle schools, effective with
the start of the 1984-85 school year and as previously
discussed at an Education and Finance Committee meeting.
(Berkeley, page 3).
The School Board implemented the change on September 19, 1984
while negotiations

for a collective bargaining agreement

for

the

1984-85 school year were still underway.
The athletic program change was first raised as an issue at
the bargaining table on September 18, 1984.
informal
formal

discussions

demand

between

the

Although there had been

bargaining

representatives,

to bargain was made before that date.

no

The school

district listened to the demand, caucused and returned to notify the
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teacher's agent

that it would not bargain about

adopt an intramural athletic program.

the decision to

The school district invoked

the protection of Section 4 and claimed that the decision was
managerial in nature and not subject to the duty to bargain.
The issue was raised again at the September 24 bargaining
session.

The school district held firm in its position but stated

that it was ready to negotiate the impact of the change.

On October

5, the teachers' representative proposed that the coaches be paid at
the rate of $10.50 an hour.

The school district presented a counter

proposal on October 9 that offered compensation of $64 a week for a
program that lasted from 3:15 until 5:00, four days a week.

The

bargaining representative filed the unfair labor charge on October
10.
There were several points at issue in the case, including
jurisdictional issue and a question of mootness.

The issue of

importance for the discussion at hand, however, is whether the school
district committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain
over its decision.
The

IELRB began its analysis with a consideration of the

wording of Section 10.

However, the phrasing of the question before

it gives the careful reader some idea of how the analysis might go.
On page 9 of the opinion, the IELRB phrased the issue before it as
" ••• whether the District was obligated to bargain in good faith over
its decision to change the focus and nature of its athletic program."
The key words in that phrase are "focus and nature".
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The earlier

discussion in this paper that dealt with the traditional scope of
bargaining under the NLRA pointed out that a change in the focus and
nature of a business were not subject to the duty to bargain.
At any rate, the Board's analysis began with the wording of
section 10 and it quickly determined that decision was not subject to
the duty to bargain under that Section:
It seems clear on its face, and is apparently at least
impliedly acknowledged by both parties here, that the
decision about the kind of athletic program the District
considered most appropriate for its students would not
be considered "wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment:, and thus would not be a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, under
accepted
public
and
private
sector
precedent
interpreting the "traditional" scope language of Section
10. (Berkeley, p.3)
However, the basic argument of the teacher's representative
was not that Section 10 required that the decision be bargained but
that Section 4 requires bargaining because the decision was
policy

matter

directly

affecting

wages,

hours,

and

••• a

tenns

and

conditions of employment ..... of the junior high coaches.
The

IELRB acknowledged that the meaning of Section 4 was

unclear on its face.
teachers'
policy

representative's

matters

"directly"
employment.

(Berkeley, page 11).

are

affect
The

position

subject
wages,
IELRB

to

as

maintaining

collective

hours

and

characterized

It characterized the

terms
the

that

bargaining
and
school

inherent
if

they

conditions

of

district

as

disagreeing with the teacher's position because to adhere to that
interpretation would •••• "contradict(s) the plain meaning of the first
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sentence of the section and would render Section 4 meaningless
because

almost

every managerial

decision

directly

affects

wages,

hours and terms and conditions of employment."
After acknowledging that the statute contained nothing that
would

help

clarify

the

situation,

the

IELRB

went

through

the

legislative history in the same fashion as presented in pages 28-32
of this work.

At the end of that process, the IELRB concluded that:
We
find no intention expressed in any of
this
legislative or veto history on either 536 or 1530 that
the Section 4 language in either Act was meant to
significantly broaden the scope of mandatory subjects of
bargaining and thus radically shift the thrust of these
Acts away from the intention to follow traditional,
accepted and known public and private sector practice
with respect to mandatory bargaining, as expressed in
the legislature on May 27, 1983 (536) and June 27, 1983
(1530).
Indeed, quite the contrary seems to be the
case.
Yet, the ultimate effect of accepting the
Association's position on Section 4 would be that the
"Employer Rights"
provision of our statute would
crucially restrict and diminish rather than protect
so-called "inherent management rights."
There is no
evidence that this is what was intended by the
legislature. (Berkeley, page 17).

In short, the IELRB rejected the position of the bargaining
representative because 1) to allow it would broaden the traditional
scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining and 2) restrict management
rights.

Neither of those possibilities were supported by the

legislative record.
The IELRB was still faced with the question of how Section 4
was

to be construed if the

rejected.

It

followed

teachers'

judicially

interpretation was

recognized

rules

of

to be

statutory

construction and construed the meaning of the section from the
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context of the section and the statute as a whole.

Therefore, it

looked to the language and to the object and purpose of Section 4 as
expressed by Governor Thompson in his amendatory veto message.

The

expressed purpose of that message was to balance the right to bargain
collectively with the unique managerial problems facing educational
employers

as

well

as

protect

the

(Amendatory veto message, page 1)

rights

of

the

taxpayers.

The IELRB then came to this

conclusion:
In our judgment, the interpretation of Section 4 most
consistent with a reasoned attempt to relate each of the
sentences and phrases of Section 4 to the underlying
purpose of the entire Section and to the legislative
history is that "policy matters directly affecting
wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment" are
those policies that have wages, hours and terms and
conditions of employment as their primary subject;
clearly,
decisions
concerning
such
policies
are
mandatory subjects of bargaining. However, the inherent
managerial policy decision involved here -- a change in
the nature of the District's athletic program -- does
not have wages, hours and terms and conditions of
employment as its primary subject and only indirectly
affects those matters; thus it is not a mandatory
subject of bargaining. (Berkeley, p. 18).
By coming to this conclusion, the IELRB essentially embraced
the primary relations test discussed earlier in this chapter.

The

IELRB also took this opportunity to carefully distinguish the IELRA
from the Pennsylvania statute mentioned earlier.

It noted that:

In Pennsylvania, employers are enjoined only to "meet
and
discuss,"
not
to
engage
in
good
faith
bargaining," ••• over policy matters affecting wages,
hours ..... Under our Section 4, formal, good faith
bargaining,
not
"meet( ing)
and
discuss( ing)"
is
mandated, but only with respect to " ••• policy matters
that directly affect wages, hours ..... (emphasis added).
These differences -- "meet and discuss" versus "bargain"
and the crucial addition of the word "directly" as a
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qualifier of "policies affecting" are, in our estimation
significant enough to render Pennsylvania precedent not
particularly useful as a guide to our deliberations in
this case under our statute. (Berkeley, p.19).
Thus, although the language of Section 4 of the IELRA was
clearly based on the Pennsylvania statute the IELRB has made it clear
that it will not be bound by Pennsylvania precedent.
The IELRB also found that the school district did have a duty
to bargain the impact of the decision.

It further found that the

school district met that duty by offering to bargain, and indeed
bargaining, as soon as the bargaining representative of the teacher
made a demand to bargain.
This
propositions.

case,

then,

stands

for

three

very

important

First, the IELRB will rely upon the words and context

of the statute as well as the legislative history to interpret the
This is significant because it gives the

meaning of the statute.

IELRB much greater latitude in coming to decisions.
Second, the IELRB intends to give import to the concept of
employer rights.
quarters

that

This should help to allay the fears held in some
the

IELRB

is

an

employee

oriented

body.

More

importantly, it established that educational employers are unique and
the management rights possessed by them are important to the public
good.
Third, the IELRB will use the primary relations test in
determining if a

policy

topics of bargaining.

decision directly affects

the mandatory

It is not, of course, clear what decisions
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will be construed as directly affecting the topic of mandatory
bargaining.

However, at least there is now an articulated test for

coming to that determination.
Finally, although the case cannot be considered as standing
for a proposition in this area, the IELRB left open the possibility
that it might even consider narrowing the scope of bargaining given
the unique managerial needs of educational employers.
The same day that the IELRB decided Berkeley, it also decided
Carbondale.
might

be

In Carbondale, the school district determined that it
more

economically

efficient

for

its

custodial

and

maintenance work to be sub-contracted than for it to continue to be
done by members of a recognized bargaining unit.

The school district

notified the employee's group of its interest in sub-contracting and
invited the employee's group to work with the school district in
exploring ways that costs might be contained.

When the school

district decided that the possibility merited serious consideration,
it invited the employee group to bargain over the decision.

The

school district did finally sub-contract the work and an unfair labor
charge was filed.
Carbondale is of primary importance for its analysis of what
kind of bargaining must occur if an employer wishes to avoid unfair
labor charges.
that

the

However, it also clearly stands for the proposition

sub-contracting

of

work

is

a

mandatory

subject

of

bargaining. (Carbondale, p 9, 11)
Community Unit School District No. 4 is a Hearing Officer's
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Recommended Decision and Order that was issued on June 20,

1986.

Exceptions have been filed by the teacher's union so the decision is
not final.

However, the decision was based on Berkeley so there is a

substantive basis for the decision.

Briefly, the facts of the case

are as follows.
Prior to 1984, the school district employed both counselors
and deans at its two high schools.

Counselors worked primarily with

the students' personal, emotional and academic needs while the deans
dealt primarily with attendance and disciplinary problems.

However,

the duties of the two groups were inter-related and overlapped.

The

counselors were in the bargaining unit but the deans were not.
In April of 1984, the principal of one of the high schools
told the counselors and the deans that the school district was
considering

the

creation

of

a

new

administrative

position

combining the separate positions of dean and counselor.

by

The deans

and counselors of the other high school did not learn of the
possibility of the change until the afternoon of May 24, 1984 when
they were told that the change would be proposed at the Board of
Education meeting scheduled for that evening.
At the Board of Education meeting on the evening of May 24,
the school district announced that there would be a reorganization of
the services beginning with the school year 1984-85.
meeting,

the

president of

the

teachers'

At that

union requested that the

school district bargain over both the reorganization and over the
impact of the decision.
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The school district refused to bargain over the decision to
reorganize and implemented the plan on August 1, 1984.
terminations as a result of the decision.

There were no

The school district also

refused to bargain over the impact of the decision.
The Hearing Officer de::._ rmined, based upon the record, that
the decision was not mo::ivated by a desire to reduce labor costs or
that

the

decision

was

by

anti-union

animus.

The

Hearin;;

Officer

began his analysis by noting that the IELRB had not yet considered
whether

a

subject

of

decision

to

mandatory

reorganize
bargaining

School District No. 4, p. 10).

student
under

service

Section

10

programs
(Community

under Lake Zurich School District No.
consideration

those

cases

relevant to the case at hand.
analysis with a U.S.

a

Unit

He noted that decisions of the NLRB,

federal courts and other state agencies were not binding.

into

was

However,

95, he was empowered to take

he considered

to

be

pE:rsuasive and

With that empowerment, he began his

Supreme Court decision, NLRB v.

First National

Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. 666(1981).
In

First National Maintenance,

the Supreme Court held that

the employer's decision to terminate part of its operation was not a
mandatory subject of

bargaining.

The court stated the premise

underlying mandatory bargaining " ••• that collective bargaining backed
by the parties economic weapons will result in a decision better for
both management and labor and for society as a whole ••• " and went on
to point out that this premise is only valid if the subject proposed
as a mandatory subject of

bargaining is
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amenable to resolution

through the bargaining process.
The Hearing Officer also cited Otis Elevator, 269 NLRB 891

(! 984) where it was held that an employer's decision to consolidate
its operations to eliminate overlapping functions was not a mandatory
subject of bargaining.

The Hearing Officer noted that under the NLRB

analysis discussed earlier in this chapter, an employer's decision is
not a mandatory subject of bargaining where the decision does not
turn upon labor costs.
The findings of fact had already established that it was not
a desire to save labor costs that motivated the decision but rather a
desire to eliminate inefficiency.

That finding of fact, coupled with

the analysis of the NLRB led to the conclusion that the decision was
not a mandatory subject of bargaining under Section 10.
The Hearing Officer also found that the decision was a matter
of inherent managerial policy under Section 4.

'

He based that

decision on the "primary subject" analysis established in Berkeley
and found that:
The primary subject of this policy decision is not
wages, hours or terms and conditions of employment, but
rather a change in the methods of providing student
services.
The impact of that decision on wages, hours
and terms and conditions of employment thus only
indirect. (Community Unit School District No.4, p. 14)
The Hearing Officer did find that the school district was
guilty of an unfair labor charge for failing to bargain the impact of
the decision after a demand to bargain was made by the teacher's
union.
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This
NLRB

decision is significant for

analysis

used

by

the

Hearing

two

First,

reasons.

Officer gives

school

the

districts

potential defenses against unfair labor charges of failure to bargain
such issues as

teacher evaluation, class size and curriculum.

instance,

a

school

amenable

to

the

district might
collective

argue

that

bargaining

the

process

decision is
or

that

it

For
not
was

motivated by a desire to save on labor costs.
Second, it is the first case to use the analysis enunciated
by the IELRB in the Berkeley decision.
precedent is of particular importance.

This acknowledgment of

The composition of the IELRB

is subject to change, and with change, may vary interpretation of the
issues

before

it.

However,

well

established

precedent

imposes

constraints upon those possible variations.
The
for

preceding discussion provides

considering

following

how

topics

are

the

IELRB is

subjects

of

likely

the
to

analytical

framework

determine whether

mandatory

bargaining:

teacher

evaluation, class size, teaching assignments and curriculum.
the topics is presented separately.

the

Each of

Consideration will be given to

the decisions of other states, Illinois legislative history, and any
Illinois decisions that have bearing on that particular issue.

Teacher Evaluations

The question of whether

teacher

evaluation is

a

mandatory

subject of bargaining is currently of great concern to both employee
groups

and school

districts.

A major
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reason

for

this

heightened

concern is the amendment to the Illinois School Code which states
..... a

school

district

shall

develop,

in

co-operation

with

its

teachers, or where applicable the exclusive bargaining representative
of its teachers, an evaluation plan for all teachers in contractual
continued service" (Section 24A-4)
The

language of Section 24A-4 makes it clear that school

districts must at least "meet and confer" with teachers regarding the
evaluation plan.

However, the statutory provision does not directly

address the bargainability of the issues.

In addition, the issue of

teacher evaluation is not addressed in either Section 4 or Section 10
of the IELRA.
Employee groups would like to see the evaluation process and
the evaluation standards treated as mandatory subjects of bargaining.
In order to support this view, the assertion would be that by virtue
of Sections 10 and 4 of the IELRA, anything that is, or affects, a
term

or

condition

bargaining.

of

employment,

is

a

mandatory

subject

of

Teacher evaluations would be construed as a term or

condition of employment,

or at least directly affecting terms and

conditions of employment, and thus a subject of mandatory bargaining
under Sections 10 or 4.

Several states have determined that teacher

evaluations are a subject of mandatory bargaining.

Cases from

Michigan and Indiana are cited to support this position.
Michigan
The

first

case

is

Central

Michigan

University

Faculty

Association v. Central Michigan University, 273 N.W. 2d 21 (1978),
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decided by the Michigan Supreme Court.
In that case, the Faculty Senate passed a resolution adopting
a teaching effectiveness program.

As part of that program, students

and department faculty would evaluate faculty members.
were

to

be

utilized

in

departmental

re-appointment, tenure and promotion.

The results

recommendations

for

The Faculty Association filed

an unfair labor charge against the University.

The charge was based

on the claim that the adoption of the program was a unilateral change
in the terms and conditions of employment and thus a violation of the
duty imposed by Section 423.15 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
The court determined that in this case, the evaluation
procedures were a subject of mandatory bargaining (Central
1978, p.25).

Michigan~

In reaching this conclusion, the court used a two step

process.
First, the court looked to the interpretation of the NLRA.
It noted that the U.S.

Supreme Court has found that a liberal

approach to what constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining is the
best way to attain the objective of labor peace.

This approach

shaped Michigan's view and the court asserted that " ••• Michigan hci.s
adopted a broad view of other terms and conditions of employment."
(Central Michigan, p. 25.)
The second step was to borrow the analysis from another
public employee sector case, Detroit Police Officers Association v.
Detroit, 214 N.W. 2d 803 (1974).

In that case, the court had looked

at private sector rulings for guidance and found that "such subjects
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as

••• seniority

bargaining."

and

promotion

are •••

mandatory

subjects

of

(Detroit Police Officers, p.809).

Because the results of the evaluations were going to be
considered

in decisions

to promote,

retain and grant tenure,

the

court determined that the evaluation process was a mandatory subject
of bargaining.

(Cent. Michigan, p.25)

There are two important points to be remembered when applying
this result to situations in Illinois.
rights clause in the Michigan statute.

First, there is no management
This allows a potentially

wider scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining in Michigan.
Second,
retention,

it

was

re-appointment

because
and

the

evaluations

promotion decisions

deemed them mandatory subjects of bargaining.

were
that

used
the

in

court

The record does not

indicate that the University ever argued that the decision was an
educational policy decision and thus excluded from the bargaining
process because it was an "inherent ·managerial policy."
Indiana
The second case is Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation
v. Roberts, 405 NE 2d 895, decided by the Indiana Supreme Court.

In

that case, the school corporation (district) implemented a teacher
evaluation plan without any discussion with the exclusive bargaining
The purpose of the plan was to

representative for the teachers.

maintain high teacher competence by means of self-evaluation forms,
classroom observations by evaluators and evaluation conferences.
record

indicates

that,

"the

entire
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process

may

result

The
in

a

recommendation for a change of assignment or a teacher dismissal .....
(Evansville-Vanderburgh, p.

898).

The school corporation had met

with a group of teachers, not members of the bargaining unit, before
the implementation of the plan.

An

unfair

labor

charge

was

filed

by

a

member

of

the

bargaining unit, alleging that the school corporation had violated
Indiana Code 20-7.5-1-5

by failing

to discuss

the plan with the

exclusive bargaining representative before implementing the change.
The applicable portion of that Section provides:

A school employer shall discuss with the exclusive
representative of certificated employees, and may but
shall not be required to bargain collectively, negotiate
or enter into a written contract concerning or be
subject to or enter into impasse procedures on the
following matters: working conditions, other than those
provided in Section 4; curriculum development and
revision,
textbook
selection;
teaching
methods;
selection, assignment or promotion of personnel; student
discipline;
expulsion or supervision of students;
pupil-teacher
ratio;
class
size
or
budget
appropriations ••• (20-7.5-1-5-(a))
Because of the stated philosophy of the plan, and the fact
that the results could result in a change of assignment or dismissal,
the court determined that this particular teacher evaluation plan was
a "working condition."

(Evansville-Vanderburgh, p. 898)

There are three important points to remember when applying
this decision to Illinois situations.

First, a careful reading of

20-7.5-1-5 reveals that the charge was based on a failure to meet and
confer, not on a failure to bargain over a mandatory subject.
section

clearly

says

that

the

school
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corporation

may

The

bargain

collectively over the enumerated matters but shall not be required to
bargain over those matters.

The court's decision did not establish

that the evaluation plan was a mandatory subject of bargaining.

It

simply

of

established

that

the

plan

was

a

mandatory

subject

The court went to some length to make that clear by

discussion.

citing Indiana Code 20-7.5-1-2 (0):
'discuss' means the performance of the mutual obligation
of the school corporation through its superintendent and
the exclusive representative to meet at reasonable times
to discuss, to provide meaningful input, to exchange
points of view, with respect to items enumerated in
Section 5 of this chapter.
This obligation shall not,
however, require either party to enter into a contract,
to agree to a proposal, or to require the making of a
concession. A failure to reach an agreement on any
matter of discussion shall not require the use of any
part of the impasse procedure •••
This definition of 'discuss' makes it abundantly clear that the court
did not perceive the plan to be a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Second, there is no provision similar to Illinois' Section 4
that

protects

inherent

mandatory bargaining.

managerial

policies

from

the

scope

of

Because of that lack, there was no argument

made that the primary purpose of the plan was related to educational
policy.

Teacher evaluation was clearly a working condition under the

meet and confer requirements of 20-7.5-1-5.
Under the evaluation plan, the evaluation process mlght
result in a recommendation for an assignment change or a dismissal.
This

would

regarding

clearly fall
selection,

within

the meet and confer requirements

assignment

or

contained in Section 20-7.5-1-5.
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promotion

of

personnel

as

It is the clarity of that statutory language that led the
court to its decision.

The court did not consider whether the

primary purpose of the plan was related to educational policy.
fact,

In

the court did not at all consider the policy underlying the

decision.
Third,

the

Illinois

statute

does

not

have

comparable to Section 20-7.5-1-5 of the Indiana Code.

a

provision

There is no

listing of subjects in the Illinois Statute that the employer is
required to discuss although not required to reach agreement on.
As discussed earlier, the approach of the IELRA is similar to
that of the NLRA when dealing with the scope of bargaining.

There

are mandatory, permissive and illegal subjects of bargaining.

There

is no fourth category of mandatorily "discussable" topics.

Because

of the unique category contained in Indiana law, it is misleading to
look to Indiana law in this area.
Proponents of the view that teacher evaluations are not a
subject of mandatory bargaining will find support in a series of
court decisions from the states of Kansas, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and
Oregon.

The courts of these states have determined, with different

variations,

that teacher evaluation is not a subject of mandatory

bargaining.
Kansas
The seminal case in
Association of

th~

s~ate

Shawnee Mission v.

of Kansas is National Education
Board of Education of

Shawnee

Mission Unified School District No. 512, 512 p. 2d 426 (1973).
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At

that time, school districts negotiated under the authority of the
Kansas

Professional

organizations

and

Negotiations Act.
school

districts

That Act
to

bargain

required
over

teacher

"terms

and

conditions of professional service."
Shawnee Mission was the first case to interpret the scope of
bargaining under this Act.

In that case, the school board had

submitted two items for negotiation and the teachers' organization
had submitted a master contract of 123 pages containing 22 sections
and 122 subsections.
The major issue before the court was how to determine what
were subjects of mandatory bargaining so that the impasse could be
resolved and the parties could get back to the table.

The court

chose to use the following approach in interpreting the Act.
The "terms and conditions of professional service" which
are negotiable under the act are something more than the
minimal economic terms of wages and hours, but something
less than the basic educational policies of the board of
education. The key to determining whether an issue is
negotiable or not is an assessment of how direct an
impact it has on the well-being of the individual
teacher, as opposed to its effect on the operation of
the school system as a whole.
Such assessment must be
made on a case-by-case basis. (Shawnee-M.ission, p.427.
Using this analysis,
conditions

of

the court determined that "terms and

professional service"

included salaries,

hours

and

amounts of work, vacation allowance, holidays, sick leave, personal
leave, insurance benefits, wearing apparel, jury duty, and grievance
procedures.
organization

The court also agreed with the position of the teachers'
that

mandatory

subjects
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of

bargaining

included

transfers,

probationary

period,

disciplinary

procedure,

contracts.

and

teacher

resignations

appraisal
and

procedure,

terminations

of

Therefore, under Shawnee Mission, teacher evaluation was

a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The Kansas legislature took note of the decision in Shawnee
Mission and amended K. s.A. 72-5413 in 1977.

The amendment defined

"terms and conditions of professional service" as follows:
"(!)'Terms and conditions of professional service' means
salaries and wages, hours and amounts of work, vacation
allowance, holiday, sick and other leave, number of
holidays,
retirement,
insurance
benefits,
wearing
apparel,
pay for overtime,
jury duty,
grievance
procedure,
disciplinary
procedure,
resignations,
termination of contracts, matters which have a greater
direct impact on the well-being of the individual
professional employee than on the operation of the
school system in the school district or of the comm.unity
junior college and such other matters as the parties
mutually agree upon as properly related to professional
service. Nothing in this act, or the act of which this
section is amendatory, shall authorize the adjustment or
change of such matters which have been fixed by statute
or by the constitution of this state."
This was how the law read when the National Education-Topeka
and Unified School District No. 501 began negotiations for the
1978-79 school year.

The law was interpreted in the court case that

ensued when the two parties could not reach agreement.
N.E.A.-Topeka v USD 501. 502 P.2d 93 (1979).

That case is

The court was concerned

with interpreting the scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining under
the revised statute.

In doing so, it noted that the statute had

incorporated the impact test enunciated in Shawnee Mission.

That is,

mandatory subjects of bargaining included those matters "which have a
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greater impact on the well being of the individual employee than on
the operation of the school system."
The court also noted that the legislature, in providing a
definition
specifically

of

terms

excluded

and

conditions

of

probationary period,

professional
transfers

and

service,
teacher

appraisal procedures (teacher evaluations) from the list of mandatory
subjects of bargaining, (N.E.A.-Topeka, p.97).
The court

then refused

to include teacher evaluations as

being subjects of mandatory bargaining because it did not satisfy the
impact test.
There are three important aspects of this case for those
seeking to use it in interpreting Illinois law.

First, there is no

management rights clause in the Kansas statute that is comparable to
the one found in the Illinois statute.

Therefore, the Kansas statute

cannot be used to help interpret Section 4 of the IELRA.
Second, the court looked at legislative intent for assistance
in interpreting the statute.

The legislature had opted to exclude

teacher evaluation in a defined list of mandatory subjects of
bargaining.

However, it had provided the opportunity for judicial

interpretation by allowing subjects that satisfied the impact test to
be determined as mandatory topics of bargaining.
The third important aspect is that the court considered the
impact test, as provided in the statute and enunciated in Shawnee
Mission, and declined to say that teacher evaluation satisfied that
test.
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Minnesota
The Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act imposes a
duty upon public employers to bargain in good faith concerning terms
and conditions of employment.

This obligation is imposed by Section

179.61 of the Minnesota Statutes.
The Minnesota Act also includes a managerial rights section
in Section 179.66.

In part, that section reads:

Subdivision 1.
A public employer is not required to
meet and negotiate on matters of inherent managerial
policy, which include, but are not limited to, such
areas of discretion or policy as the functions and
programs
of
the
employer,
its
overall
budget,
utilization of technology, the organizational structure
and selection and direction and number of personnel.
This section is quite similar to the Illinois Act.

Both Acts

identify matters of inherent managerial policy as functions of the
employer, the overall budget, the organizational structure and the
selection and direction of employees.

The Minnesota Act specifically

includes programs, utilization of technology and number of employees
while the Illinois statute does not specifically mention those items.
The

Illinois

statute

specifically includes

standard

of

services,

while the Minnesota Act does not use those terms.
The similarity of the Illinois and Minnesota statutes makes
it particularly appropriate to look to Minnesota cases to determine
i f teacher evaluations are a mandatory subject of bargaining or an

employer right.
At this time, there is only one Minnesota case that addresses
this

question.

That case is University Education Association v.
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Regents of the University of Minnesota, 353 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 1984).
In that case, the University Education Association (UEA) alleged that

the Board of Regents had committed an unfair labor practice by
refusing

to

bargain

the

subjective

criteria

used

to

determine

promotion and tenure, review of faculty evaluations and the academic
calendar.

The Minnesota Supreme Court found that all three of these

issues were matters of inherent managerial policy.
The basis of the NEA' s argument was that the three matters
all had a significant impact on faculty job security, advancement,
compensation and work assignment

so were terms and conditions of

employment. (University Education Association, p. 537.)
The court began its analysis by noting that:
This court has repeatedly emphasized that the purpose of
PELRA requires the scope of the mandatory bargaining
area to be broadly construed so that the purpose of
resolving labor disputes through negotiation could best
be served. (University Education Association, p. 578).
However, it also noted that a string of Minnesota decisions
recognized " ••• that many inherent managerial policies concomitantly
and directly affect the terms

and conditions of employment." (Id at

539).
Because areas of 'inherent managerial policy' and 'terms and
conditions of employment' often overlap, the court had to establish a
test for determining how an issue would be categorized.
The

court

had

established

such

a

test

in

St.

Paul

Firefighters, Local 21 v. City of St. Paul, 336 N.W.2d 301 (Minn.
1983).

The court established the basic approach as follows:

57

A decision in respect of a matter of inherent managerial
policy--a discretionary decision which a public employer
is not required to negotiate--may well impinge upon
negotiable
terms
and
conditions
of
employment.
Minn.Stat. S 179.66 (1982).
The impact upon the terms
and conditions of employment of an inherent managerial
policy decision does not, however, render the policy
decision a subject of mandatory negotiation if the
decision and its implementation are so inextricably
interwoven that requiring the public employer to meet
and negotiate the method of carrying out its decision
would require the employer to negotiate the basic policy
decision. See Minneapolis Association of Administrators
and Consultants v. Minneapolis Special School District
No. 1, 311 N.W. 2d 474, 476-77 (Minn. 1981).
If,
however, the inherent managerial policy decision is
severable from its implementation,
the effect of
implementation on the terms and conditions of employment
is negotiable to the extent that negotiation is not
likely to hamper the employer's direction of its
functions, and objectives.
Minneapolis Federation of
Teachers,
Local 59 v.
Minneapolis
Special School
District No. 1, 258 N.W. 2d 802, 805 (Minn. 1977);
International Union of Operating Engineers v. City of
Minneapolis, 305 Minn, 364, 233 N.W. 2d 748 (1975).
(St. Paul Fire Fighters, 336 N.W. 2d at ·302.)
Essentially,

the

approach

Fighters is a two- part test.

established

by

St.

Paul

Fire

First, the impact of a policy decision

upon terms and conditions of employment must be determined.

If the

policy impinges upon mandatory subjects of bargaining, the court must
then determine if the policy and 'terms and conditions of employment'
are

so interwoven that negotiation of the issue would require

negotiation of the policy.

If they can be separated, bargaining is

mandatory for the issues relating to the implementation of the
policy.
After establishing that

this was

court addressed each of the three issues.

58

the proper approach,

the

It dealt with the issue of

faculty evaluations in two brief paragraphs on page 542 of the
opinion:
The MEA argues that the faculty has a direct interest in
assuring that evaluations are fair, accurate and
properly used. The faculty evaluation issue relates to
all faculty and consequently is an issue separate from
tenure and promotion.
The substantive criteria, weights and review of faculty
evaluations are undoubtedly managerial matters while the
application of the evaluations is an issue that may
directly affect a faculty member's terms and conditions
of employment.
The fairness of the application of
faculty evaluation standards
is
ensured by
the
negotiability of the tenure and promotion procedural
process. It is obvious that the quality of work an
employer, public or private, expects is a managerial
decision. (University Education Association, p. 542)
It

between

is important to note that the court saw a distinction

the

substantive

criteria,

weights

and

review of

evaluations and the application of those evaluations.
distinction is also

faculty

This kind of

recognized in Section 4 of the IELRA by the

impact bargaining provision.
This case is significant for three reasons.

The first is

that it involves a statute with an employer's rights provision
similar to that of the IELRA.
The second is that in creating an approach to the dilemma
created by the employer's rights provision, the court realized that
there would often be an overlapping between subjects of mandatory
bargaining and matters of inherent managerial policy.

The approach

recognizes that and acknowledges that a balance must be struck that
will fulfill the legislative purposes of the Act.
The third important aspect of the case is the distinction the
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court made as discussed above.

This distinction may be analogized to

the provisions of Section 4 of the IELRA and will be referred to
later in this discussion.
WisconSin
Wisconsin's statute establishing the right of bargaining in
the public sector is found in Section lll.70(1)(d) of the Wisconsin
Statutes.

The

representatives

statute
to

requires

bargain

conditions of employment.

public

with

respect

employers
to

and

wages,

employee

hours

and

The statute does not have as an employer's

rights provision as explicit as the Illinois Act.

However, it does

reserve some power to management within the statute:
The employer shall not be required to bargain on
subjects reserved to management and direction of the
governmental unit except insofar as the manner of
exercise of such functions affects the wages, hours and
conditions of employment of the employees.
It

is

important to note that those management rights are

limited if the exercise of them affects the wages, hours and
conditions of employment of the employee.
The most significant case to date in interpreting the scope
of

bargaining

in

Wisconsin

Employment, Etc, 242 N.W.

is

City

of

Beloit,

2nd 231 (Wis. 1976).

Etc.

v.

Wis.

In this case, the

Beloit Education Association (BEA) and the Beloit City School Board
could not agree whether a list of eleven topics were mandatory or
permissive subjects of bargaining under the Wisconsin statute.

The

eleven subjects were:
(1)

the manner in which supervision and evaluation of
teachers will be conducted,
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(2)

the structure and maintenance and availability to
teachers of school district files and records,
(3) right of representation prior to reprimand, warning
or discipline,
(4) whether or not "just cause" shall be the standard
applied in limitation of the Board's actions with
respect
to
renewal
of
individual
teachers
contracts,
(5) the procedure and order of preference to be
utilized in event of teacher layoffs,
(6) the treatment and disposition of problem students,
(7) class size,
(8) type and extent of in-service training to be
conducted,
(9) the type and extent of reading program to be
utilized,
(10) the establishment and structure of summer programs,
(11) the school calendar.
Because they could not agree, they took advantage of a
provision in the statute that allowed them to submit the list to the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission for a declaratory ruling on
The Commission issued a declaratory

whether they were mandatory.

ruling and the ruling was appealed.
The court first discussed the statute, the limitations on the
scope of the bargaining and the nature· of the parties.

When it came

to the discussion of the problem, the court stated that the problem
with interpreting the statute was that many subject areas relating to
wages, hours and conditions of employment also had " ••• a relatedness
to

matters

of

educational

policy

and

school

management

and

operation." (City of Beloit, 235).
After defining the problem, the court considered how to best
construe

the

statute.

The

court

concluded

that

"What

is

fundamentally or basically or essentially a matter involving wages,

61

hours and conditions of employment, is, under the statute, a matter
that is required to be bargained."

(Id, at 236).

This kind of test,

by necessity, must be applied on a case by case basis.
The court then applied this test to the question of teacher
evaluations.

The court acknowledged that the area of teacher

evaluation related to management and direction as well as to wages,
hours and conditions of employment using the primary relations test,
the court held that

BEA proposals

regarding who was

to evaluate

teacher performance and assistance to teachers with poor evaluations
were not mandatory subjects of bargaining.

However, five proposals

went "to the right of teachers to have notice and input into
procedures that affect their job security," (Id., at 237.)

Those

five proposals were:
Teacher Supervision and Evaluation ( 1) Orientation of
new teachers as to evaluative procedures and techniques,
(2) Length of observation period and openness of
observation, (3) Number and frequency of observations,
(4) Copies of observation reports and conferences
regarding same, and teachers' objections to evaluations,
and (5) Notification of complaints made by parents,
students and others. (Id., Footnote 16 at 237)
There are three important aspects to be remembered when
applying this case to Illinois.

First, the employer's rights clause

in Wisconsin is not as strong as that in Illinois.
Second, the court did not address the negotiability of
criteria.

That is important because many school districts are

willing to concede the negotiability of procedures but will maintain
that

criteria

are

strictly

matters
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of

educational

policy

and

therefore insulated by Section 4.
Third,

the

language

of

Section

4

only

requires

the

negotiation of policy matters "directly" affecting wages, hours and
terms and conditions of employment.

Arguably, this is a different

test than the primary relations test applied by the Wisconsin court.
Oregon
Oregon's Public Employment Collective Bargaining Act, found
in the Oregon Revised Statutes, Section 243. 650 et seq., requires
public employer to bargain in good faith over "matters concerning
direct or indirect monetary benefits, hours, vacations, sick leave,
grievance procedures and other conditions
Revised Statutes, Section 243.650 [7]).

of employment."

(Oregon

Oregon has elected to use a

balancing approach to determine the scope of bargaining when dealing
with school districts.

That approach "weighs the comparative effect

of a proposed bargaining subject on educational policy and on teacher
employment

conditions •••• "

East

County

Bargaining

Council

v.

Centennial School District No. 28JT, 685 P. 2d 453 at 454 (Or. App.
1984).
This approach was adopted by Oregon's Supreme Court in a 1980
decision, Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 621 P.2d. 547
(Ore.

1980).

That

decision developed

a three-part

standard for

applying the balancing approach to teacher evaluation proposals:
"ERB concluded that the bases for and use of evaluation
related predominantly to educational policy, although
they affect teachers' working conditions somewhat,
because the bases represent the determination of
programs and program standards and the use of evaluation
is to determine whether these program standards are
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being met. The determination and measurement of program
standards are management functions.
ERB also concluded that the mechanics of evaluation also
affect working conditions, but relate primarily to
educational policy because the mechanics and bases of
evaluation are 'inextricably intertwined.'
The form,
content, number and sequence of evaluations, and the
resources allocated therefore, ERB reasoned, must be
designed to correlate to the program standards and to
serve as the basis for subsequent managerial action.
Accordingly, both the bases for and uses of evaluation
and the mechanics of evaluation were deemed not to be
conditions
of
employment
and,
hence,
subject
to
permissive rather than mandatory bargaining.
ERB next concluded that those parts of the proposals
dealing with procedural fairness (e.g., notice and
opportunity to be heard)
had no effect on the
formulation and achievement of program and little effect
on the allocation of resources, but greatly affected
teachers'
employment.
Hence,
procedural
fairness
procedures were deemed to be subject to mandatory
bargaining." 290 Or. at 235-37, 621 P. 2d 545.
Following that case, however, the Oregon legislature amended
the

Oregon

found

at

Statute governing

Oregon

Revised

teacher evaluations.

Statutes

Section

That

342.850 was

statute,

amended

to

include a provision very similar to the Illinois statute dealing with
teacher evaluations on that matter.

The section added,

reads

in

pertinent part as follows:
(2)(a)The district school board shall develop an
evaluation process in consultation with school
administrators
and
with
teachers.
If
the
district's teachers are represented by a local
bargaining organization, the board shall consult
with teachers belonging to and appointed by the
local bargaining organization in the consultation
required by this paragraph.
(b) The district school board shall implement the
evaluation process that includes:
"(A) The establishment of job descriptions and
performance standards which include but are
not limited to items included in the job
description;
"(B) A pre-evaluation interview which includes but
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is not limited to the establishment of
performance goals for the teacher, based on
the job description and performance standards;
"(C) An evaluation based on written criteria which
include the performance goals; and
"(D) A post-evaluation interview in which (i) the
results of the evaluation are discussed with
the teacher and (ii) a written program of
assistance for improvement, if needed, is
established.
"(c) Nothing in this subsection is intended to prohibit
a
district
from consulting with any other
individuals."
A subsequent case determined whether the amendment of the
evaluation law affected the application of the Springfield test for
determining what evaluation related matters are mandatory subjects of
That

bargaining.

case

is

East

County

Bargaining

Council

v.

Centennial School District No. 28JT, 685 P.2d 452 (Or. App. 1984).
In

that

case,

the

teachers'

bargaining

council

(council)

argued that:
because the amendment made the statutory requirements
for
evaluations
more
specific,
increased
the
evaluation-related rights of teachers and reduced the
flexibility and discretion of school districts in
connection with evaluations, the effect was to shift the
balance from the educational policy to the employment
conditions end of the spectrum and to make virtually all
matters pertaining to teacher evaluations mandatory
bargaining subjects. The council implicitly makes the
related point that, because the district must comply
with the statute, it has no educational policy interests
which militate against bargaining about proposals that
simply duplicate the statutory requirements. (Id., at
455, 456).
The court however, determined that any bargaining proposal
was still subject to the balancing test.
that

the

amendment

did

not

"explicitly
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Indeed, the court stated
enlarge

the

scope

of

mandatorily bargainable subjects." (Id at 457.)
The most significant aspect of this case, within the Illinois
context, is the court's holding that the amendment did not enlarge
the scope of mandatory bargaining.

This is particularly important

when considered in conjunction with Section 17 of the IELRA.
Illinois
There are no Illinois decisions to date that deal with the
issue of teacher evaluation as a mandatory subject of bargaining.
However, a Complaint and Notice of Hearing has been issued by the
Executive Director of the IELRB for a case involving this issue.
The case, Community Consolidated School District 59, Case No.
86-CA-0012, deals with a demand to bargain collectively about the
development of evaluation criteria and
impact of them.

procedures as well as

the

The complaint was issued on July 24, 1986.

There is also very little legislative history on this issue.
Teacher evaluation was not discussed at all in the House debates and
was only mentioned once in the Senate debates.

That discussion is

cited on page 32 of this work and gives no direction on this issue.
However, based on the IELRB decisions discussed earlier in
this chapter, the NLRB decisions and the decisions of other states,
it is possible to make a reasonable prediction as to how the IELRB
might approach this question.
First, the IELRB will likely reject the argument that teacher
evaluations have been made a mandatory subject of bargaining by the
amendment

to

the

School

Code which
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requires

school districts

to

develop " •••• in co-operation with its teachers, or where applicable
the

exclusive

bargaining
for

all

representative

evaluation

plan

its

service."

(Section 24A-4).

teachers

in

of

its

teachers,

contractual

an

continued

A careful reading of that amendment

reveals that the school district is required to develop a plan in
co-operation with the teachers or their bargaining representative.
The language does not

impose an affirmative duty

to bargain the

contents of that plan but rather, is similar to the meet and confer
requirements of a state like Indiana.
Another reason the IELRB is likely to reject this argument is
because of the provisions of Section 17 of the IELRA.

That section

reads:
Effect on other laws.
In case of any conflict between
the provisions of this Act and any other law, executive
order or administrative regulation, the provisions of
this Act shall prevail and control. Nothing in this Act
shall be construed to replace or diminish the rights of
employees established by Section 36d of "An Act to
Create the the State Universities Civil Service System",
approved May 11, 1905, as amended or modified.
This section makes it very clear that the IELRA is to be the
controlling law i f there is any conflict between the IELRA and any
other state law.

Further, the only exception to this rule that the

legislature was willing to contemplate was incorporated in Section
17.

Therefore, the only way the list of mandatory subjects of

bargaining can be expanded by statute is by amending the IELRA to
reflect that change.

The new teacher evaluation law is incorporated

in the School Code, not the IELRA.
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Therefore, it cannot be regarded

as a statutorily imposed subject of mandatory bargaining.
The IELRB will consider several factors when it addresses the
issue of whether
bargaining.

teacher evaluations are

a subject of mandatory

One will be the strong language of Section 4 of the

In Berkeley the IELRB made it very clear that it viewed

IELRA·

management rights as significant and that educational employers are
unique.

In that decision, the IELRB considered the claims by both

sides and determined that the word 'directly' was very significant
and that unless there was a direct effect on the subjects of
mandatory bargaining, the decision was to be left to management.
Another factor that the IELRB will likely consider is whether
teacher evaluations are a matter of educational policy.

All the

state courts that have considered this question have concluded that
teacher evaluations at least include an element of educational
policy,

even

those

courts

that

have

determined

evaluations are a mandatory subject of bargaining.
most

likely concur with

those

courts

that

teacher

The IELRB wi 11

and determine

that

teacher

evaluations are a matter of educational policy.
Al though all the courts cited have determined that teacher
evaluations

include

applied different

a

tests

question

of

educational

policy,

they have

to determine whether it might still be a
Under the minimal relations test

subject of mandatory bargaining.

and the significant relations test the courts have determined that
teacher evaluations are mandatory subjects of bargaining.
However, under the primary relations test and the balancing
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test the courts have determined that teacher evaluations are not a
mandatory subject of bargaining.
primary relations test.

In Berkeley, the IELRB adopted the

The application of that test in the context

of teacher evaluations is best exemplified in Beloit discussed
earlier.
If the IELRB applies the primary relations test as in Beloit,
it will find that the number, frequency and duration of evaluations
will be subjects of mandatory bargaining.
time

span

between

the

observation

It will also find that the
and

the

evaluator/teacher

conference will be a mandatory subject of bargaining.

However, the

identity of the evaluator will probably be found to be an inherent
managerial right.

The criteria for the evaluation are clearly

matters of educational policy because they are pronouncements of what ,
the district considers to be proper teaching behavior as the behavior
relates to attaining the district's educational objectives.

This

will be the result i f the IELRB follows the lead of the Wisconsin
courts.
One caveat is in order, however.

The Wisconsin statute

dealing with managerial rights, cited on page 60, gives employees the
right

to bargain over managerial rights if the exercise of those

rights affect the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the
employees.

That statute does not include the word 'directly' that

the IELRB found so significant in Berkeley.

Therefore, the primary

relations test applied by the IELRB may narrow the scope of mandatory
bargaining even beyond that established in Beloit.
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In summary then, if the IELRB follows Beloit, it will find
that the procedures of teacher evaluation are mandatory subjects of
bargaining but that the identity of the evaluator and the criteria
for evaluation will be permissive subjects of bargaining.

If the

IELRB continues to place great reliance on the presence of the word
'directly' in Section 4 it may even find that the procedures are not
subjects of mandatory bargaining.
and

criteria

will

likely

be

At any rate, both the procedures

found

to

be

subjects

for

impact

bargaining under Section 4.

CLASS SIZE
Class size is another topic that

the teacher unions will

likely consider as a mandatory subject of bargaining.
long believed that

Teachers have

the number of pupils in a class has a direct

impact on the quality of teaching and learning that goes on in the
classroom.

School administrators might agree with that sentiment,

but argue that precisely because the number of students affect
teaching and learning, a determination of class size based on that
belief would be an educational

policy decision.

Employee groups

would likely consider it a term or condition of employment.
Several states now have judicial determinations of whether
class size is a mandatory subject of bargaining.

Those states

include Connecticut, Nevada, Florida and Wisconsin.
Connecticut
The Connecticut Teacher Negotiations Act is found at C.G.S.A.
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sections 10-153(a) through 10-153(h).
negotiate

over

"salaries

and

It requires school boards to

conditions

of

employment."

This

statutory requirement was interpreted with respect to class size in
the case of West

Hartford Education Association v.

DeCourcy,

162

Conn. 566 (1972).
West Hartford was an action for a declaratory judgment
determining

whether

certain

items

were

mandatory

subjects

of

bargaining.

In the court's analysis of the scope of bargaining, it

began by noting that absent guidance from the statute, the court must
look

to

the

legislative

history

to

"conditions of employment. (Id.at 533.)

determine

the

meaning

of

All three of the labor acts

covering public employees in Connecticut mirrored the language of the
National Labor Relations Act and made it mandatory for the employer
to bargain over wages, hours and conditions of employment.

The court

determined that the omission of hours from the Teacher Negotiations
Act

reflected

a

legislative

judgment

that

"teachers'

hours

of

employment' determine students' hours of education and that this is
an important matter of education policy which should be reserved to
the board of education."

(Id. at 534.)

Because of that attributed legislative judgment, the court
found that the length of the school day and the school calendar were
not mandatory subjects of bargaining.

It also used the perceived

legislative judgment as the basis of the analysis regarding class
size.

The court asserted that the legislature intended that the

scope of negotiations should be broad, stating that, "The use of the
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phrase 'conditions of employment' reflects a judgment that the scope
of negotiations should be relatively broad, but sufficiently flexible
to accommodate the changing needs of the parties."

(Id at 535.)

Having made that determination, the court looked to decisions
under the National Labor Relations Act.

The scope of bargaining

under that Act, as discussed earlier, has been expanded under the
penumbra

of

the

phrase,

"terms

and

conditions

of

employment."

However,

there are still some limits to that scope as defined in

Fibreboard Paper Products ,"nothing should be understood as imposing
a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions,
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control." (379 U.S. 203 at
223.)

The Connecticut court equated the controls in Fibreboard with

matters of educational policy in the case at hand and defined
educational policy as "those which are fundamental to the existence,
direction and operation of the enterprise."

(West Hartford at 536.)

The Connecticut court also looked to the history and custom
of

the

industry

in

collective

bargaining

underlying the Teacher Negotiation Act.
fact

that

Connecticut,

of

the

ninety-six

and

to

the

policies

The court took notice of the

teacher

contracts

sixty-one had class size provisions.

negotiated

in

The court also

noted that the Act divested the boards of education of some of the
discretion they would normally have in an effort to eliminate any
"need for resort to illegal and disruptive tactics." ( Id at 536.)
Using this three pronged analysis,

the court stated that,

"There can be no doubt that policy questions are involved •••• but that
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cannot be decisive in the present case •••• Class size and teacher load
chiefly

define

traditional

the

amount

indicator

employment."

of

of

work

whether

expected

an

item

is

of

a
a

teacher,
condition

a
of

(Id. at 537.)

There are two important aspects of this decision when applied
to the Illinois situation.

The first is that the Connecticut statute

does not have the equivalent of the
Illinois Act.

employer's rights section of the

The second is that the Connecticut court engaged in a

kind of balancing test.

This is quite different than the "primary

relations" test enunciated by the IELRB in Berkeley and applied in
Community Unit School Dist. No. 4.
Nevada
The

Nevada statute

requires

every government

employer

to

negotiate concerning "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment."

NRS 288.150(1).

However, this obligation is limited by

subparagraph 2 of that section:
"2. Each local government employer is entitled, without
negotiation or reference to any agreement resulting from
negotiation:
(a) To direct its employees;
(b)
To hire, promote, classify, transfer, assign,
retain, suspend, demote, discharge or take disciplinary
action against any employee;
(c) To relieve any employee from duty because of lack
of work or for any other legitimate reason;
(d) To maintain the efficiency of its governmental
operations;
( e)
To determine the methods, means and personnel by
which its operations are to be conducted; and
(f) To take whatever actions may be necessary to carry
out its responsibilities in situations of emergency.
The

interpretation

of

this
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statute

as

it

concerns

the

negotiability of class size is found in the case of Clark County
School District v.

Local Government Employee Management Relations

Board...!. 90 Nev. 442, 520 P.2d 114 (1974).

-

This case consolidated two

separate actions where the court was called upon to determine the

negotiability

of

several

items

including

class

size.

In

the

decision, the court upheld the standard enunciated by the Employment
Management Relations Board, "that the government employer be required
to negotiate if a particular item is found to significantly relate to
wages, hours and working conditions even though the item is also
related to management prerogative." (Id. at 117.)

Using that

analysis, the court found that because class size had a significant
impact

on

working

conditions,

it

was

a

subject

of

mandatory

bargaining.
There is one very important aspect of this case when applying
it

to the Illinois situation.

The test applied in Nevada is the

significant relationship test which is a much easier test for
employee groups to satisfy than the primary relations test adopted by
the IELRB.
Florida
The Florida statute requires school boards to negotiate over
wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment.
447.309(1).

F.S.A. Section

However, this obligation is modified by F.S.A. Section

447. 209 which allows public employers to unilaterally set "standards
of service to be offered to the public."
The application of this statute to the negotiability of class
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size

is

found

in

Hillsborough Classroom Teachers

Association v.

School Board of Hillsborough County, 423 So.2d 965 (1982).

In that

case, the court found that class size was not a mandatory subject of
bargaining.

However, the impact of a decision regarding class size

will be a subject of mandatory bargaining after the employee group
makes a showing of negotiable impact.

The basis of that decision was

the belief that class size was a matter of educational policy and
thus was within the term "standards of service to be offered to the
public" and to be unilaterally set by the public employer.
There are two important aspects of this case when applying it
to the Illinois situation.

The first is that the Florida court's

conclusion that class size was an educational policy decision is in
agreement

with

the

other

state

courts

that have considered this

question.

The second important aspect is that the limiting factor in

Florida, standards of service to be offered to the public, is
different

than

the

limiting

factor

in

Illinois

which

is

the

management rights found in Section 4.
Wisconsin
The Wisconsin statute, found at W.S.A. Section lll.70(l)(d)
requires the parties to meet and confer with respect to wages, hours,
and conditions of employment.
negotiability of

The case applying this statute to the

class size is

City of

Beloit,

discussed in the

section of this chapter dealing with the negotiability of teacher
evaluations.
The court began its discussion of the general scope of
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negotiability by offering an evaluation based on class size:
The difficulty encountered in interpreting and applying
Sec. lll.70(1)(d), is that many subject areas relate to
"wages, hours and conditions of employment," but not
only to such area of concern. Many such subjects also
have a relatedness to matters of educational policy and
school management and operation.
What then is the
result if a matter involving
wages, hours and
conditions of employment" also relates to educational
policy or school administration? An illustration is the
matter of classroom size, subsequently discussed. The
number of pupils in a classroom has an obvious
relatedness to a "condition of employment" for the
teacher in such classroom. But the question of optimum
classroom size can also be a matter of educational
policy. And if a demand for lowered classroom size were
to require the construction of a new school building for
the reduced-in-size classes, relatedness to management
and direction of the school system is obvious.
Would
such required result of a new building not be a matter
on which groups involved, beyond school board and
teachers' association, are entitled to have their say
and input? (City of Beloit at 235,6.)
Thus,

the Wisconsin court

acknowledged

the difficulty of

separating the issues when educational policies are related to the
subjects of mandatory bargaining and explicitly used class size as
the perfect kind of example of this conflict.
After establishing the primary relations test, discussed at
page 24 of this work, the court addressed the issue of negotiability
of class size at pages 240 & 241 of its opinion.

The teacher's

association proposal regarding class size read as follows:
Because the pupil-teacher ratio is an important aspect
of an effective educational program, the Board agrees
that class size should be lowered wherever possible to
meet the optimum standards of one (1) to twenty-five
( 25).
Exceptions may be allowed in traditional large
group instruction or experimental classes, where the
Association has agreed in writing to exceed this
standard. (Footnote 35 at 240.)
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The

court

conceded

that

class

size

had

an

impact

on

conditions of employment but adopted the language of the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission's memorandum which stated:
size of a class is a matter of basic educational policy
because there is a very strong evidence that the
student-teacher ratio is a determinant of educational
quality.
Therefore, decisions on class size are
permissive and not mandatory subjects of bargaining.
(Footnote 36 at 241.)
Therefore,

the

application of

the

primary

relations

test

resulted in a finding that although there was an impact of the
decision on the working conditions, the decisions concerning class
size were purely managerial and not mandatory subjects of bargaining.
However, the court did find that the impact of that decision
was mandatorily bargainable because if the class was larger, there
would be more papers to grade, more preparation would be required,
there would be a greater likelihood of discipline problems, and there
would be more work projects to be supervised.

(Id. at 241.)

Illinois
Apart from the exchange between Senators Bruce and Buzbee on
November 2,

1983, quoted on page 32,

there is no mention in the

legislative history of the negotiability of class size.

Therefore,

it is likely that the IELRB will look to other jurisdictions with
similar statutes for guidance in applying the IELRA to this question.
The IELRB will not find the Connecticut decision persuasive
for four reasons.

The first

reason is that when the Connecticut

court looked to its legislative history, it found that the scope of
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bargaining was to be relatively broad.

This is in direct contrast to

the Berkeley decision which found a narrow scope of bargaining
reflected in the Illinois legislative history.
The second reason is that there is no management rights
provision in the Connecticut statute.

The very presence of such a

provision in the Illinois statute sets it apart from Connecticut.
The third reason is that the Connecticut court looked to the
history and custom of the industry when considering the question and
found it persuasive that nearly two-thirds of the Connecticut school
districts had class size provisions.

There is nothing in the

Illinois statute or in the IELRB decisions to indicate that the IELRB
will look to custom and history of the industry if it can find
guidance in the statute and in the legislative history.
The fourth reason is that the Connecticut court relied on a
balancing test rather than the type of primary relations test adopted
by the IELRB.

Because the weight accorded each factor was different

than it might be in Illinois (according such difference to the habit
and custom of the industry) the result was very likely different than
it

would be in Illinois even i f the balancing test was used.

addition,

the

primary relations

test

is

very different

In

than the

balancing test.
The IELRB will not find the Nevada decision persuasive for
two very important reasons.

The first, as noted above, is that the

Nevada court used the significant relations test.

That standard is

much easier to satisfy because all that must be demonstrated is that
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there is

a significant relationship between the topic and the

conditions of employment.

However,

the test adopted by the IELRB

requires that there must be a primary relationship between the topic
and the conditions of employment.
The second reason for the IELRB's unwillingness to follow the
Nevada court is to be found in the legislative history of the IELRA.
As noted earlier, the management rights provision was added to the
IELRA by the Governor's amendatory veto and is essentially the
management
rights
Senator

rights

provision found

provision was
Greiman.

added

However,

to

the

before

in

the

IPLRA.

IPLRA through
that

That management
an

amendment was

amendment
adopted

by
the

House rejected a management rights provision by Representative Davis.
That amendment read:
Public employers should not be required to bargain over
matters of inherent managerial policy, which should
include, but shall not be limited to, such areas of
discretion or policy as the functions and programs of
the employer, the standards of services, the overall
budget,
the
utilization
of
technology,
and
the
organizational structure, and selection, and direction
of personnel.
83rd Gen. Assem. House Debates on S.B.
536, p279 (June 23, 1983).
This language is very similar to the management rights provisions in
Nevada.

The Nevada statute, found at NEV. REV. STAT. Sec. 288.150(2)

reads:
Each local government employer is entitled without
negotiation or reference to any agreement resulting from
negotiation: (a) to direct its employees; (b) hire,
promote, classify, transfer, assign, retain, suspend,
demote, discharge, or take disciplinary action against
any employee; (c) to relieve any employee from duty
because of lack of work or for any other legitimate
reason;
(d)
to maintain
the
efficiency
of
its
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governmental operation; (e) to determine the methods,
means and personnel by which the operations are to be
conducted; and {f) to take whatever actions may be
necessary
to
carry out
its
responsibilities
in
situations of emergency.
The Illinois legislature had opportunity, then, to consider a
provision that would have allowed the IELRB and the courts to look to
Nevada for precedent and chose to reject it.

By doing this, it can

be

to

inferred

that

the

legislature

intended

provide

stricter

guidelines than that afforded the administrative agency and judiciary
in Nevada.

The legislature's decision to use the clause it did and

to qualify the exceptions by the use of the word directly reflects a
desire to construe the scope narrowly and to take some options out of
the hands of the judiciary.
The IELRB may look to the Florida court for confirmation that
class size is indeed a matter of educational policy, a conclusion
that is shared by the other state courts that have considered this
question.
even

a

However, the management rights provision of the IELRA is
stronger

non-mandatory

argument

topic

of

for

determining

bargaining

than

the

class

size

standard

of

to

be

a

services

relied upon by the Florida court as in the question concerning the
negotiability of teacher evaluations,

the IELRB is most likely to

look to the Wisconsin court, if any, for guidance in the question at
hand.

Because class size is so clearly related to educational

policy, the IELRB will find it as a matter of inherent managerial
policy if the employer defends its position on that basis.

The only

way that class size might be viewed as a subject of mandatory
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bargaining is if, as suggested in Community Unit School District No.
!!_, it is clearly evident that the district's decisions are prompted

only by a desire to save labor costs.

A school district wishing to

retain the right to make class size decisions as a matter of inherent
managerial policy must argue that it needs the flexibility to do so
in order to adequately meet the educational needs of its students.

CURRICULUM
Curriculum is likely to be another subject that teacher
organizations would prefer to see classified as a mandatory subject
of bargaining while school boards would see it as a matter of
inherent managerial policy.
curriculum is similar to
condition of employment.

Teacher organizations might argue that
the

tools used by craftsman and thus a

On the other hand, schoo: districts might

look to Section 4 of the IELRA and argue that curriculum falls under
the rubric of "standards of service."
Curriculum certainly is an area of educational policy.

The

question is whether its impact on working conditions is great enough
to meet any of the four tests discussed in the first section of this
chapter.

Using any of the four tests, only one state was found that

established that curriculum was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
A state using the minimal relations test is Pennsylvania.

In

State College Ed. Ass'n. v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 306
A. 2d 404

(1973),

the court held that curriculum was a matter of

inherent

managerial

policy

within
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the

ambit

of

Pennsylvania's

This is the easiest test to satisfy and

management rights clause.
curriculum was

still believed to a matter of inherent managerial

policy.
A state using the significant relations test is Nevada.

Clark

In

County School District v. Local Government Employee Management

Relations

Board,

the

court

held

that

there

was

a

significant

relationship between the amount, type, quality and availability of
instructional
Therefore,
bargaining.

supplies

curriculum

and
was

the
held

working
to

be

conditions
a

of

mandatory

teachers.
subject

of

However, the management rights clause of Nevada's

statute is significantly different than that of Illinois.

The

Illinois legislature had considered and rejected a clause like that
of the Nevada statute.
A state utilizing the primary relations test is Wisconsin.
In City of Beloit v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, the
court held that a school reading program related primarily to basic
educational policy and was not a mandatory subject of bargaining.

In

the court's words:
"It is clear that the Association's proposal on
'reading' relates primarily to basic educational policy,
and therefore concerns a matter subject to permissive,
but not mandatory bargaining.
The need for such a
program is essentially a determination of whether the
District should direct itself toward certain educational
goals." (City of Beloit at 242, Footnote 39.)
A state using the balancing test is Oregon.
Education Association v.

In Springfield

Springfield School District No.

19,

the

court held that where matters to a large extent involve questions of
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educational
bargaining.

policy,

those matters

are not

Because curriculum was

found

mandatory subjects

of

to involve educational

policy to a greater extent than it involved working conditions, the
court held that curriculum was not a mandatory subject of bargaining.
In support of this finding, the court looked at rulings of a number
of other states:
Labor relations boards and courts in other jurisdictions
have reached similar conclusions.
Dunellen Bd. of Ed.
v. Dunellen Ed. Assn., 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973)
(class size, curriculum, transfers, work assignments
held not mandatory bargaining subjects); School Dist. of
Seward, 188 Neb. 722, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972) (class size,
work schedules and transfers held not mandatory
subjects); Burlington Cty. Col. Fae. Assoc. v. Bd. of
Trustees, 64 N.J. 10, 31l A.2d 733 (1973) (the school
calendar held not a mandatory subject); Aberdeen Ed.
Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of Ed., S.D., 215 N.W.2d 837
(1974) (class size and the availability of materials and
supplies held not mandatory bargaining subjects).
(Springfield Education Association at 650.)
There is a Michigan case that must be discussed as well
because of the contrast it has with Nevada.
applies the significant relations test.

Like Nevada, Michigan
However, in doing so,

Michigan came up with the opposite result that Nevada reached.
The case that applied the test in dealing with the issue of
curriculum is West Ottawa Education Association v. West Ottawa Public
Schools Board of Education, 334 N.W. 2d 533 (Mich. App. 1983).
this case,
dance class.

In

the school board had decided to quit offering a Dutch
The teacher's organization filed a complaint charging

that the decision was a change in working conditions and therefore a
mandatory subject of bargaining.

The Michigan court articulated the
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test to be applied in this fashion:
Various tests have been employed to determine whether a
subject is a "term and condition of employment", and,
therefore, a mandatory subject of bargaining. This
Court has developed a standard which incorporates·
several of these tests. Any matter which has a material
or significant impact upon wages, hours, or other
conditions of employment or which settles an aspect of
the relationship between employer and employee is a
mandatory subject, except for management decisions which
are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate
enterprise or which impinge only indirectly upon
employment security. (West Ottawa at 542.)
After enunciating that test, the court looked to the Supreme
Court's decision in First National Maintenance.

In that decision,

The Supreme Court decided that absent an anti-union animus, a
business was not required to negotiate a partial closing of a
business for economic reasons.

The Michigan court analogized the

decision to drop a class offering to the partial closing of a
business and found that:
We conclude that the board was not required to bargain
over its initial decision to drop the Dutch dance
program. The decision was made solely because of school
budget cuts. The decision related to the board's right
to determine curriculum. West Ottawa at 543.
Illinois and the negotiability of curriculum
The prevailing weight of states have held that curriculum is
not a mandatory subject of bargaining.

Although Illinois is not

bound by any of those state decisions the IELRB will certainly be
aware of them and may look to them for guidance.
The state

that uses the test most similar to the one
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articulated by the IELRB in Berkeley, Wisconsin, has held that issues
of curriculum are not mandatory subject of bargaining.

It should be

expected that the IELRB will look first to Section 4 of the IELRA and
determine that curriculum would fall under the category "standards of
service.

Applying the primary relations test, the IELRB will find,

if it follows the weight of opinion, that issues of curriculum are

not mandatory subjects of bargaining.

TEACHER TRANSFERS
Another concern of teacher organizations is the negotiability
of teacher transfers.

Teacher transfers means the transfer of

teachers between buildings and/or

a change of subject assignments.

In light of building closings and termination of teaching positions,
teacher organizations can be expected to argue that a transfer to
another building or a change in teaching assignment is a change in
working conditions and thus a mandatory subject of bargaining.
School boards will look to Section 4 of the IELRA and argue that
teacher transfers fall within the scope of "organizational structure"
and "direction of employees."
will use

the

primary

relations

It should be assumed that the IELRB
test

established in the Berkeley

decision.
The weight of authority is that teacher tr.ansfers are not a
mandatory subject of bargaining.

Springfield Education Association,

Dunellen Board of Education, School District of Seward.
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The only

case discovered that
mandatory

found teacher transfers

bargaining was

the

Nevada

case

of

to be a subject of
Clark County School

District discussed earlier in the chapter.
One case deserves special mention because of the wording of
its statute and its clear analysis of the issue.

That case,

Minneapolis Federation of Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Special
School District No. l, 258 N.W. 2d 802 (1977), deals with a situation
where the teachers' organization sought a declaratory judgment on the
question of whether the school district's teacher transfer procedures
were subject to mandatory negotiations.
The wording of Minnesota's employer rights is very similar to
The Minnesota

the language contained in the Illinois statute.

statute, found at Minn. St. 179.66 provides in pertinent part:
"Subdivision l.
A public employer is not required to
meet and negotiate on matters of inherent managerial
policy, which include, but are not limited to, such
areas of discretion or policy as the functions and
programs
of
the
employer,
its
overall
budget,
utilization of technology, the organizational structure
and selection and direction and number of personnel.
For purposes of the question at hand,
between the two statutes is that
selection

of

new

employees

and

Illinois'
direction

the only difference

statute refers
of

employees

to the
while

Minnesota's statute refers to the "selection, direction and number of
personnel."
Relying upon that phrase in the statute, the Minnesota court
held that the decision to transfer a number of teachers was a
managerial decision and not a subject for negotiation:
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Minn. St. 179.66 outlines in very broad terms what
managerial policy shall be. Thus, under the phrase
"selection and direction and number of personnel," the
question is what scope is to be given the word
"direction." If the entire section is read, however, it
seems ~lear the legislature intends the board shall have
direction over the broad educational objectives of the
entire district. There is no doubt the decision to
transfer a number of teachers is a managerial decision.
The criteria for determining which teachers are to be
transferred, however, involves a decision which directly
affects a teacher's welfare and enters into a field
which we hold is in fact negotiable. (Id at 806)
Therefore, although the decision to transfer was not a
mandatory subject of bargaining, the adoption of criteria by which
individual teachers may be identified for transfer was found to be a
mandatory subject of bargaining.
Illinois will probably adopt the prevailing view and find
that teacher transfers are not a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Nevada's decision is not likely to be persuasive because it applied a
different

test

than

that adopted in

Illinois

and

because of

the

difference in the language of the statute discussed under the section
dealing with class size.
In addition, the IELRB is compelled to look at the language
of

the statute before considering even legislative history.

The

language of Section 4 appears to be clearly applicable to this issue.
School closings and resultant transfers appear to be included within
the term "organizational structure" and the term "direction of
employees" would apply to the

transfer of teachers for any other

reason and to changes of subject teaching assignments.
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CONCLUSION
Determining the scope of bargaining under the IELRA will be a
difficult task because of the potential conflict presented by the
strongly worded employer rights section.

The legislative history

clearly indicates that the purpose of that section was to provide
notice to the judiciary that the scope of bargaining was not to be
extended

beyond

traditional norms.

The

legislative history also

makes it clear that the unique nature of the educational employer was
one of the reasons that the employer rights section was included.
The two IELRB decisions dealing with this issue to date have
recognized

this

legislative

intent

and

have adopted

the

primary

relations test as a means of determining whether particular issues
are mandatory subjects of bargaining.
The IELRB will consider each issue on a case by case basis
and will carefully consider the individual facts of each case before
making its determination.
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CHAPTER 4
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with unfair labor practices under the
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA).

The chapter will

first provide a general consideration of unfair labor practices under
the

National

Labor

Relations

Act

(NLRA)

and

then

consideration of unfair labor practices under the IELRA.
those

discussions

will

include

consideration

of

six

a

general
Both of
specific

questions regarding unfair labor practices:

1. Is an illegal strike

an unfair labor practice under the IELRA?

2. Can employees file

charges of unfair labor practices?

3. Who is to prosecute an unfair

labor practice charge under the IELRA?

4. Does a breach of the duty

of fair representation constitute an unfair labor practice under the

s.

Is recognitional picketing an unfair labor practice under

the IELRA?

6. What is the standard of the burden of proof under the

IELRA?

IELRA?
National Labor Relations Act
The NLRA recognizes that both the employer and the employee
have legitimate rights.

(NLRA Section l(b)) The rights of the

employees are listed in Section 7:
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Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section
8(a)(3).
However, it is worth noting that although the NLRA clearly recognizes
that there are legitimate employer rights it does not explicitly list
them.
One of the stated purposes of the statute is to "provide
orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by
either (the employee or the employer) with the legitimate rights of
the other.

(NLRA Section l(b))

Those means of prevention are listed

in Sections 10 and 11.
Another of the stated purposes of the statutes is to "define
and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which
affect commerce and are critical to the general welfare."
Section l(b))

(NLRA

Those practices, known as unfair labor practices, are

found in Section 8.

This section does list specific unfair labor

practices for both the employer and the employee organizations.
Section

8(a)

lists

the

unfair

labor

practices

for

the

employer:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -( l) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute
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financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject
to rules and regulations made and published by the Board
pursuant to section 6, an employer shall not be
prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him
during working hours without loss of time or pay;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in
any other statute of the United States, shall preclude
an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization (not established, maintained, or assisted
by any action defined in section 8(a) of this Act as an
unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of
employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth
day following the beginning of such employment or the
effective date of such agreement, whichever is the
later,
(i)
if
such
labor
organization
is
the
representative of the employees as provided in section
9(a), in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit
covered by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless
following an election held as provided in section 9(e)
within one year preceding the effective date of such
agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least
a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such
election have voted to rescind the authority of such
labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided
further,
That
no
employer
shall
justify
any
discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in
a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds
for believing that such membership was not available to
the employee on the same terms and conditions generally
applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that membership was denied or
terminated for reasons other than the failure of the
employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation
fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
employee because he has filed charges or given testimony
under this Act;
(S) to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of section 9(a).
The application of the statute has resulted in the following
acts being defined as unfair labor practices by the NLRB:
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Failure
to
re-employ striking employees.
Western
Cartridge Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
c.c.A.7, 139 F.2d 855, 858. Refusal of employer to
reinstate union members who were evicted from plant
unless members would withdraw from union. National
Labor Relations Board v. J.G. Boswell Co., C.C.A.9, 136
F.2d 585, 590, 592, 596. Refusal of employer to bargain
collectively in good faith.
National Labor Relations
Board v Griswold Mfg. co., c.c.A.3, 106 F.2d 713, 724;
National Labor Relations Board v. Somerset Shoe Co.,
C.C.A.l, 111 F.2d 681, 688, 689. Threats by employer to
close i f union gained a foothold in plant.
National
Labor Relations Board v. J.G. Boswell Co., C.C.A.9, 136
F.2d 585, 590, 592, 596. Anti-union statements made by
employer's supervisory employees during and after
strike, together with statement to one of the strikers
that he would never get a job in that town anymore.
N.L.R.B. v. Indiana Desk Co., C.C.A.7, 149 F.2d 987,
992, 996.
Refusal of employer to permit posting of a
notice that employer would not discriminate against
employees who wished to join union. National Labor
Relations Board v. J.G. Boswell Co., C.C.A.9, 136 F.2d
585, 590, 592, 596. Discharge of am employee because of
membership in or activity on behalf of a labor
organization. National Labor Relations Board v. Newark
Morning Ledger, C.C.A.3, 120 F.2d 262, 268; National
Labor Relations Board v. Bank of America Trust & Savings
Ass'n, C.C.i\.9, 130 F.2d 624, 628, 629. Employer's
interference with and his dominating formation and
administration of new labor organization. National
Labor Relations Board v. Swift & Co., C.C.A.8, 116 F.2d
143, 145, 146;
National Labor Relations Board v.
Blossom Products Corporation, C.C.A.3, 121 F.2d 260,
262; National Labor Relations Board v. Stackpole Carbon
C o • , C• C• A• 3 , l 0 5 F • 2 d 1 6 7 , l 7 3 , 1 7 5 •
Re f us a 1 o f
employer which had refused to bargain with union which
had been certified as the exclusive bargaining agent.
National Labor Relations Board v. John Engelhorn & Sons,
C.C.A.3, 134 F.2d 553, 558. Assault by persons employed
by manufacturer upon union organizers or sympathizers.
National Labor Relations Board v. Ford Motor Co.,
c.c.A.6, 114 F.2d 905, 911, 915. Discharge of employee
because he would not become member of union in
accordance with closed shop agreement.
Virginia
Electric & Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
C.C.A.4, 132 F.2d 390, 396. (Black's 1979)
It

is clear from this brief list that the NLRB has taken a broad view
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of what constitutes an unfair labor practice on the part of an
employer.
Section 8(b) of the NLRA lists the unfair labor practices for
employee organizations.

Because of the nature of labor disputes in

the private sector, not all of the provisions of Section 8(b) are
pertinent to this discussion. However, the pertinent provisions make
it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to restrain or
coerce employees in their Section 7 rights, to cause or attempt to
cause an employer to discriminate against an employee with regard to
hiring,

tenure

of

employment,

or conditions

of employment or to

refuse to bargain collectively with an employer. It is also an unfair
labor practice to picket or cause to be picketed an employer, or
threaten that action where an object of the picketing is to force the
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees.
The application of the statute has resulted in the following
employee acts being defined as unfair labor practices by the NLRB:
an employee walkout

protesting failure

to

transfer a supervisor,

Communication Workers Local 2250, a strike to force the employer to
concede on a subject which is not a term or condition of employment,
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,

striking to induce

alteration of contract terms without complying with the notice and
cooling off

provisions

of

Section 8(d),

Local 113, United Elect.

Workers v. NLRB, 1955, striking in violation of a no strike clause in
the contract, NLRB v.

Sands Mfg.
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Co.,

"wildcat" strikes, NLRB v.

Draper, engaging in violence, assault, and trespass, NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., an employee protest which is timed so as to
create a risk of injury to the employer's plant or equipment, NLRB v.
Wheeler

Car

Wheel

Co.,

blatant

disloyalty,

insubordination,

or

disobedience, NLRB v. !BEW Local 1229, false accusations against the
employer,

Atlantic

Towing

Co.

v.

NLRB,

and

intermittent

work

stoppages or slowdowns, NLRB v. Montgomery Ward and Co ••
Clearly, employee groups may be found guilty of committing
unfair labor practices.

However, the scope of practices found to be

unfair by employees is narrower than the scope of unfair labor
practices by employers.

It is of passing interest to note that the

courts have been willing to broaden the scope of unfair labor
practices for employees much more than the NLRB has been willing to.
Illegal Strikes
Illegal strikes are not unfair labor practices under the
NLRA.

However, participants in unprotected strikes are not protected

from being discharged as a result of their participation.
Filing of an Unfair Labor Practice Charge by an Employee
The NLRA is silent as to whether an individual may file
charges.

However, the NLRB regulations allow charges to be filed by

any person.

The NLRB and its agents, however, are not empowered to

institute charges.

The charges are usually filed by the employee or

a representative from his union if the employer is the charged party
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and by the employer or his representative if the union is the charged
party.
After the complaint is made, an investigation is conducted to
determine if a complaint and notice of hearing should be issued.

The

NLRB is given the power to investigate and issue a complaint in
section 10 of the NLRA.
Responsibility to.Prosecute an Unfair Labor Practice Charge
If

a

complaint

and

notice

of

hearing

is

respondent is given the opportunity to file an answer.

issued,

the

The hearing

is conducted in a trial-like setting before an Administrative Law
As far as practicable,

Judge.

applied in this hearing.

the federal rules of evidence are

(NLRA Section lO(b))

At the hearing, the charging party is represented by an
attorney from the office of the General Counsel for the NLRB.
Therefore, once a complaint and notice of hearing has been issued, it
is the responsibility of the NLRB to prosecute the charge.

In fact,

the charging party is not even required to be present at the hearing.
(Gorman, 1976)
A Breach of the Dutf of Fair Representation
Practice

a~

an Unfair Labor

Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides that if a majority of the
employees

in

an

appropriate

unit

select

a

representative

for

bargaining purposes, then that representative becomes the exclusive
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representative for all the employees in that unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment or other conditions of employment.
Because the majority representative has the power to speak
for all the employees, it has been established that it has a
corresponding duty to make a good faith representation of the
interests of all the employees within the unit.

This duty was first

articulated by the Supreme Court in dictum in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB.
In 1962, the NLRB declared that it was an unfair labor
practice on the part of the union to fail in that duty.

The case in

which that declaration was made was NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co..

In

that case, an employee began an extended leave three days early and
the union requested that the employer drop the employee to the bottom
of the seniority list.

A synopsis of that case is provided in

Meltzer:
The duty of fair representation is a corollary of the
representative's exclusivity under Section 9(a) and is
incorporated into Section 7.
A bargaining agent's
breach of that duty, regardless of whether it was
influenced by an employee's union activities, violates
Section
7 and
Section 8(b)(l)(A)
of
the
Act.
Furthermore, a bargaining representative's attempt to
secure employer participation or acquiescence in such a
violation constitutes a violation of Section 8(b)(2),
and resultant arbitrary employer action is derivatively
a violation of Sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3). (Meltzer,
1977, p.920)).
Recognitional Picketing as an Unfair Labor Practice
Recognition picketing is construed as picketing by a union
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with the object of forcing

the employer

to

recognize

that union.

This should be distinguished from organizational picketing which is
directed at employees with the intent of persuading the employees
that

they

should

affiliate

with

a

particular

union.

This

distinction, relatively clear on its face, becomes very difficult to
interpret

in practice.

There is

an element of both types of

picketing in situations where the picketing union is not recognized
as the exclusive representative.
This difficulty is reflected in the legislative history of
Section 8(b).

(Gorman,

1976, pages 220-223)

Congress attempted to

clarify the situation by adding Section 8(b)(7) in 1959.

That

section outlaws recognition picket or organizational picketing if: 1)
the employer has already lawfully recognized another union and there
is

not

a

question

representation
months

and;

election
3)

representation

of

representation
has

picketing

election

taken
is

under

place
taking

petition

being

in

9(c);
the

place
filed

2)

a

valid

preceding

twelve

without

within

a

valid

a

reasonable

recognition

picketing.

organizational

purpose as

period of time.
The

statute

clearly

prohibits

However,

picketing with the elements

well as

recognition are

prohibited i f

pure
of

it falls within any of the

three categories discussed above.

The Standard of the Burden of Proof

The burden of proof refers to the duty of affirmatively
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proving a fact or facts in dispute.

That burden always belongs to

the charging party in an unfair labor practice charge.
refers

to

The standard

the required level of belief that a trier of fact must

have.
Section lO(c) of the NLRA states clearly that the standard
for the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.

That

standard is defined as "Evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it."
(Black's, 1979)
Unfair.Labor Practices.Under the iELRA

The

listing of unfair labor practices under

contained in Section 14.
that are unfair for
The

listing

of

the

IELRA is

Like the NLRA, the IELRA names practices

both the employer and employee organizations.

unfair

labor

practices

for

employers

is

found

in

Section 14(a):
Educational employers, their agents or representatives
are prohibited from:
(1) Interfering, restraining or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed under this Act.
(2) Dominating or interfering with the formation,
existence
or
administration
of
any
employee
organization.
(3) Discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any employee
organization.
(4) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against an
employee because he or she has signed or filed an
affidavit, authorization card, petition or complaint or
given any information or testimony under this Act.
(5) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with
an employee representative which is the exclusive
representative of employees in an appropriate unit,
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including but not limited to the discussing of
grievances with the exclusive representative; provided,
however, that if an alleged unfair labor practice
involves, interpretation or application of the terms of
a collective bargaining agreement and said agreement
contains a grievance and arbitration procedure, the
Board may defer the resolution of such dispute to the
grievance and arbitration procedure contained in said
agreement.
(6) Refusing to reduce a collective bargaining agreement
to writing and signing such agreement.
( 7) Violating any of the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Board regulating the conduct of
representation elections.
(8) Refusing to comply with the provisions of a binding
arbitration award.
Much of the language in Section l(a) is similar to that found in the
NLRA, especially subsections (2),

(3),

(4), and (5).

The section

does not directly address any of the questions posed at the beginning
of the chapter.
The unfair

labor

practices

by

employee

organizations

are

listed in Section 14(b):
Employee organizations, their agents or representatives
or educational employees are prohibited from:
(1) Restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed under this Act.
(2) Restraining or coercing an educational employer in
the selection of his representative for the purposes of
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.
(3) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with
an educational employer, if they have been designated in
accordance with an provisions of this Act as the
exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate
unit.
( 4) Violating any of the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Board regulating the conduct of
representation elections.
(5) Refusing to reduce a collective bargaining agreement
to writing and signing such agreement.
(6) Refusing to comply with the provisions of a binding
arbitration award.
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This language is similar to that found in the NLRA, especially
subsections (2) and (3).
The procedure for handling charges of unfair labor practice
charges is found in Section 15.

The section provides that a charge

may be filed with the IELRB by an employer, an individual or a labor
organization.

The IELRB is then supposed to investigate the charges

and, if it states an issue of law or fact, the IELRB is to issue a
complaint and notice of hearing.
notice given to the parties.

There is to be at least five days

At the hearing, the charging party may

present evidence in support of the charges and the responding party
may file an answer to the charges and present evidence in defense
against the charges.
The section also gives the IELRB the power to issue subpoenas
and administer oaths.
If the IELRB finds that the charged party has committed an

unfair labor practice it is empowered to issue an order requiring the
party

to

stop

the

affirmative action.

unfair

practice

and

may

require

additional

A charge of an unfair labor practice must be

filed within six months of the alleged violation or the IELRB may not
take action on the charge.

If the IELRB finds that the charged party

did not commit an unfair labor practice the IELRB must make findings
of fact and dismiss the charge.
Section 15 also grants the IELRB broad powers to petition the
circuit court of the county in which the violation occurred or where
the charged party resides or transacts business, to enforce an order
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and for other relief.
The actual mechanics of the processing of unfair labor
charges

are

found

in

Section

1120.20-1120.50

Educational Labor Relation Rules and Regulations.
be made on a form provided by the IELRB.

of

the

Illinois

'llle charge is to

The form requires the

names, addresses and affiliations of both the charging party and the
respondent, a statement of the facts supporting the charge, and a
statement of the relief sought.'

The complaint must be made within

six months of the alleged unfair labor practice.
'llle IELRB has empowered its Executive Director to investigate
charges and issue complaints.

He, in turn, has empowered the Hearing

Officers of the IELRB to issue complaints, make investigations of the
charges and to recommend to him whether a complaint should be issued
or dismissed.

The test that determines whether the complaint should

be issued was established in the IELRB's full board decision of Lake
Zurich School District 95:
" •••• in order to support the issuance of complaint and
to set the charge for hearing, the investigation must
disclose
adequate
credible
statements,
facts,
or
documents which, if substantiated and not rebutted in a
hearing, would constitute sufficient evidence to support
a finding of a violation of the Act." (Lake Zurich
School District 95, 1 PERI 1031.)
If a complaint is issued the responding party has 15 days in

which to file an answer.

The answer must include a specific

admission, denial or explanation of each allegation of the complaint.
If the

respondent does not have sufficient knowledge to make that

response the respondent must state that
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this is the case and the

statement will operate as a denial.

The answer must also contain a

specific, detailed statement of any affirmative defenses.

A failure

to file a timely answer will be considered as an admission of the
material facts alleged in the complaint and the right to a hearing
will be waived.

If the respondent fails to answer any part of the

complaint that part of the allegation will be considered to have been
admitted.
The actual hearing will be conducted in front of a Hearing
Officer.

Interested persons wishing to intervene in the hearing may

direct a request to the Hearing Officer who has the discretion to
grant or deny the request.

The Hearing Officer is to consider the

timeliness of the request, the degree to which the person requesting
the intervention has a real interest at stake and the ability of the
parties to represent the interest of the person making the request.
Section 1120.40( c) encourages Hearing Officers

to schedule

voluntary prehearing conferences with the parties if such conferences
might narrow or resolve the issues.
It is the responsibility of the Hearing Officer to make a
full inquiry into all the matters that are in dispute.

After the

record is closed either party may move the removal of the case to the
full IELRB.

The Hearing Officer is to rule on such motions within 10

days after the close of the record.

The Hearing Officer may also

order the case removed on his own motion.

If the case is not

removed, the Hearing Officer is obligated to file and serve a
recommended decision on both parties as promptly as possible.
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After a recommended decision has been served the parties have
15 days in which to file exceptions.
support of those exceptions.

The parties may file briefs in

If the exceptions are not filed within

15 days the exceptions will be considered as waived.
The full

IELRB will review the

request by either party.
its own motion.

recommended decision upon

It may also review the recommendation on

The full IELRB may adopt all, part, or none of the

recommended decision.
If cases are removed to the full IELRB the parties are
required to file briefs.

The IELRB has the power to direct the

manner in which the briefs are to be presented.

Oral argument is not

a right of the parties but may be allowed at the discretion of the
IELRB.
The IELRB has determined a wide range of actions to be unfair
labor practices.

Some practices were particularly flagrant and it

should be expected that they would be deemed to be unfair.

Others

are more mundane but still deserve mention because they reflect the
approach taken by the IELRB.
One of the more flagrant examples is the case of Board of
Education School District No.

1, 2 PERI 1029.

In that case, the

district's administration and school board were charged with several
violations.
The district terminated the employment of three employees at
the end of the 1983-84 school year.

One of the teachers, Tamara

Worchester, was warned early in the 1983-84 school year by a board
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member to "watch out for the older teachers and that union." (2 PERI
l029, p.68)

Worchester ignored the warning and joined the union.

In

March of 1984, during her second evaluation, her principal told her
that she was doing a fine job but there was a problem about rehiring
her "because of the way the Board felt about the union." (Id. at
p.68)
1he second teacher, William Wrate, was asked by his principal
to be president of the PTA for the 1983-84 school year.

At that

point Wrate was not a member of the union because of his belief that
there was disparate treatment of union and non-union teachers.
at p.68)

(Id.

Wrate agreed to serve as president of the PTA and later

joined the union.

After Wrate stated his position on a controversial

board policy matter in December 1983, his principal allegedly told
Wrate that if he had known that Wrate was going to join the union
that Wrate would never have been asked to become PTA president.
Three months

after

this

conversation Wrate

received a letter of

termination.
The third employee, Katherine Evans, was a school nurse.
was very active in union affairs.

She

She had participated in the

organizational process, picketed during contract negotiations and had
served as an unofficial courier for union literature.

Her employment

was terminated in March and her position was eliminated.
The IELRB determined that each of the dismissals was in
response to protected activity and thus a violation.

The IELRB also

found that the school district committed unfair labor practices when:
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l) A school board member met with the union president and proposed

that if she would resign her position and use her influence to get
other teachers to resign from the union,

the school board member

would use his influence to help her get the teaching position she had
requested for the coming year.

2) The school district conditioned

wage increases for the teachers upon the local unit's willingness to
bargain directly with the District and not rely upon the State
affiliate.

3) The school district refused to offer wage increases

during

negotiations.

the

4)

Principals

questioned

prospective

employees about their union sympathies and recommended against union
membership.

5) The school district only agreed to meet once for

negotiations during a six month period.
As a remedy to the violations, the IELRB issued a cease and
desist order, required the posting of notices of the findings in all
the school buildings, required the mailing of the notice to all the
employees, and ordered the reinstatement of Worchester, Wrate, and
Evans.

Titis variety of remedial actions is an example of the powers

that may be exercised by the IELRB under Section 15, discussed
earlier.
Another example of an unfair labor practice is found in Oak
Lawn Community High School District No. 218, 2 PERI 1014.

The IELRB

found that it was an unfair practice for a school district to
continue to deduct dues on behalf of the incumbent union when
employees had made a proper and timely request
deductions be redirected to a rival union.
105

that the dues

The IELRB also found an unfair labor practice when a school
district discharged a part time librarian after she had assisted in
the organizational campaign for a union and initiated negotiations
for a collective bargaining agreement.

The factual pattern leading

to that determination is found in Balyki Community School District
No. 125, 2 PERI 1047.
Judith Hilst, the librarian, was a member of the Illinois
Education Association and the National Education Association at the
time she was hired in 1973.

She became president of the local in the

At that time,

late 1970's.

the local was not recognized by the

school district.
In October, 1983, the local sought recognition.

'nle school

district refused to grant voluntary recognition and the local then
filed a recognition petition.

The local was certified as the

exclusive representative of all certified full-time and part-time
teachers,

excluding all

administrative

employees

on December

20,

1984.
Hilst began preparation for negotiations in January,

1985.

She surveyed the membership and requested financial information from
the school district.

In early March, she notified the Superintendent

that the union was about to present its demands for collective
bargaining.

On March 13, 1985 the Superintendent informed her that

she was not going to be recommended for re-employment.
board

accepted

the

Superintendent's

dismissed Hilst effective May 25, 1985.
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recommendation

and

The school
formally

The basis of Hilst' s complaint was that the discharge was a
discriminatory discharge and thus a violation under Section 14(a) of
the IELRA.

The test applied by the IELRB for establishing a prima

facie case of discriminatory discharge was a three- prong test.
required that the evidence show:

It

1) That Hilst engaged in activity

protected under Section 3 of the IELRA;

2) that the school district

was aware of the activity; and 3) that Hilst was discharged for that
activity.
The

IELRB

found

that

Hilst

had

engaged

in

activities

protected under Section 3, (organizing activities and presenting a
demand to bargain) , and that she had maintained a very vocal and
highly visible role in those activities.
district knew of
obvious inference.
heels

of

the

those activities

Furthermore, the school

by their own admission and

Finally, the discharge followed so closely on the

protected

activity

that

the

IELRB

discharge as motivated by Hilst' s union activity.
established

a

by

prima

facie

case

of

construed

the

Because Hilst had

discriminatory discharge,

the

burden of proof shifted to the school district to demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the discharge was for legitimate
reasons.
The school district argued that the discharge was because of
unsatisfactory work by Hilst.

However,

the IELRB found that the

behavior complained of, maintaining a cluttered library that was not
conducive to study and failure to promptly complete Title IV program
forms,

had been tolerated for eleven years and no at tempt to
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remediate had been made during that time period.

Furthermore, before

the successful organizational campaign, the superintendent had asked
Hilst if she might be interested in a full time job as a librarian
for the coming year.

Because of those actions, the IELRB determined

that the school district failed to meet its burden of proof and that
the district was guilty of violating

the

provisions of

Sections

14(a)(l) and 14(a)(3).
The case is significant not only because of its finding that
the district was guilty of an unfair labor practice but also because
of the articulation of the three-prong test to be applied in
discriminatory discharge cases.
The case of Chicago Board of Education, 2 PERI 1089 is
significant because it provides an exception to the six month filing
requirement imposed by Section 15.

In this case, the employee did

not know that the employer had refused to comply with a grievance
arbitration award until eleven months after the school district had
made the refusal.

The employee filed the complaint six weeks after

the letter of repudiation was received.

The IELRB held that the

complaint was timely because the statute of limitations period was
tolled when knowledge was imputed to wronged party, not when award
was issued.
Another

representative

example

of

employer

unfair

labor

practices is found in Goreville Districts Nos. 18 & 71, 1 PERI 1108.
In this

case,

the union had filed a complaint alleging that

the

school district had altered the work load of teachers in violation of
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the contractual agreement and had threatened reprisals unless
union dropped the complaint.

the

The school district failed to answer

the charge of an unfair labor practice until after the response date
bad passed and then failed to present good cause for its failure to
make a timely response.

'llle IELRB held that the failure on the part

of the school district constituted an admission on the part of the
The case is significant because it indicates the

school district.

IELRB's resolve to enforce the timely response provision of Section

15·
In Heyworth School District No.

3,

1 PERI 1069,

the IELRB

found that the unilateral change of the high school starting time,
the unilateral addition of fifteen minutes to the teacher work day,
and

the

unilateral

requirement

of ·teacher

attendance

at

monthly

meetings were all unfair labor practices by the school district.
The

IELRB has

been less

willing

to

find

unfair labor practices by union in 1984 or 1985.
find

one

instance

of

unfair labor practice.
District No.

5,

guilty of

'llle IELRB did not issue any findings of

unfair labor practices.

did

unions

where

a

union

In 1986, the IELRB

technically committed

an

That instance, reported in Catlin Unit

2 PERI 1023,

involved a situation where the union

failed to post a notice concerning fair share dues in violation of
Section 1125.20 of the IELRB Emergency Rules.
technical violation,

the

IELRB found that

Although this was a

there was no showing of

prejudice because

the non-union employees received adequate notice

through

of

receipt

the

negotiated
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contract

and

the

union's

enforcement of the contract.

Because there was no prejudice, the

IELRB dismissed the complaint.
It is also instructive to be aware of actions that the IELRB
has determined are not unfair labor practices.

One such action was

complained of in Maine ToWnship High School District No.
1034·.

167,

2 PERI

In that case, the IEA filed an unfair labor practice charge

against the school district as a result of the district's action
during a representation election.

The IEA contended that the school

district timed an announcement of increased salaries and benefits to
precede

the

election

followed the election,

when

the

announcement

would

usually

have

that the school district granted materially

greater benefits than had been granted in previous years, that the
school district publicized the increases in a more extensive fashion
than in previous years, and that the school district met with
employees to solicit grievances in an attempt to resolve them before
the election.
The IELRB dismissed the charges except for the contention
that the school district had timed the announcement of the wages and
benefit increases with the intent of affecting the representation
election.

The IELRB found that the increases were not materially

greater than those of previous years.
not untoward.

The publicity was accurate and

Because of these facts, the pre-election announcement

did not constitute an unlawful conferral of benefits.
The case is significant because it recognizes the right of
school districts to carry on business in a normal manner without the
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fear of being found guilty of an unfair labor practice as long as the
district does not deviate from past practices or act in any manner
inconsistent with its normal procedures.
City Colleges of
another significant case.

Chicago 11108,

Case No.

86-CA-0021-C,

is

In this case, Melvin Malone, a training

specialist with City Colleges, filed a complaint alleging violations
of Section 14(1) and (3).

He had been dismissed from employment.

The stated reason for his dismissal was a lack of work.
The basis of Malone's complaint was that he was discharged in
retaliation for his complaints about the inadequate cleaning of his
classroom and the frequent transfers that he experienced.

However,

there was no evidence that he was engaged in concerted or protected
activities when he complained.
the

Hearing

dismissed.

Officer

(City Colleges, p.2)

recommended

that

the

On that basis,

14(a)(l)

charge

be

In considering the Section 14(a)(3) charge, the Hearing

Officer noted that although it was illegal for an employer to
discriminate in regard to the hire or tenure of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any employee organization, the
IELRA does not proscribe all types of employment discrimination.

On

that basis, the Hearing Officer recommended dismissal of the 14(1)(3)
charges as well.
The significance of this case is that the IELRB recognized
that there is not recourse for every perceived wrong and that unfair
labor practices are only those practices proscribed under the IELRA.
The

procedures

and

sanctions

available
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under

the

IELRA are only

available when the provisions of the IELRA are violated.
East St. Louis School District No. 189, Case No. 84-CA-OOSl-S
deals with the standards a labor organization must meet if it is to
attain successor status under the IELRA.

In this case, the school

district had refused to recognize a union as successor union on the
basis that more than de minimis changes had occurred.

The union that

had been the exclusive representative filed unfair labor practices
alleging violations of Section 14(a)(l),

(2),

(3),

and (S).

The

IELRB upheld the dismissal of all the charges and provided a lengthy
explanation of why the 14(a)(S) charges did not meet the Lake Zurich
standard.
Local 2S3 had been the recognized union.

The SEIU ordered

that Local 2S3 be consolidated and merged with Local SO.

Local SO

simultaneously imposed the following changes:
1.
2.
3.
4.

s.
6.

Former Local 2S3 became a division of Local SO.
Division 2S3 was governed by the constitution and
by-laws of Local SO.
Local SO assumed indebtedness incurred by former
Local 2S3 including legal expenses,
Illinois
property tax and sewage bills.
The structure of elected of fices at the local level
was changed to reflect control by Local SO.
The
former offices of local president, vice-president,
recording
secretary
(treasurer)
and
business
representative
became
division
chairperson,
vice-chairperson, secretary and board members.
Local SO' s existing officers were given authority
over the day-to-day operations of Division 2S3.
Additionally, Local SO appointed a full-time
business representative to meet with the Employer
to administer the contract on behalf of Division
2S3's employees. p.3

The IELRB first considered whether the union had attained the
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status of exclusive representative under the IELRA and could invoke
sanctions under Section 14(a)(5) of the IELRA.
The IELRB applied the test found in Triton College, 2 PERI
1013·

That test states that a surviving union after a merger will

attain successor status if the change involves nothing more than a de
minimis change in name and structure.

In this context, the IELRB has

defined de minimis as "a modification in name or structure which does
not result, directly or indirectly, in more than a minimal change in
the focus of authority or control over either the internal affairs of
the organization or its

external

collective bargaining matters."

relationship to the Employer in

(East St, Louis, p.2.)

Using that

test, the IELRB determined that the changes imposed were significant
changes and that Local 50 did not qualify as a successor union.
The

most

significant

change

imposed

was

that

Local

50

appointed the collective bargaining agent for Division 253 rather
That fact,

than allowing Division 253 to select its own agent.

coupled with the other five imposed changes, convinced the IELRB that
there was more than a de minimis modification of status.
The

union

also

argued

that

its

status

as

exclusive

representative was determined by a federal court in a prior consent
judgment.
Local

That action had been brought to keep former oificers of

253 from interfering with the operation of Local 253 as a

division of Local 50.

That action had been settled by a consent

judgment which acknowledged the status of Local 50 as the controlling
body.

However, the IELRB found that the consent judgment dealt with
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internal matters rather than recognition status, so the judgment was
not binding on the IELRB.
The case is significant for two reasons.

The first is the

IELRB's unequivocal statement that the federal court proceeding does
not "deal disposively with recognition under our statute."

(Id.,

p.5)
The second important proposition this case stands for is that
representation must be sought and won before an employer is bound to
deal with a union if the union has changed in a significant way since
it gained recognition.
Another case where no unfair labor practice was found is
Carbondale Community High School District No. 165.

In that case the

school district decided to subcontract its custodial and maintenance
services.

The union,

Service Employees

International Local union

#316, charged that the school district violated Sections 14(a)(l) and
(5) of the IELRA.

The IELRB, reversing the recommended decision of

the Hearing Officer, dismissed the charges.
The school district had recognized the SEIU as the exclusive
representative of its custodial and maintenance employees for many
years

and

entered

into

successive

labor agreements with SEIU on

behalf of those employees.
The fact pattern leading to the school district's decision to
sub-contract began in the fall of 1983.

At that time, the district

became aware of a deficit in revenues of $177, 000 for 1983 and an
anticipated deficit of approximately $100, 000 for 1984.
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The school

district had budget deficits for the two previous years as well.

As

a result, the district began to look for more ways to reduce costs.
At that point, the district and the union were beginning the last
year of their collective bargaining agreement.
In February, 1984, the Board of Education directed the school

subcontracting
reducing
Donald

to

administration

district

custodial

costs.

Yost,

to

They
gather

and

look

into

maintenance

directed

the
services

the district's

information

possibility

regarding

as

a

way

of
of

business manager,
the

advantages

and

disadvantages of subcontracting for cleaning services.
At

the end of March, 1984, Yost reported to the Board of

Education that the school district could save approximately $27,000
by subcontracting its custodial and maintenance services.
same time,

Yost

informed the business agent of

the union,

At the
Elmer

Brandhorst, that the Board of Education was exploring the possibility
of subcontracting the work.
On May 17, 1984, the Board of Education directed the school
district administration to seek bids on the custodial work so they
could see whether the estimated cost savings could actually be
achieved.

It is not clear from the facts when the bid specifications

were released to prospective bidders but Yost sent Brandhorst a copy
of the bid specifications on June 4, 1984.
The bids were opened on June 11, 1984.
City Wide Maintenance with a bid of $109,000.

The low bidder was

It had cost the school

district $243,000 for the same services by its own employees in the
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198 3-84 school year.
On June 14, 1984, Yost sent Brandhorst a letter informing him
that the school district was seriously considering the possibility of
subcontracting

the

custodial services for

economic reasons.

The

letter invited SEIU to bargain over the matter as soon as possible.
The

school

district

and

the

negotiating session on June 18, 1984.

union

met

for

the

first

Representatives for the school

district noted the potential savings of the district if the work were
subcontracted.

They urged the union representatives to make a

proposal in light of City Wide's bid and also expressed a willingness
to discuss effects bargaining if no agreement was reached.
On June 27, 1984, another session was held.
Brandhorst

asked

for

additional

information

At that meeting

about

the

~ype

of

proposal desired by the school district and also asked for more time
to make a proposal.

The district representative explained that the

union should make a proposal competitive with City Wide' s bid and
that the only factor concerning the district was cost.

The district

agreed to give more time to the union for preparation of the proposal
and affirmed that the district was willing to consider and discuss
proposals make by the union.
Yost called Brandhorst several times between June 27 and July
18.

Brandhorst testified that the purpose of the calls was to

suggest ways that the union might craft a proposal that would be
acceptable to the school district.
The next negotiating session was on July 18, 1984.
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The union

presented a proposal providing the same services as proposed by City
Wide, but at a cost of $157,525.

The Board of Education immediately

considered and rejected the proposal.
On July 24, 1984, Yost informed Brandhorst that the union's
proposal had been rejected and set a follow-up meeting for July 26.
At

the July 26 meeting the district informed the union that the

proposal

was

rejected

because

it

was

too

costly.

Brandhorst

presented a joint letter for Yost to sign, requesting mediation from
the Department of Labor.

Yost signed the letter and it was submitted

to the Department of Labor.
A mediation session was held on August 14, 1984.
meeting

the

SEIU informed

the

proposal was the last offer.

school

district

that

the

At that
$157 ,000

Brandhorst also informed the school

district that, unlike the City Wide bid, the SEIU proposal would not
include a guarantee about the quality of work.

The school district

responded that the City Wide bid of $109,000 was its proposal.
the

conclusion

of

the

session

Brandhorst

declared

that

At
the

negotiations were at an impasse •.
The School Board, at its regular meeting on August 22,
accepted City Wide's bid and terminated the custodial and maintenance
employees.
The school district and SEIU began "effects bargaining" on
August 24.

Both sides presented proposals on items such as severance

pay, retraining programs and preference for hiring for SEIU employees
by City Wide.

After another session on August 28, a proposal was
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presented to

The proposal was unanimously

the union membership.

rejected and there was no further attempt by either party to bargain
about the decision or the effects.
The IELRB took careful notice of all these facts when
It affirmed the finding of the Hearing

reaching its decision.

Officer that the decision to subcontract is a mandatory subject of
bargaining.

(Id.

at

11)

However,

the

IELRB determined that

the

school district had in fact bargained in good faith about the topic.
The

IELRB

began

subcontracting context,
must

give

notice

to

its

analysis

by

stating

that

in

a

good faith bargaining means "the employer
the

union,

meet

with

the

union,

provide

information necessary to the union's understanding of the problem,
and consider, in good faith, any proposals that the union advances."
(Id. at 11, 12)
In the opinion of the IELRB,
those requirements.

the school district had met

The school district provided notice to the union

that it was considering the possibility before it actually sought the
information.

The district met with the union as frequently as the

union wished and the district provided any information sought by the
union.

In fact, Brandhorst acknowledged in his testimony that Yost

had provided good faith suggestions for ways in which the union might
prepare a proposal that would be acceptable to the district.
footnote,

In a

the IELRB found it important that there was an economic

reason for the district's decision and that there was an absence of
bad faith:
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It is significant to our decision that the Hearing
Officer found that the District did not take its actions
to
undermine the union or to discourage union
membership, but rather acted solely for economic
reasons. Also, there was no evidence of any collusion
between the District and City Wide to "low ball" the bid
to oust the union. (Id. at 13, fn. 11)
The case is significant in two ways.

First, it clearly

establishes that an employer must follow certain procedures if it
wishes to consider subcontracting work that has been performed by
members of a recognized bargaining unit.

The employer must give

notice to the union that it is considering the possibility, meet with
the union to discuss the possibility, provide information necessary
to the union's understanding of the problem,

and,

in good faith,

consider any proposals by the union.
The second important result of this case is the IELRB's
recognition of the right of the employer to seek bids in this type of
situation.

The IELRB acknowledged that "it was a legitimate means of

determining whether its beliefs or estimates about the outcome of
subcontracting were founded in fact or merely speculative" (Id. at
14)

This case allows a school district to seek bids and then to

place the bid of its choice on the bargaining table as a proposal.
One final example of conduct that was not considered an
unfair labor practice is found in Crystal Lake Community High School
District 155, 2 PERI 1073.

In that case the school district filed an

unfair labor charge against the union because the union designated a
department chair to sit as a representative on the union's bargaining
team.

This was in violation of a contractual agreement between the
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union and the district which prohibited department chairs from
participating on the collective bargaining team.

The Hearing Officer

dismissed the charge because the alleged conduct did not violate any
terms of the IELRA.
The case is significant because it makes it clear that
parties may not use the offices of the IELRB to seek redress for just
any grievance.

The conduct complained of must violate some provision

of the IELRA before a party can use remedies afforded by the statute.
Illegai· Strikes as Unfair Labor Practices.Under the IELRA
Section 13 of the IELRA lists five prerequisites for a legal
strike by educational employees.

The five requirements are: 1.

That

the employees be represented by an exclusive bargaining agent, 2.
That mediation be used without success, 3.
given, 4.

That a five day notice be

1bat the collective bargaining agreement, if one exists,

be expired, and 5. That the parties have not jointly submitted any
unresolved issues to arbitration.

All five of the requirements must

be met or the strike is illegal.
There are two situations where the first requirement might be
violated.

The first is a "wildcat" strike, a strike when employees

strike without the authorization of their union.

In that situation

the strike would be conducted by some party other than a labor union
so the IELRB would not have jurisdiction.

Without jurisdiction no

unfair labor charges can be filed.
The

second

situation

is
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when

a

union

engages

in

organizational or recognitional picketing.

That situation will be

discussed under a separate subheading.
The
mediation.

statute

clearly

requires

the

parties

to

engage

in

Refusal to participate in mediation would be a refusal to

bargain in good faith.

This would be a violation of Section 14(a)(5)

by the employer and a violation of Section 14(b)(3) by the union.

An

outright refusal to comply with clearly stated requirements of the
statute presents a prima facie case of an unfair labor practice.
The basic purpose of the five day notice requirement is to
allow the IELRB to ensure that a good faith attempt at mediation has
occurred and a failure to provide that notice presents another prima
facia case of a failure to bargain in good faith.
A strike

when

a

collective

bargaining

agreement

exists

presents a situation where there is both a contractual violation and
a violation of the statutory requirements.

Section lO(c) requires

all contracts to have a no strike clause so every legal contract will
have one.

Under Crystal Lake, discussed supra, an intertwining of

the facts will not necessarily make a contractual violation an unfair
labor practice.

However, an intertwining of legal issues will result

in the IELRB having jurisdiction over the dispute as an unfair labor
practice.
However, Section 10 of the statute also requires the contract
to

include

binding

arbitration

of

disputes

administration or interpretation of the contract.
policy consideration in the drafting of the statute.
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concerning

the

This reflects a
The policy is

to assure students and educational employers that the educational
process will not be disrupted while there is an enforceable contract
in existence.
Therefore,
educational

it

is

employees

to

likely
seek

an

that

the

courts

injunction

will

pursuant

allow
to

the

provisions of Section 13(3) and the employer will not be forced to
pursue its remedy through the administrative process.
Violation of the final provision will result in an analysis
similar to

the one just described.

The requirement of

interest

arbitration is another one of the trade-offs for the no strike
provision.

A violation of this implicit agreement should result in

the employer being given access to the process leading to injunctive
relief.
Filing of an Unfair Labor Charge by an Employee
The original wording of the statute did not address the
question of whether an individual employee could file an unfair labor
charge.

In

the

Board

of

Governors

of

State

Colleges

and

Universities, 1 PERI 1175, the IELRB dismissed the charges filed by
an individual.

The charge had been filed pursuant to the provisions

of Section 1120. 20 of

the Rules and Regulations which authorized

individuals to file unfair labor charges.
The

legislature

recognized

the

problem

caused

by

the

statute's failure to address the question and amended Section 14 of
the statute to expressly authorize an individual to file unfair labor
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practice charges.

This amendment was effective on July 1, 1985.

Responsibility to.Prosecute an Unfair Labor Practice Charge
Section 15 of the IELRA provides that the charging party may,
at the hearing, present evidence in support of the charges.

Section

1100. 60 of the Rules and Regulations provides that parties may be
represented by counsel or any other representative of their choosing.
The inference to be made from the statute and regulation, therefore,
is that the charging party has the responsibility to prosecute the
charges.
Indeed, that is the official position of the IELRB.

Robert

Perkovich, the Executive Director of the IELRB wrote a brief article
entitled

"Practice and

Procedure Before

Labor Relations Board."
that "the Board does

the

Illinois

Educational

In that article, he stated unequivocally

~

prosecute

the unfair labor charge,

but

rather the charging party is required to appear on its own behalf or
through

a

duly

designated

claim."

(Ferkovich, p. 5)

A Breach of the.Duty
Practice

representative

and must

of Fair •epreseniaticin

~s

prosecute

~n Unf~ir

the

tabor

Section 14 (b)(l) prohibits an employee organization from restraining
or coercing an employee in the exercise of his rights under the
statute.

The statute does not address the question of whether a

violation of

the duty of fair

representation is an unfair labor
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practice.

The IELRB has not conclusively answered that question but

the indications are that the answer would be affirmative.
'llte IELRB first faced the question in Custodial & Maintenance
Employees Organization of District 59, 1 PERI 1107.

In that case an

employee charged the union with violation of Section 14(b) (1) for
failure to submit a grievance to arbitration.

The IELRB dismissed

the charge for failure to raise an issue of law or fact sufficient to
warrant a however,

in the concluding portion of the opinion,

the

IELRB addressed the issue of whether a breach of the duty of fair
representation is an unfair labor practice:
The issue whether there is a duty of fair representation
under the Act is one of first impression. It cannot be
ignored that a number of various jurisdictions, both in
the private and public sector, have found such a duty
arising out of statutory language similar, if not
identical, to that contained in Section 3, Section 8 and
Section 14(b)(l) of the Act in which certain statutory
rights are granted to the educational employees and
their exclusive bargaining representative.
See e.g.s.
Steele v. Louisville and Nashville and Nashville
Railroad, 323 U. s. 192, 15 LRRM 708 (1944); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 64 LRRM 2369(1967); Miranda Fuel
Co., 140 NLRB 181, 51 LRRM 1584 (1962); Kaufman v.
"GOI'dberg, 64 Misc. 2d 524, 315 N.Y.s. 2d 35 (1970);
Belanger v. Matteson, 346 A.2d 124 (1975); Teamsters
Local 45 v. Montana, 110 LRRM 2012 (Mont. 1981);
Kaczmarek v. N.J Turnpike Authority, 99 LRRM 2159 (N.J.
1978).
The IELRB then assumed, arguendo, that such a duty did exist
and went on to dismiss

the charge because there was no apparent

breach of the assumed duty.
Recognitional Picketing as· an Unfair Labor Practice
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The IELRA does not have a provision prohibiting recognitional
or organizational

picketing.

An

examination of

the

legislative

record reveals that the legislature was well aware of the existence
of this kind of picketing in the private sector but did not believe
that it would occur in public education labor relations.
SENATOR SANGMEISTER:
Where are we on the ••• I'm not exactly what you call it
but •• but I think there are such things as, you know,
fights between labor unions aon representation strikes
and picketing and that kind of stuff.
Is there any
pro hi bit ion?
Its my understanding that the National
Labor Relations Act prohibits those kind of strikes or
picketing where there's union fights. Is there anything
in this bill to prevent that or go along with the
National Labor Relations Board regulation, or law, or
rule?
PRESIDING OFFICER: (SENATOR SAVICKAS)
Senator Bruce
SENATOR BRUCE:
Recognition strikes are becoming a thing of the ••• the
past and certainly is not a big item in the area of ••• of
collective
bargaining.
This
bill,
in
fact,
would ••• would ••• would
remove any necessity for
a
recognition strike, because the procedure sets forth an
election procedure and it would be an unfair labor
practice if the employer did not recognize the
bargaining unit.
So, I can ••• I can see no reason why
there would ever be a recognition strike, you'd just
submit names to the Educational Labor Relations Board
and they shall conduct an election.
So, there would
never be a need for a recognition strike."
(Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, p. 23 June 27, 1982)
However, it is not impossible that such action might occur.
If it does, employees might have to stand to file charges of unfair
labor practices against the union for restraining or coercing them in
the exercise of their statutory rights.
It is also possible that the employer might file unfair labor
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practice

charges

alleging

violations

of

Section 14(b)(2).

That

section prohibits employee organizations from restraining or coercing
an

educational

employer

in

the

selection

of

the

exclusive

representative of the employees.
Before a complaint could be issued, the investigation by the
IELRB

must

disclose

documents, which,

"adequate

credible

statements,

facts

or

if substantiated and not rebutted in a hearing,

would constitute sufficient evidence to support a finding of a
violation of the Act."

(Lake Zurich)

After the charge was issued,

the charging party would have to prove a violation by a preponderance
of the evidence.
Based upon the IELRB seeming unwillingness to find a union
guilty of unfair labor practices (no violations have been found) it
is unlikely that a violation would be found unless the union's
actions were particularly egregious.

The

Standard-of' tile :Burden of

Proof

The statute does not make a declaration about the standard of
the burden of proof in unfair labor practice proceedings.
Section

llOS.190

of

the

Illinois

Educational

Labor

However,
Relations

Rules and Regulations provides that all the hearings shall be
conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applied in the
courts of Illinois pertaining to civil actions.

Under those rules, a

charging party must prove his charge by a preponderance of the
evidence.
A preponderance of the evidence is the standard specifically
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required by the IPLRA and the NLRA.

The IELRB has consistently

applied this standard as well.

cc>iici\islons
There are three conclusions to be drawn about unfair labor
practices under the IELRA.

The first is that the determination of

whether an action is an unfair labor practice will be made on a case
by case basis.

The particular fact pattern leading to the charges

will be considered individually by the IELRB before a decision is
rendered.

Therefore,

it

is

difficult

to

absolutely

define

a

particular practice as unfair unless all the facts are known.
The second general conclusion is that the IELRA. is unclear
regarding the mechanics for processing unfair labor charges.

The

Illinois Educational Labor Relations Rules and Regulations attempt to
clarify the process.

However, there is certain to be controversy

about whether the statute enables the IELRB to develop regulations as
comprehensive as they developed.
The third general conclusion is that, to date, unions are
less likely than employers to be found guilty of unfair labor
practices.

That likelihood may be a function of the number of

changes filed rather than being reflective of a posture by the IELRB.
As more charges are filed and processed it will become easier to
explore the reasons for this conclusion.
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CHAPTER 5
UNIT DETERMINATION
INTRODUCTION
The question of unit determination, who will be included in a
bargaining unit, is of great interest to both unions and employers.
This chapter will begin with a discussion of the guidelines developed
by the NLRB in response to questions dealing with unit determination.
The statutory scheme of the IELRA and the significant cases issued by
the IELRB in this area will then be presented and analyzed.

The

discussion of unit determination under the Illinois Educational Labor
Relations

Act

(IELRA)

will

include

answers

to

the

following

questions:
I.

Will department chairmen be considered part of the
professional unit?
2. Will academic deans be considered part of the professional
unit?
3. Will student deans be considered part of the professional
unit?

Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides the basic scheme for unit
determination:

Representatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by the majority ( 50%+1) of the
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all employees in
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such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment: Provided, That any
individual employee or a group of employees shall have
the rights at any time to present grievances to their
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without
the intervention of the bargaining representative, as
long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement
then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining
representative has been given opportunity to be present
at such adjustment. (NLRA, Section 9(a))
There are two particularly significant words in that section.
The first is "majority."

This binds all the members of the unit,

whether the minority of the membership agrees or not.

The provision

that individuals have the right to seek redress of their grievances
is an attempt to protect the rights of the minority.
The second is the word "appropriate."

The statute does not

say rt must be the most appropriate, simply that it must be a unit
appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining.
adopted

this

conflict

that

approach

to

avoid

would

result

if

the
it

excessive
had

to

The NLRB has

entanglement

determine

the

and
most

appropriate unit.
Gorman notes that in the history of bargaining in the private
sector, the jurisdiction of the NLRB to make decisions determining
units is at the heart of our system of collective bargaining and has
the most pervasive impact on our industrial system. (Gorman, p. 67.)
He lists several reasons for this importance.
First, a large unit will be more difficult for a union to
organize.

The union must demonstrate a showing of interest before an
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election can be held and that is more difficult in a large unit.
Second, the larger the unit the more diverse interests within
the unit.

Those diverse interests give rise to more internal

conflict and make it more difficult for

the union to adequately

represent the interests of all the members.
Third, if there are several small units it is more likely
that the employer will face the threat of several work stoppages over
the course of time rather than facing only one every two or three
years.

It is also more expensive for the employer to be involved in

several sets of bargaining cycles and negotiation sessions.
Fourth, large units carry the threat of such major work
stoppages

that

production might

be

completely halted.

For that

reason, some employers may prefer smaller units because that could
allow them to shift work between units.
Fifth, if there are a number of smaller units there may be
juridictional disputes and other forms of rivalry that disrupt the
production process.
All of these examples illustrate the important role of unit
determination in the private sector.
The NLRA does not give very specific guidelines to assist the
NLRB in determining what positions should be included in the unit.
Section 9(b) simply directs the NLRB "to assure to the employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act."
an effort to satisfy this statutory requirement,

In

the NLRB has

developed an approach which seeks to create units which have a
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coilllllunity of interest.
Gorman has identified twelve factors which the NLRB considers
when determining if a community of interest exists:
1.

Similarity in the scale and manner of determining
earnings;
2. Similarity in employment benefits, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment;
3. Similarity in the kind of work performed;
4. Similarity in the qualifications, skills and training of
the employees;
5. Frequency of contact or interchange among the employees;
6. Geographic proximity;
7. Continuity or integration of production processes;
8. Common supervision and determination of labor-relations
policy;
9. Relationship to the administrative organization of the
employer;
10. History of collective bargaining;
11. Desires of the affected employees;
12. Extent of union organization.
(Gorman p.69)
Although the NLRB has a great deal of freedom in determining
what constitutes an appropriate unit, there are some limitations on
that freedom.

Section 9(b) prohibits the inclusion of professional

employees in a unit with non-professional employees unless a majority
of the professional employees vote for inclusion in a separate
representation election.
guards

The section also prohibits the inclusion of

in a unit with non-guards and sets up some limitation on

severance elections involving workers involved with the crafts.
The NLRA also requires that certain individuals not be
included in a bargaining unit as they are excluded from coverage by
the

statute.

Section (3)

specifically excludes supervisors
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from

Section

coverage.

2(11)

provides

the

statutory

definition

of

supervisor:
( 11 )The term "supervisor" means any individual having
authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if
in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature,
but requires the use of independent judgment.
In NLRB v. Textron, the Supreme Court extended the exclusion
to

"managerial"

employee,

defined

as

those

who

formulate

and

effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the
decisions of their employer.

In the landmark case of NLRB v. Yeshiva

University, the Supreme Court applied this test and found that the
university faculty members were managerial employees by virtue of the
fact

that

decisions

they participated
through

their

in

the making and

participation

in the

implementation of
faculty

senate

and

committee structure.
In NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp.,
confidential
capacity

to

employees
persons

who

assisted

exercising

and

acted

managerial

in a

confidential

functions

in

labor

relations matters were also excluded.
However, probationary and regular part-time emploeyes are not
excluded under the NLRA.

Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass

Co.
An awareness of the exclusions and guidelines found under the
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NLRA is reflected in the legislative history and final wording of the
IELRA· However, there is also an awareness of the unique nature of
the relationship between public education employers and employees.

Section 7 of the IELRA provides the basic statutory framework
for unit determination under the IELRA.

The prefatory statement of

Section 7 gives the IELRB the right to adminster the recognition of
bargaining

representatives

of

employee

school

districts,

public

community colleges, state colleges and universities, and any state
agency whose major function is providing educational services.

This

power is limited by the provision that the IELRB must make certain:
That each bargaining unit contains employees with an
identifiable community of interest and that no unit
includes both professional employees and nonprofessional
employees unless a majority of employees in each group
vote for inclusion in the unit. (IELRA, Section 7)
It is of particular interest to note that the drafters of the
IELRA made the community of interest a statutory requirement and that
it requires a majority vote of both the professional employees and
the non-professional employees before they can be included in the
same unit.
It is also of interest, that unlike the private sector
setting,

there

is

a

trend among

unions

representing educational

employees to seek a wall- to- wall bargaining unit.

The reason for

this difference is the historical lack of co-operation between
different groups of educational employees when one of the groups was
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involved in labor disputes.
part

to

the

fact

that

That lack of co-operation was due in

relatively

few

of

the

non-professional

employees were unionized and so subject to employer discipline i f
they did not cross picket lines.

It is the apparent intent of the

major unions representing educational families to seek to represent
the "educational family."
Section 7(a) provides the parameters for the decision making
process of the IELRB:
(a) In determining the appropriateness of a unit, the
Board shall decide in each case, in order to ensure
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the
purpose of collective bargaining, based upon but not
limited to such factors as historical pattern of
recognition, community of interest, including employee
skills and functions, degree of functional integration,
interchangeability and contact among employees, common
supervision, wages, hours and other working conditions
of the employees involved, and the desires of the
employees. Nothing in this Act shall interfere with or
negate the current representation rights or patterns and
practices
of
employee
organizations
which
have
historically represented employees for the purposes of
collective bargaining, including but not limited to the
· negotiations of wages, hours and working conditions,
resolutions of employees' grievances, or resulution of
jurisdictional disputes, or the establishment and
maintenance of prevailing wage rates, unless a majority
of the employees so represented experesses a contrary
desire under the procedures set forth in this Act. This
Section,
however,
does
not
prohibit
multi-unit
bargaining.
Notwithstanding the above factors, where
the majority of public employees of a craft so decide,
the Board shall designate such craft as a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.
It is significant to note that the statute uses the definite
article "the" when referring to "appropriate unit." Arguably, this
would require the IELRB to select the most appropriate unit.
134

It

is also of significance that although the statute lists

factors which are to be considered when making the decision,
statute also makes

it

clear that

the list is not

the

necessarily

exhaustive.
Sections 7(b) and (c) provide the process for recognition of
representatives

by

the

employer

and

for

recognition by election.

Neither of these processes will be discussed since the focus of the
chapter

is

on

how

the

IELRB

will

analyze

questions

of

unit

detennination.
Exclusions From Bargaining Units
Section 3
employees.

~xtends

Section

the right

2(b)

provides

to organize to educational
a

definition

of

educational

employee:
"Educational
employee"
or
"employee"
means
any
individual,
excluding
supervisors,
managerial,
confidential,
short
term
employees,
student,
and
part-time academic employees of community colleges
employed full or part time by an educational employer,
but shall not include elected officials and appointees
of the Governor with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
For the purposes of this Act, part-time
academic employees of community colleges shali be
defined as those employees' who provide less than 6
credit hours of instruction per academic semester.
(IELRA, Section 2(b))
Unlike the NLRA, the IELRA provides a statutory exclusion for
managerial, confidential and part-time employees.
To

date,

most

exclusions

has

revolved

considered

supervisors,

of

the

controversy

around

the

managerial
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in

questions
employees,

interpreting
of
and

who

will

the
be

confidential

employees.
Section 2(g) provides the statutory definition of supervisor:
(g) "Supervisor" means any individual having authority
in the interests of the employer to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, reward or
discipline other employees within the appropriate
bargaining unit and adjust their grievances, or to
effectively recommend such action if the exercise of
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature but requires the use of independent judgment.
The term "supervisor' includes only those individuals
who devote a preponderance of their employement time to
such exercising authority.
In the original version of the statute, the supervisory
exclusion was the only statutory exclusion.

That exclusion was not

nearly as explicit, the definition only provided that "No employee or
group of employees shall be deemed to be a supervisor because the
employee or group of employees participates in decisions with respect
to course, curriculum,

personnel, or other matters of educational

policy." (H.B. 1530, as enrolled, Section 2(9).)
This

provision

was

obviously

intended

application of Yeshiva to public school employees.

to

negate

the

The language was

changed to its present form by the governor's amendatory veto.
(Governor's Amendatory Veto, pp. 2-3)

The change was an attempt, in

his words, "to create a workable and fair system that balances the
rights of educational employees with the unique managerial problems
that beset educational employers and the taxpayers who ultimately pay
the bill." (Id. at p. 2)
The effect of the change was that now the IELRB was to apply
a percentage of time test.

If an individual devotes a preponderance
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of her time to exercising supervisory authority, she is to be
considered a supervisor.

In order to understand the legislative

intent of the meaning of the definition, it is necessary to look at
the House debates on the IPLRA.

The language was taken directly from

the IPLRA and at the time the language was debated, the IPLRA
provided for coverage of educational employees.

The following

exchange took place during the floor debates:
Representative Hoffman:
"I'm chairman of a social studies department at a small
suburban high school where I spen ••• 40% of my time in
the classroom and then ••• 10% of the time ••• with the
responsibility as the chairman of the department or, to
translate it into total percentage, I guess it would be
80% and 20%.
And that's fairly typical of the
supervisors or the department chairmen in our high
school.
Would this language prohibit the department
chairmen in the high school where I teach from
organizing their own bargaining unit?"
Representative Grieman:
"Are you presently organizing a supervisory unit?"
Representative Hoffman:
"No."

Representative Grieman:
"Then you could not under this Bill ••• ( S )upervisors,
unless they are presently in a supervisory unit, cannot
organize in supervisory units after this Bill."
Representative Hoffman:
"But since a preponderance of my time is not spent in
supervision, I would be required to become part of the
teachers bargaining unit. Is that correct?"
Representative crleman:
"I guess if you' re a teacher, you' re a teacher.
You
would not have been a supervisor before either.
83rd Gen. Assem. House Debate on S.B. 536.pp.287-88
(June 24, 1983).
The debates on the House floor reflect a general intent that
department chairs should not be considered supervisors unless they
could meet the preponderance of time test.
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The Senate debates that

took place after the amendatory veto made the intent even more
explicit:
Senator Davidson:
Question of the sponsor.
President:
Indicates he will yield, Senator Davidson.
Senator Davidson:
Senator Bruce, when you were asked earlier about
supervisor,
and
you
said
it
would
depend
on
the ••• preponderance of employement time. The question I
have, would that include a department chairperson in
that title?
Presiding Officer: (Senator Demuzio)
Senator Bruce.
Senator Bruce:
Senator Davidson, it would be my feeling since that we
were talking about determination by actual function and
not title, and since we're talking about whether a
person has the right to hire, fire and effectvely
recommend a ••• an individual, that under NLRA rules,
requlations and prior court decisions, I don't believe
that department chairs in either K through twelve or
community
colleges
would ••• would
be
considered
supervisors; they rarely could be, and I think that if
they were to have spent a preponderance of their
employment time, as it was defined by the Governor in
this amandatory veto, they could be, but I don't believe
that they ••• that they do.
The Yeshiva decision which
dealt with New York seemed to say that they would be,
but it is clear under Illinois law and the proceedings
here that that is an entire different situation. They
do not have the input in its administrative or
managerial decisions which the Supreme Court found
determinative in that case.
83rd. Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, p.
61, 62 (Nov. 2, 1983).
It is clear from this exchange that it was

the legislative

intent that department chairmen should rarely, if ever, be considered
as supervisors.
Section 2(0) provides the statutory definition of managerial
employee:
"Managerial employee" means an individual who is engaged
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predominantly in executive and management functions and
is charged with the responsibility of directing the
effectuation of such management policies and practices.
(IELRA, Section 2(0))
This

exclusion

was

also

added

by

the

amendatory

veto.

(Amendatory Veto Message, p. 3)
The legislative history of this section also indicates that
this was

intended to be a very narrow exclusion.

The following

exchange took place on the Senate floor following the Governor's
amendatory veto message:
Senator Luft:
Question, please, Mr. President.
President: 0
Indicates ••• the sponsor indicates he'll yield. Senator
Luft.
Senator Luft:
Managerial employee, the definition, is it determined by
his title or by the role of the individual?
President:
Senator Bruce.
Senator Bruce:
On ••• on managerial employees, Senator Luft, I believe
the Governor in ••• in his definition made it very clear
that it is ••• it is not the title. It is the question of
the preponderance of time that the employee will spend
in the question of management, and those people who
would be excluded from management are only those people
who would be limited to what is known as the central
management team.
So, I would believe that the ••• it is
not the title.
President:
Senator Luft.
Senator Luft:
Okay.
As a managerial employee, is that normally the
central management team?
President:
Senator Bruce.
Senator Bruce:
That ••• when we are ••• I believe that we will develop and
using NLRA decisions, the National Labor Relations Act,
that they have ••• they have very narrowly defined
managerial employees, and I believe that that will be
the case here ••• that that function of management would
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be limited to and kept within a central management team.
We're not talking about excluding everyone, just those
very limited people that are central management, at the
very highest leve.
83rd. Gen. Assem, Senate Debate on H.B. 1530,
p.45-6 (Nov. 2, 1983)
The intent to make this a narrow exclusion is reflected in
the statement that it is limited to the central management team.

Not

only is it to be a very narrow exclusion, the IELRB is to use the
same preponderance of time test that is to be used in determining the
supervisory exclusion.
The statutory definition of confidential employee is found in
Section 2(n):
"Confidential employee" means an employee, who (i) in
the regular course of his or her duties, assists and
acts in a confidential capacity to persons who
formulate, determine and effectuate management policies
with regard to labor relations or who (ii) in the
regular course of his or her duties has access to
information relating to the effectuation or review of
the employer's collective bargaining policies.
(IELRA, Section 2(n))
The legislative history reflects an intent
decisions
exclusion.

of

NLRB

which

would

result

in

a

to follow the

relatively

narrow

This intent is reflected in the following exchange:
Senator Welch:
Question of the sponsor, Mr. President.
President:
Indicates he'll yield, Senator Welch.
Senator Welch:
••• Senator Bruce, I have a question concerning your
section on confidential employees.
Could you tell me
whether or not that section re£ers to only those persons
who work with collective bargaining materials?
President:
Senator Bruce.
Senator Bruce:
Thank you.
Both ••• both this question and the earlier
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one bring to mind the National Labor Relations Act, and
when we start talking about confidential employees,
professional employees, managerial employees, I believe
that ••• that all of us should be aware that under
National Labor Relations Act, we have had more than
thirty years of decisions. Other states, when they have
enacted collective bargaining bills, have looked to the
prior decisions under the National Labor Relations Act,
and I believe that the State of Illinois should also do
that. We don't have to reinvent the wheel when it comes
to deciding what is a confidential employee.
The
purpose of that exclusion as it exists in the section
is ••• is to ensure that people are not put in any sort of
position of being compromised.
The definition within
the Statute says that they must have access to the
confidential labor relations material of the employer,
and so that would probably mean the secretary to the
head of the labor relations section would be a
confidential employee. It would not and should not
include people who have access to the budgets, planning
documents and other general material of a ••• a ••• an
educational institution.
President:
Senator Welch.
Senator Welch:
Then your specific intent is to exclude any person who
would be an otherwise confidential employee if they
don't deal with ••• collec·tive bargaining.
President:
Senator Bruce.
Senator Bruce:
That is correct. Again, we should look to the private
sector where we have a ••• a good case history.
The
matter has been well debated and decided.
The
definition, for example, is not even within the National
Labor Relations Act at all.
This has been done on a
case-by-case basis,
and
I
believe
Illinois,
in
interpreting this law, their courts and the agencies of
the State of Illinois should not be bound by the private
sector; but where those prior decisions under the
National Labor Relations Act can be used to give
appropriate guidance to the courts and agencies of the
State of Illinois on how a matter should be ••• decided as
to whether or not an individual is a confidential
employee, those private sector cases should be utilized.
President:
Senator Welch.
Senator Welch:
So, your intent is to include other case decisions in
NLRB references in interpreting the ••• the provision of
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the Statute dealing with confidential employees, is that
correct?
President:
Senator Bruce.
Senator Bruce:
I would assume that the courts of the State of Illinois
and the Educational Labor Board would certainly want to
look at the National Labor Relations Act and develop
from that, where they can, a definition of confidential
employee.
We do not need to reinvent the wheel, it's
thirty years of case decisions.
83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, P•
46-48 (Nov. 2, 1983)
It is important to note that the confidential exclusion has
two alternatives for satisfying the requirement.

The employees may

be excluded if they regularly assist an individual who has managerial
responsibilities with regard to labor relations or i f the employee
has access to information relating to the effectuation or review of
collective bargaining responsibilities.
Appropdai:e unii:s-irn<ier-the.iELRA
Section 7 of the IELRA requires the IELRB to find an
identifiable

community

of

interest

bargaining unit it certifies.

among

employees

within

any

The first question to be discussed is

when an employer with multiple facilities must recognize one unit for
all of its employees.
dealing

with

this

The most significant published decision

question

is

Tri-County

Special

Education

Cooperative, 2 PERI 1046.
The case arose out of a recognition petition filed by the
Tri-County

Special

Education

Association

at

Anna.

The

petition

requested recognition of a unit including all full and regular
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part-time employees employed by the employer at its Anna, Illinois
facility•
Tri-County Special Education Cooperative objected to the unit
on the basis that recognition of the unit would bring about a
fragmentation and

proliferation of bargaining units.

This would

result in a substantial burden on the Cooperative because it operated
a number of separate facilities.

The Cooperative also argued that

the proposed unit was inappropriate because it was an artificial and
arbitrary

separation

of

a

larger

appropriate

unit

because

the

employees at the other facilities shared a community of interest with
the employees at the Anna facility.
As

always,

the

considering the factual
existence since 1968.

Hearing

Officer

background.

began

the

analysis

by

The Cooperative has been in

It serves three counties and provides services

to approximately 2,000 students.

The Cooperative has approximately

seventy certified employees and operates six centers.
The

center at Anna employs approximately thirty certified

employees.

Unlike the other centers, the center at Anna is a

residential placement center.
The policy making body of the Cooperative is the Executive
Board comprised of the superintendents of the local districts served
by the Cooperative.

There is an Executive Director responsible to

this Board who is directly responsible for all of the programs
operated

exculusively

by

the

Cooperative.

The

other managerial

personnel include a project coordinator for the program at Anna, and
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three program coordinators.

All of those individuals are supervised

by the Executive Director.
There are specialized teaching positions at Anna that do not
exist at other programs operated by the Cooperative and there are
positions at the other centers that do not exist at Anna.

The

authority for administration of the Cooperative rests primarily with
the

Executive

Board.

This

is

despite

the

fact

that

the

Administrative District has the authority to sanction or disapprove
the actions of the Executive Board.

Although the project coordinator

and the program coordinators at the Anna Center interview prospective
employees, they do not have the authority to hire employees.

That

authority, as well as the authority to terminate the employment of
individuals, rests with the Executive Director.

Evaluations and day

to day personnel matters such as requests for personal leave are
handled by the immediate supervisors of all employees.

The Executive

Director does not become involved in these matters unless a problem
arises.

The budget for each of the centers is prepared by the on

site managerial personnel,
office bookkeeper.

the Executive Director and the central

Those budgets are subject to approval by the

Administrative District and the Executive Board.
At the time the petition was filed there was not a history of
formal

or

informal

certified employees.

bargaining

between

the

Cooperative

and

its

All of the salaries for certified employees are

paid on the same salary schedule and receive the same benefits.

The

only distinction is that teachers working in local school districts
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work the same calendars as those districts so that students can be
mainstreamed and go to school with their peers.
Based on these facts,

the Hearing Officer found that the

proposed unit was inappropriate because the employees working at Anna
shared a community of interest with employees working at the other
facilities operated by the Cooperative.
The Hearing Officer noted that although there were positions
unique to the center at Anna, the positions all served the same basic
function as those in other facilities.

All of the teachers in the

Cooperative were required to have the same certification, that of
teaching the student with severe behavior disorders or severe and
profound learning disabilities.

Therefore, the teachers at Anna did

not have certification requiring special expertise or qualifications
that would justify establishing a separate unit.
The Hearing Officer also found it significant that all of the
teachers worked under the same salary and fringe benefit scale.

This

indicated that there was no bifurcation of control over labor
relations as between the Anna Center and the central administration.
The Hearing Officer also addressed the question of whether
the employees had

the right

to create smaller units if i t would

enhance their fullest exercise of their statutory rights.
upon Downers Grove Community High School District No.
1105,

the

Hearing

Officer

first

acknowledged

that

99,

Relying
1 PERI

the statutory

requirement was that the petitioned for unit meet the minimum
standards

necessary

for

appropriateness.
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However,

the

Hearing

Officer relied upon the finding in Elgin Community College District

--

HS09, 1 PERI 1085 in finding that the requested unit would result in

the separating out of individuals that would be more appropriately

included in a comprehensive potential certified unit of all certified
employees of the Cooperative.

The portion of Elgin relied on is:

"even though the Act does not literally command that
factors other than those specifically enumerated in
Section 7(a) (historical pattern, community of interest,
desire of employees) be considered in making unit
determinations, the Act wisely allows for the weighing
of
factors
'not
limited
to'
those
specifically
identified in the Act.
We will, of course, consider
allegations
that
a
proposed
bargaining
unit
is
inappropriate based on claims of gerrymandering or
arbitrary fragmentation or based on allegedly compelling
efficiency
needs
dictated
by
the
structure
and
organization of the employer. In weighing these factors
as well as those that the statute specifically requires
us to consider in making unit determinations, it will be
our intent to establish units which are 'appropriate for
the purpose of collective bargaining.'"
(Id. at p.
168)
The Hearing Officer acknowledged that there were, in fact,
differences

between

operated

the

by

functional

the

employees

Cooperative.

integration,

a

lack

at

Those
of

the

different

differences

interchange

facilities

included

among

little

facilities,

special characteristics of each program and geographical separation
of the facilities.
However,

these

differences

were

significant community of interest factors.
central

administration

of

all

the

outweighed

by

very

Those factors included

facilities,

uniform

employment

policies, and the same educational objective shared by all the
personnel at each facility.
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The case is significant because it stands for the proposition
that the IELRB is willing to engage in a balancing test to determine
if

the

community

of

interest

factors

are

outweighed

by

the

differences.
Another significant question in the area of appropriate units
is whether employees teaching in a joint program, working under the
auspices of an administrative district, should be included in the
unit of that district's teachers or should be in a separate unit.
The most significant case in this area is Sterling Community School
District No. 5, 2 PERI 1051.
This case arose out of a unit clarification petition filed by
the

Sterling

Education

Association.

The

petition

sought

the

inclusion of all teaching personnel employed at the Whiteside Area
Vocational Center in a bargaining unit consisting of all teaching
personnel,

excluding

administrative

personnel,

employed

by

the

Sterling Community School District.
The Whiteside Area Vocational Center was created pursuant to
a joint agreement authorized by Section 10-22.3la of the School Code.
Seventeen school districts are parties to the joint agreement and
three private schools participate to a lesser degree in the program.
The Center is directed by a Board of Control comprised of the
district superintendents of each of the seventeen districts.

It has

the responsibility to develop general policies not in conflict with
the policies of the individual Boards of Education and is to advise
the Administrative District relative to the administration of the
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The

Center.

Sterling

School

District

was

designated

as

the

Administrative District but the Board of Control has the right to
change the Administrative District.
The 1982-83 joint agreement provided that the staff of the
Center, for legal purposes, should be considered as employees of the
Sterling school district and would be subject to all the policies
adopted by Sterling's Board of Education.
The 1983-84 joint agreement changed that portion to make the
employees subject to Sterling's policies except where those policies
conflicted with the Center's policies.
It

was

unclear

whether

collective

bargaining

agreements

between the school district and the union covered Center teachers.
The

language

consistently

ref erred

to

"regulary

employed,

certificated teachers" and referred to vocational teachers only in
the "miscellaneous" section of the contract.
The hiring procedure of the Center was found to be of
particular significance in the IELRB' s decision that the Board of
Control should be considered a separate employer for purposes of unit
determination.

The Board of Control has to approve the filling of a

position before the position can be posted.

The Director of the

Center, legally an employee of the Administrative District although
hired by the Board of Control, then interviews candidates for the
position.

The

Director

recommends

an

individual

to

the

Administrative District's Board of Education who has the authority to
approve the employement of the candidate.
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However,

the Board of

control also has the authority to approve the hiring of an individual
before the district's Board of Education considers the matter.
The Director recommends discharges of Center employees as
well·

The Board of Control then approves the action and then the

district's Board of Education approves the action.
The

Board

of

Control

has

different than the district's.
the Center only and

a

reduction

in

force

policy

The Center teachers have tenure at

the seniority lists at the district and the

Center are different.
The salary schedule for Center teachers is the same as that
of the district teachers.
supplemental pay,

However, Center teachers also receive

set by the Board of Control,

and their entire

salary is paid for with Center funds.
The IELRB relied upon Section 2(a) of the Act which provides
that "the governing body of joint agreements of any type formed by
two or more school districts" may be considered an educational
employer.

Although

the

Administrative

attributes of an employer as
Control

possessed sufficient

separate employer status.

District

displayed

program administrator,

some

the Board of

decision making authority

to

obtain

Characteristics of that authority included

the right to vote on the hiring and firing of employees, the adoption
of governing policies that were substantially different than those of
the district's,

the element of financial control exhibited by the

right to determine supplemental pay, and the supervision of Center
teachers

by

Center

supervisory

personnel
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rather

than

district

personnel.
The IELRB also noted that a recent court decision had found
that the Center, as the educational employer, could only grant tenure
-within the Center and did not have the power to confer tenure in
member districts.

Koppi v. Board of Control of Whiteside Area

vocational Center, 133 Ill. App. 3d 591.
The case is significant because it discusses

factors

the

IELRB will consider when determining whether employees working in a
joint

agreement

setting

should

be

considered

employees

of

the

Administrative District or of the governing body of the joint
agreement.
The question of what employees qualify as regular part-time
employees is also important for questions of unit determination.

The

case of Mt. Zion Community School District No.3, 1 PERI 1013 reveals
some

of

the

conclusion.

factors

the

IELRB

will

consider

in

coming

to

a

The case arose when the employer refused to consider

regular part-time employees working less than thirty hours a week as
members of a unit comprised of full and part-time cafeteria workers,
custodial

and

maintenance

employees,

mechanics,

bus

drivers

and

secretaries.
The statement of facts reveals that all part-time employees
are appointed on a yearly basis, are scheduled to work a set number
of hours each day, receive the same benefits and are subject to the
same evaluation and personnel policies.

Because of the common nature

of their employment with other employees, the Hearing Officer found
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that the part-time employees working less than thirty hours a week
shared a sufficient community of interest that they should be
included in the unit with other full and part-time employees.
The case is significant because it makes it clear that the
test for community of interest is shared characteristics and is not a
function of hours of employment.
The question of whether part-time certified employees possess
a sufficient community of interest with full-time certified employees
is another issue that was addressed by the IELRB.

The case of

Pleasant Valley School District No. 62, 2 PERI 1020 addressed that
question.
In

that

case,

the Pleasant Valley Federation of Teachers

filed a representation petition.

The petition sought the right to

represent all full-time certified teachers.

The petition sought to

exclude the statutory exclusions as well as substitutes and part-time
employees.

The district had three part-time employees -

a music

teacher, band teacher, and school nurse.
The findings of fact established the following:
1.
2.

3.
4.
S.

Full-time certified employees normally work Monday
through Friday from 8:10 a.m. until 3:20 p.m.
(tr.6).
Carol Wagaman is a certified teacher of vocal
music.
She normally works on Monday and Tuesday
from 8:10 a.m. until 3:20 p.m.
She is on the
nontenure track (tr.6).
Diane Roeder is a certified teacher of band. She
normally works on Friday from 8:10 a.m. until 3:20
p.m. She is on the nontenure track (tr.6).
Carol Tjaden is a certified school nurse.
She
normally works on Tuesday afternoons for two hours
(Emp. 4).
Salaries for part-time employees are based on their
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6.

7.

years of service and education commensurate with
full-time teachers and then prorated accordingly
(Tr. 13).
Wagaman and Roeder signed contracts substantially
similar to those signed by full-time tenured and
nontenured classroom teachers, i.e., providing for
an annual salary (Emp. 7,8).
Tjaden signed a contract for an hourly wage (Emp.

6).
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.

Wagaman, Roeder and Tjaden receive the same paid
days off as full-time employees except such are
prorated (Tr. 20, 28).
Wagaman, Roeder and Tjaden do not receive the
insurance benefits, prorated or otherwise, provided
to the full-time employees (Tr. 21-22, 38-39).
Wagaman and Roeder are eligible to participate in
extracurricular programs (Tr. 15).
Full- and part-time employees have the same
supervisors (Tr. 14).
There is recurring interaction between full- and
part-time employees.
Wagaman and Roeder make
arrangements with the classroom teachers for
students' release for vocal music, band and related
programs (Tr. 16-18). Tjaden interacts with the
classroom teachers in terms of both nursing and
providing supplemental instruction (Tr. 26-27).
Wagaman and Roeder grade students and communicate
the grades to classroom teachers for placement of
the grade on report cards (Tr. 20).
Roeder and Tjaden are also employed at other school
districts (Tr. 36).
(Id. at 50)

Based on these facts, the Hearing Officer found that there
was a sufficient community of interest to warrant the inclusion of
the part-time certified employees in the unit.

The salaries of the

part-time staff are determined on the same basis, they are located
within the same buildings, the skill levels are similar, the calendar
length of employement and expectations of re-employment are similar,
the supervision is identical, benefits are substantially the same,
there are regularly recurring work schedules and there is regular
interaction between the two groups.
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There was

only one factual

difference and that was that one group was full-time and the other
group was part-time.
The Hearing Officer distinguished this finding from that of
Downers Grove, 1 PERI 1105.

In that decision, the IELRB found that a

musical accompianist used on an occasional basis did not have a
sufficient community of interest to be included in a unit of full and
part-time employees.

In that case, the pianist worked only on a need

basis and there was no contractual obligation to use her when the
need did arise.

The Hearing Officer characterized that

type of

position as casual and short term.
All
teachers.

school

districts

have

occasion

to

use

substitute

Therefore, it is of interest to both substitute teachers

and school districts whether substitute teachers have the right to
organize

under

the

IELRA.

The

IELRB has addressed that question

regarding on-call substitutes in Rockford School District No. 205, 2
PERI 1031.
The case arose when the Rockford Council of Substitute
Teachers filed a representation petition for a bargaining unit
consisting of all regularly employed, on-call substitute teachers.
The school district objected to this petition on the basis

that

employees were short term and thus not educational employees under
Section 2(b).
The statement of facts reveals that substitute teachers in
the district are listed on a roster kept by the district.

In order

to be on the approved roster, a teacher must be a certified teacher.
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She is also required to complete an application,
examination and be interviewed.

take a physical

After the teacher is approved by the

Board of Education and placed on the list, she may substitute for up
to ninety days in any one postiion.

Substitutes do not sign

employment contracts nor are they eligible for tenure.
Substitute teachers are paid on a salary schedule separate
from the regular teachers' salary schedule.

Placement on that

schedule is a function of education and experience.

After a

substitute accumulates a total of 170 days of substitute teaching
(the total may be over a period of time) she becomes eligible for
step increases.
A letter is sent to every person on the list at the end of
the school year and the person must respond affirmatively i f she
wishes to remain on the list.
The

Hearing

Officer

first

considered

the

district's

contention that the substitutes were short-term employees and thus
not covered by the statute.

Bismarck Community School District #1, 1

PERI 1163 provides a definition of short-term employee.

The elements

of that definition are 1 )employment for a definite period of time,
2)in place of another employee who is expected to return, and 3)who
does not share an adequate community of interest with the rest of the
bargaining unit.

In Bismarck, a long-term substitute teacher was

seeking the same rights as regularly employed teachers and was denied
that right.

The Hearing Officer distinguished the case in Rockford

from Bismarck for several reasons.
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The first reason was that the substitute list comprised an
exculsive pool of workers that the district would draw from as the
need arose.

Based on NLRB decisions and an ISLRB decision,

Hearing Officer found

the

that by virtue of being in that exclusive

manpower pool, "Substitutes can be considered employees despite the
fact that the actual work they perform does not occcur daily or even
regularly."

(Rockford at p.88)

The Hearing Officer also found that the substitutes had a
reasonable expectancy of employment.

The district maintains a list

of between 200 and 300 substitues and had in excess of 13,000
substitute days in school year 1984-85.

Based on those numbers, the

Hearing Officer found that although the substitutes do not have a
certain

expectancy

of

employment

they

do

enjoy

a

reasonable

expectancy of employment by virtue of their placement on the list.

The Hearing Officer also found that the existence of salary
steps provided some reason for expectancy of employment.
district had

Indeed, the

ten steps on its salary schedule which the Hearing

Officer interpreted as holding out the promise of a long term
relationship between the district and the substitutes.
The

Hearing officer also

distinguished

Rockford

from

the

situation in Bismarck on the basis that work performed by per diem
substitutes is more on-going than that of long-term substitutes:
The focus should not be placed upon the expected return
of the absent teachers. Rather, the focus should be on
the fact that absences are conditinuous. In fact, they
occur daily throughout the school year and, presumably,
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from school year to school year. In that sense the work
is not temporary. (Id. at p. 88-89)
In summary, the Hearing Officer found that:
The substitutes share common qualifications, a common
salary schedule,
similar working conditions,
are
interchangeable,
and
share
common
superision.
Substitutes do not receive fringe benefits such as sick
leave days, personal leave days, hospitalization or
pension. They are selected from a common pool and the
employees desires have been demonstrated through the
requisite showing of interest. In addition, during the
pendency of this matter, no other labor organization has
sought to intervene. (Id. at 89)
The case is significant because while it acknowledges the
definition of short-term employee under Bismarck, it substantially
expands the coverage of the statute by providing an exception to the
short-term exclusion if the employees can demonstrate an expectancy
of employment.
One

of

the

early

IELRB

decisions

dealing

with

unit

determination was Jacksonville District No. 117, 1 PERI 1106.

This

case arose out of a representation petition filed by the IEA-NEA.
The petition sought an election to represent a union comprised of all
full and part-time secretaries, custodians, maintenance employees and
teacher aides.

The IELRB granted an election but ordered that three

separate units would be most appropriate.
appropriate were

(1)

The units found to be

custodial and maintenance employees;

(2) bus

drivers; and (3) secretaries.
The

IELRB reached the decision based on the fact pattern

shown by the record.
First,

custodial and maintenance workers work out of
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the

maintenance shop in the Central Administrative Office and are part of
the Buildings and Grounds Department.

They are supervised by the

supervisor of the Buildings and Grounds Department.

They are paid by

the hour and receive overtime pay for any hours worked in excess of
forty hours per week.

They are scheduled for work during the winter

and

and

spring

vacations

Christmas as paid holidays.

receive

Good

Friday,

Thanksgiving,

and

They receive pay raises for every five

years of service to the district and are entitled to a paid vacation
based on the number of hours of employment.
Bus drivers work out of the transportation building and are
supervised by the Director of Transportation.

Most of them work from

7:00 a.m. until 8:15 or 8:30 a.m. and again from 2:30 p.m until 4:00
p.m.

They are paid by the trip for their regular assignments and

receive an hourly rate for Saturday work or other extra assignments.
Like the custodial and maintenance workers, bus drivers are entitled
to pay raises for every five years of service to the district.

They

are not formally evaluated on their work performance and do receive
paid vaction time.

They do receive ten days sick time as do the

other employees of the district.
The secretaries in the district all work regular eight hour
days.

They work in individual school buildings and are supervised by

the administration center administrator or building principal for
whom they work.

Their work year varies from ten months to a

year-round schedule.

Those secretaries who work at least ten and

one-half months receive paid vacations and approximately fifty per
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cent of the secretaries are entitled to paid vactions.

Most of the

secretaries do not work during Thanksgiving, winter and spring
vacations.
The IELRB found that the differences in terms of wages,
supervision, hours, skills and functions and degree of contact were
sufficient to direct an election for each of the units.

Within each

of the units, the IELRB found a sufficient community of interest.
This case is significant because it was the first full IELRB
decision to address the appropriate unit question and established the
analytical approach the IELRB would take.

The IELRB will consider

the way pay is determined, commonality of supervision, work hours and
the comparability of fringe benefits.
Section 7 of the IELRA provides, in part, that no unit shall
include both professional and non-professional employees unless a
majority of both groups vote for inclusion in the unit.

There are

three particularly important decisions that deal with attempts to
include professional and non-professional employees in the same unit.
The decisions are Niles Elementary School District No.

71, 2 PERI

1009, Alton Community Unit School District No. 11, 2 PERI

1048 and

Kankakee Area Special Education Cooperative, Case No. 84 UC 0007-C.
The Niles decision arose out of a representation petition
filed by the Niles Council of Teachers.
recognition

of

a

unit

comprised

of

The petition sought the
all

full

and

part-time

professional instructional personnel including classroom teachers,
special

education

teachers,

librarians,
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nurses,

social

workers,

psychologist, speech therapists and reading specialists.

The Hearing

officer directed an election for a bargaining unit including all
those positions and the health aide.

Every member of the unit except

the health aide holds a teaching certificate.
The district excepted to the inclusion of the health aide on
the basis that she did not have a teaching certificate so could not
be considered a
statute.

professional

Without

a

vote

employee
to

under

determine

Section 2(1)
if

of the

professional

and

non-professional employees desired to be in the same unit, the
district maintained that the health aide could not be considered as
part of the unit.
The district also maintained that the health aide lacked a
community of interest with the other employees because she did not
contribute to the district's educational programs except in an
incidental manner.
In her findings, the Hearing Officer found that the health
aide was a registered nurse but did not hold a teaching certificate.
She found that the health aide provides emergency health care,
answers the phones when the secretary is not present, monitors
student absences, and maintains and reviews student health records.
She also found

that

there was not instruction of classes by the

health aide.
Because the health aide is a registered nurse and because of
the nature of her duties, the Hearing Officer determined that the
health aide is a professional employee and shared a community of
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interest.
The full IELRB reversed the decision of the Hearing Officer
to the extent that

the health aide was included in the bargaining

The basis of the reversal was that the health aide did not

unit.

meet the standard of a professional employee as set by Section 2(1)
of the statute.

Because the health aide was not a professional, the

statute requires

a majority vote of both the professional and

non-professional employees in the unit.

No such vote was ever

conducted so the health aide must be excluded from the unit.
The Alton decision marked the first time the IELRB extended
recognition to a "wall to wall" bargaining unit that included all of
the

professional

exclusions)

of

representation
(AEA).

and
a

non-professional

district.

petition

filed

The
by

the

employees
decision
Alton

(with

arose

Education

statutory
out

of

a

Association

The petition sought a unit consisting of:
All full and part-time certificated and educational
support
personnel
including
but
not
limited
to:
teachers,
counselors,
nurses,
librarians,
social
workers,
psychologist,
coordinators,
department
chairpersons, secretaries, aides, special education
aides, safety aides, bus aides, clerks, food service
workers,
custodians,
maintenance
workers,
crossing
guards, warehouse workers, and drivers. (Alton at 119)
The district contended that there were major differences in

the

duties,

and

responsibilities

working

conditions

of

the

certificated and non-certificated personnel and that no community of
interest

existed.

The

district

also

argued

that

the

historical

pattern of recognition and bargaining confirmed the significance of

160

those differences.
The Hearing Officer found that the district recognized the
AEA as the representative of its certified employees in 1972 and had
negotiated
time.
the

collective bargaining agreements

with

them since

that

The Hearing Officer also found that the district recognized
Alton

Association

of

School

Personnel

(AASSP)

as

representative of its non-certificated employees in 1977 or 1978.

the
In

1978 the AASSP affiliated with the IEA and, with the assistance of
the IEA, negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with the
district.

In 1981,

the AEA and the AASSP voted to merge into a

single organization,

the AEA.

bargained

entered

with,

and

Since that time the district has
into

separate

collective

bargaining

agreements with the AEA for the certificated and non-certificated
employees.
The Hearing Officer found that there was a significant
community of interest between two groups of employees with regard to
wages, hours and other working conditions.

Although the levels of

pay are different, pay for both groups is influenced by longevity.
Medical and life insurance, sick leave, personal leave and leaves of
absence are very similar.

Employees in both groups may volunteer for

extracurricular duty such as
athletic contests.
those duties.

loading buses and taking tickets at

Both groups are paid the same rate of pay for

Both groups attend orientation days, participate in

safety and other committees, and have access to the same procedures
for resolving differences not covered by the collective bargaining
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agreement.
The Hearing Officer also found that the history of bargaining
in the district reflected an interrelationship between the two
groups.

There had been separate sets of negotiations but the same

members on both sides of ten participated as bargaining team members
or as observers.

Virtually identical language was contained in many

sections of both contracts.
Based on these findings, the IELRB affirmed the Hearing
Officer's decision, pending approval by a majority of both groups, to
extend

recognition

to

the

non-professional employees.

combined

unit

of

professional

and

The IELRB acknowledged that there were

many differences between the duties, responsibilities and conditions
of employment between the two groups.

However,

the community of

interest and historic patterns of bargaining combined to outweigh
those differences

and warrant

the inclusion of both groups

in a

single bargaining unit.
The IELRB also noted that H.B. 701, the predecessor to the
IELRA had sanctioned wall to wall units.

The IELRB stated that the

General Assembly was clearly aware of that fact and that the IELRA's
provision for wall to wall units was a manifestation of the General
Assembly's intent to provide for precisely the type of unit proposed
in this case.
This case is particularly significant because it isolates the
factors the IELRB will consider when faced with decisions about wall
to wall units, which are primarily community of interest, historic
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patterns of bargaining and the wishes of employees.
Kankakee arose as a result of a unit clarification petition
filed by the employer.
provisions

of

professional,

The existing unit, recognized pursuant to the

H.B.

701,

consisted

non-supervisory

of

all

employees

regularly

and

occupational therapists, and music therapists.

teacher

employed
aides,

The creation of the

unit had bee approved by a majority vote of both professional and
non-professional employees.

The employer sought a unit clarification

on the basis that there was not a shared community of interest
between the groups.

The Hearing Officer denied the petition and the

IELRB upheld the Hearing Officer's decision.
The Hearing Officer found that all employees in the unit work
directly with children to improve the children's physical or mental
condition.

Teacher aides assist teachers with instruction and

perform similar duties

in the classroom.

They prepare classroom

materials, correct work and assist students on an individual basis.
Teachers and teacher aides are paid on a salaried basis
although they are on different pay scales.
schedules and the same number of days.
belonging
benefits.

to different retirement systems,
Teachers

are

eligible

accrue seniority while aides cannot.

for

They work the same

With the exception of
they receive the same

professional leave and can

Teachers can obtain tenure but

aides cannot.
Teacher aides and teacher are in almost constant contact.
Teacher aides attend faculty meetings, in-service training with the
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teachers and participate in the annual reviews of students where
their input is given equal weight to that of the teachers.
The teachers do have some oversight responsibilities vis a
vis the teacher aides.

They are responsible for assigning work to

the aides and may participate in the interview process.

They may

also have some informal input into the evaluation of the aides.
However, the ultimate responsibilities in these areas belongs to the
Program Coordinator.

The teachers have no authority to hire,

transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, or discipline
teachers aides or increase aides' salaries.
These oversight responsibilities,
negate

the

considered.

community

of

interest

the IELRB found,

demonstrated

by

the

do not
factors

Therefore, the combined unit was held to be appropriate.

This case is significant because i t reaffirms the IELRB's
willingness

to

weigh

differences

against

factors

indicating

a

community of interest.
Supervisory~

Manageriai and Confidential Exciusions

Supervisory, managerial, and confidential exclusions play a
major

role

in

the

determination

of

professional

units.

The

legislative history makes it clear that these are to be narrow
exclusions.

However, school districts would prefer to broaden those

exclusions since many school personnel act in more than one capacity.
Four Rivers-Jacksonville District No. 117, 2 PERI 1058 is an
example of a case where all three of the exclusions are dealt with.
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The case arose out of a representation petition filed by the Illinois
Federation of Teachers (!FT).

The petition sought certification of a

bargaining

unit

of

employees

excluding

consisting

all

supervisors,

certified

and

non-certified

managerial

and

confidential

employees.
The Hearing Officer held a hearing on the petition and
reached the following conclusions:
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

Four
Cooperative)

Under the Act, the "employer" is the Four Rivers
Council rather than the Operating Board of
Directors or the Administrative District;
Administrative
Secretary
Eleanor
Abel
is
a
confidential
employee
under
the
Act,
but
Administrative Secretaries Velma Smith and Marilyn
Johnson are not confidential employees;
Program Supervisors Pat Baptist, Delores Hill and
Edward Randorf are not managerial employees under
the Act;
Program Supervisors Donald Bryan, Janet Engle,
Robert Everett, Beverly Johns and Veva Siria are
not supervisory employees under the Act;
The unit petitioned for by the IFT, which includes
professional and nonprofessional employees of the
Cooperative, is appropriate under the Act.
(Four Rivers-Jacksonville at p. 143)

Rivers-Jacksonville
filed

administrative

exceptions

secretaries

to

Velma

School

District

those

findings,

Smith

and

117

(the

asserting

that

No.

Marilyn

Johnson

are

confidential employees, that all of the program supervisors named in
the third conclusion are managerial employees, that all of the
program supervisors named in the fourth conclusion are supervisors,
and that the IELRB should find separate units of professional and
non-professional

employees

to

be
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appropriate

for

collective

bargaining.
The

IELRB affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision that the

employees alleged should be included in the unit and affirmed the
decision that a combined unit was appropriate.

The IELRB reversed

the Hearing Officer's decision regarding

the

program supervisors named in the petition.

The basis of the reversal

was

that

although

those

positions

were

inclusion of certain

neither

managerial

nor

supervisory they had duties and responsibilities which made it
inappropriate

to

include them in a bargaining unit with other

employees.
The

Cooperative

which combined

to

such services.

consists

of

twenty-four

provide special services

for

school

districts

students

requiring

The Cooperative is governed by the Four Rivers

Council (Council) and by the Operating Board· of Di rectos (Operating
Board).

The administrative staff consists of the Director of Special

Education and two assistant Directors.
Prior to the filing of the petition, a personnel committee of
the Operating Board met on an informal meet-and-confer basis with a
personnel

committee

of

elected

representatives

of

certified

and

non-certified employees.
The
first.
input

IELRB

considered the

issue of

confidential employees

The Hearing Officer found that the Director has substantial
into the formulation,

Cooperative's

management

determination and effectuation of

policies

regarding

makes recommendations regarding the hiring,
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labor

relations.

the
He

firing and transfer of

personnel.

He has the day-to-day responsibility for implementing

labor relations policies and acts as an advisor to the personnel
committee involved in the meet and confer sessions.
The three administrative secretaries keep the files for the
administrative personnel,

type reports and correspondence and keep

the financial records.
Abel is the secretary to the Operating Board.

Her duties

include acting as recording secretary for the Operating Board and
acting as the personal secretary to the Director.

As

his secretary,

she types all of his confidential memos and has access to all the
administrative files, including those dealing with labor relations.
As recording secretary to the Operating Board she is privy to
confidential information dealing with preparations for the meet and
confer sessions.
affirmed

the

Based on the nature of these duties

decision

of

the

Hearing

Officer

that

the IELRB
she

is

a

confidential employee.
Smith's
personnel files.

main

administrative

responsibility

is

handling

There is no evidence that she regularly assists the

Director regarding his responsibilities dealing with labor relations.
She provides no direct assistance to the Operating Board.

Her mere

handling of personnel files was found to be insufficient to qualify
her as a confidential employee.
Johnson works for the Cooperative as a financial secretary.
Her duties include the preparation of the payroll, maintaining
accounts, the payment of bills, and the keeping of a general and a
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master

ledger.

Most

of

the

inspection by the public.

documents

she

keeps

are open to

She does not handle personnel files or

type documents dealing with labor relations.

She does not prepare

financial information for the meet and confer sessions.
Based on these facts, the Hearing Officer found that Johnson,
as financial secretary, does not perform a single duty relating to
confidential labor relations.

Therefore, Johnson is not eligible for
The IELRB also affirmed the

exclusion as a confidential employee.
Hearing

Officer's

decision

that

Baptist,

Hill,

and

program supervisors, are not managerial employees.
program supervisors have similar responsibilities.

Randorf,

All three of the
They all spend

the majority of their time in local school districts,
curricula,

monitor

recommends

the

programs,

students

attendance

evaluates

interview process

and
of

teachers

non-tenured

and makes

prepare

program
at

teachers,

employment

the

prepare

goals.

particular
participates

recommendations.

Hill
training
in

the

However,

recommendations by Hill are subject to approval by the local school
boards.

Baptist and Randorf do not evaluate teachers unless they are

requested to do so by local school districts.

They are not involved

in personnel decisions at all unless the local school district
requests their input.
None
Central

of

Service

the

three

personnel.

have any
Their

administrative
only

authority over

participation

in

the

administration of the Cooperative is through their participation in
the following advisory committees and groups:

168

1.

2.

3.

4.

An "administrative/supervisory group" to which all

administrators and program supervisors belong.
This group discusses such topics as job vacancies,
current status of rules and regulations governing
special education, status of Committees of the
Cooperative, · in-service training procedures and
proposed personnel policies (before these policies
are proposed to the Operating Board).
Committees of the Cooperative.
These committees,
to which Cooperative administrators, teachers and
secretaries and local district superintendents and
principals may also belong, serve .a wide variety of
purposes, including development of procedures and
guidelines for evaluation of Central Service
personnel, guidelines for evaluation of students
and development of forms.
Annual
multidisciplinary
staff
conferences,
attended by both Central Service and local district
personnel, which develop individual education plans
for students in special education programs or
terminated from programs.
Administrative
Roundtables,
sponsored
by
the
Cooperative and coordinated by the Director,
Assistant Director and several supervisors, which
inform local school districts of programs offered
by the Cooperataive, and discuss the views and
concerns of the local districts.
(Four Rivers-Jacksonville at p. 145)

Each of the program supervisors is on the teachers' salary
schedule

and

receives

an

additional

stipend

for

acting

as

a

supervisor.
In affirming the Hearing Officer, the IELRB relied upon the
statutory definition of managerial employee and the interpretation of
that definition that was provided in Niles Township.

Niles Township

interpreted the definition to cover those employees who "exercise
substantial and continuing authority over relatively crucial aspects
of the Employer's operations which impact on, or have the potential
for impacting on, the wages, hours or terms and conditions of
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employment of significant numbers of bargaining unit employees" Niles
Township at p.

92.

Based on this interpretation, the IELRB found that the
supervisors were not managerial employees.

Any managerial functions

served by them were incidental to their primary job responsibilities
and only took the form of providing advisory services.
The IELRB also affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision that
program directors Bryan,

Engle,

Everett, Johns and Siria were not

entitled to be excluded as supervisory employees.
The duties of these program directors differ from those of
Baptist, Hill and Randorf in three respects.
evaluate subordinate teachers,

They have the power to

to make non-binding recommendations

based on the evaluations and to hear grievances at the first and
second steps.
The Hearing Officer made

factual

specific duties of these program supervisors.
1.

findings

concerning

the

Those findings are:

Donald
Bryan
works
as
a
part-time
field
psychologist (which accounts for 70% of his work
time) and spend the remainder of his workday as a
part-time supervising psychologist. As Supervising
Psychologist, Bryan annually evaluates other school
psychologists, submits recommendations based on
these evaluations, and provides monthly in-service
training
to
the other psychologists.
The
psychologists working under Bryan set their own
schedules, and Bryan may not alter these schedules.
Bryan has
interviewed eight of the fifteen
psychologists whom the Cooperative has hired since
he assumed this present position. The Cooperative
has
not
acted
in
accordance
with
his
recommendations that one candidate be hired and
that another currently employed psychologist be
discharged.
One transfer of a psychologist
170

2.

3.

occurred
without
Bryan's
prior
knowledge
or
recommendation.
Bryan -can recommend changes in
work behavior to his subordinates but he cannot
unilaterally impose discipline.
Janet Engle works as part-time Program Supervisor
for the Hearing Impaired Program (40% of work
time), and as part-time In-Service Coordinator.
The Hearing Impaired Program uses the services of
three teachers and two aides, whom the Cooperative
hires
but
who
work
in
buildings
of
the
Administrative District.
Engle evaluates the
teachers but not the teacher aides.
She may not
unilaterally order changes in the work behavior of
her subordinates.
In addition to her evaluative
duties, Engle provides teachers with necessary
forms and reports, gives teaching advice when
needed, participates in development of Individual
Educational Plans (IEPs) for students in the
hearing impaired programs, follows up on students
who
need
hearing
screening,
and
provides
transportation for students who need hearing tests.
Engle does not recruit job applicants and the
Cooperative does not consult her before making
hiring decisions.
Engle' s duties as In-Service Coordinator do not
appear to involve supervision or evaluation of
other employees.
Her duties include planning and
appropriating adequate funds for the in-service
committees described in the preceding section. As
part of an in-service proposal, Engle has prepared
a hearing-impaired curriculum.
Engle is also in
charge of a "Material Center" of the Cooperative
which functions as a lending library.
Robert Everett is employed by the Cooperative as
the Coordinator of the Child Find Services Center.
This Center screens children between the ages of
three and five who are suspected of having
disabilities.
There are two components to the
Center: a Developmental Screening Component, which
identifies
children
with
handicaps,
and
a
Diagnostic Clinic component, where diagnostic tests
are
performed.
The
Developmental
Screening
Component is headed by the Developmental Screening
Coordinator, who is assisted by a second-level
screening technician and two part-time screening
technicians.
The diagnostic staff includes a
speech and language therapist and a clinical
diagnostician.
Everett, who splits his work time
equally between the
Center's
two
components,
evaluates
both
the
Developmental
Screening
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4.

5.

Coordinator and the clinical diagnosticians.
Beverly Johns is the program supervisor for
programs in the areas of learning disabilities,
behavioral disorders and educational handicaps.
These
programs
are
scattered
throughout
the
participating local school districts. In addition,
Johns supervises Central Service programs for
severe and alternative behavior disorders which are
instructed by four teacher aides, a part-time
social worker and a contractual psychiatrist.
Approximately 65% of her working time, Johns
advises
the
local
school
districts
and
approximately 35% of her time she supervises
Central Service Programs.
Although she formally
evaluates teachers in the Central Service programs,
Johns makes no evaluations of local district
teachers unless requested to do so.
Johns has
helped to develop a teacher evaluation form.
She
has
assisted
in
interviewing
teacher
aide
applicants, but has no unilateral authority to
hire.
Suspensions,
layoffs,
promotions
or
discharges are not within her authority. Johns has
dealt with one grievance, which she transferred to
the jurisdiction of the Director prior to making a
ruling.
She has submitted to Jan Engle proposals
outlining the cost of specific in-service programs,
but is not involved in developing proposals for the
Cooperative' s
budget
or
in
submitting
recommendations how the budget should be divided
between various items.
Veva Siria supervises programs for Early Childhood
educational
intervention,
which
are
located
throughout
the local school districts.
The
Cooperative directly employs eight teachers and
eight teacher aides who work in this program area.
Siria evaluates Cooperative employees under her
jurisdiction.
She is involved in interviewing
applicants, but has no final hiring authority.
Similarly, she can recommend discipline, but cannot
unilaterally
impose
significant
disciplinary
measures.
As part of her duties, Siria offers
suggestions to the Director on which programs
should be expanded to meet students' needs.
She
consults with Central Service and local district
personnel concerning problems in the area of early
childhood
education
and
suggests
procedures,
materials and equipment to be used in connection
with the early childhood education curriculum.
(Four Rivers-Jacksonville at p. 146)
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The IELRB agreed with the Hearing Officer that the duties
listed do not meet
exclusion.

the statutory requirement for the supervisory

The program supervisors formally evaluate the teachers

working under their direction but do not have the authority to
unilaterally
suspension,

direct
lay

or

off,

to

effectively

recall,

discipline of other employees.

promotion,

recommend
discharge,

the

hiring,

reward

or

The final authority to make personnel

decisions rest solely with the Operating Board acting either directly
or upon the recommendation of the Director.

The record also showed a

number of instances where the Operating Board did not consult the
supervisors before making personnel decisions or acted aginst the
recommendations of the supervisors.
The IELRB affirmed
community

of

interest

non-professional employees.

the Hearing Officer's decision that a

existed

between

the

professional

and

The IELRB considered three factors to be

significant in reaching this decision.

First, the meet and confer

sessions had always involved a committee representing both groups of
employees.

Although not technically a bargaining team, the IELRB

viewed it as indication that there was a historical pattern of
recognition.
Second, there is significant contact between the two groups.
They work jointly in multidisciplinary staff conferences and in the
Diagnostic

Clinic.

The

specialized

nature

of

the

educational

services provided by the Cooperative requires that the two groups
work closely together as a team.
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The third factor considered significant by the IELRB is the
similarity of work schedules, fringe benefits and scheduled holidays.
Al though the IELRB found that the unit was appropriate and
that the program supervisors did not qualify under the managerial or
supervisory exclusions, the IELRB found that it was not appropriate
for the program supervisors to be included in the unit.

They based

this finding upon the fact that the supervisors, through their
participation in the groups, committees and conferences have a degree
of involvement in the formulation and implementation of educational
policy that impacts both the Cooperative and the participating school
districts.

This involvement is not shared by the other members of

the unit.
In addition, the program supervisors exercise some degree of
true supervisory authority.

The evaluations made by Bryan, Everett,

Engle, Johns and Siria serve as formal measures of work.
Cooperative may,

at

its discretion,

basis for personnel decisions.

The

use those evaluations as the

The role played by Baptist, Hill and

Randorf in monitoring curriculum and teaching methodology has some
potential for impacting the working conditions of teachers in the
Cooperative.
Based on this potential for tension and conflict, the IELRB
essentially created a new category of exclusions:
The "quasi-managerial" and "quasi-supervisory" status of
the program supervisors, within the context of the
District's
overall
special
education
program,
establishes a potential for tension and conflict in the
performance of their duties and responsibilities were
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they to be included in the same unit with the other
employees that is of greater significance than the
community of interest they share with the other
employees.
Thererfore, we shall exclude them from the
unit.
(Four Rivers-Jacksonville at p. 148)
The case is significant for two major reasons.

First, the

IELRB created a new exclusion based on the facts of the case.

They

are willing to exclude positions if they are of a quasi-supervisory
or quasi- managerial nature.

The IELRB has thus developed a sort of

sliding scale to be applied in cases of this sort.
The second major reason for the significance of this case is
the application of a balancing test in cases of this sort.

The IELRB

will weigh the potential for conflict as a result of this status
against the community of interest.

If the potential for conflict and

tension outweighs the community of interest the IELRB will exclude
the positions.
There is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the program
supervisors could not petition for recognition of a unit composed of
program supervisors.

Arguably, they share a community of interest

and are not barred by the statute from being members of a recognized
unit.

The opinion simply states that it would be inappropriate for

the program supervisors to be included in the unit petitioned for in
this case.
The other major case dealing with supervisory exclusion from
a professional unit is Indian Prairie Community Unit School District
204,

Case

No.

86-UC-0001-C.

The
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case

arose

out

of

a

unit

clarification petition sought by the school district.
sought

to

exclude

the

newly

established

The petition

classification

of

Instructional Supervisor from the professional employee bargaining
unit.
The

record

established

that

the

three

instructional

supervisors make budget recommendations for their divisions, conduct
teacher

evaluations,

participate

in

the

hiring

and

dismissal

procedures for teachers within their divisions and participate in the
scheduling of teacher assignments.
of a

They each teach two periods out

seven period day and are paid on the administrators'

salary

schedule rather than on the teachers' salary schedule
The

Hearing

Rivers-Jacksonville,

Officer

relied

upon

discussed

supra,

after

Supervisors

Instructional

"quasi-managerial"

or

satisfied

"quasi-

supervisory"

the

test

determining

that

definition

the
as

of

Four
the
of

interpreted by that

decision.
Using
potential

that

for

test,

tension

or

the

Hearing

conflict

Officer determined
outweighed

the

that

community

the
of

interest shared by the Instructional Supervisors and the other
members

of

the

bargaining

unit.

Therefore,

the

Hearing

Officer

excluded the postiions from the unit.
The case is significant because it shows the application of
the Four Rivers-Jacksonville test in another context.

It also is an

indication of how department chairmen might be excluded from a
bargaining unit.
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There is one particularly important decision dealing with the
managerial exclusion and professional units.

That case is Niles

Township High School District No. 219, 2 PERI 1033.

The case arose

out of a unit clarification petition filed by the IFT.

The petition

sought to include the districts' six deans in the historically
recognized bargaining unit.

The deans had never been part of the

unit nor covered by the collective bargaining agreement.
The record shows that the primary duties of the deans are to
oversee student discipline and attendance.

This is the only area in

which they have substantial discretion and independence.
The

deans

monitor

the

day

to

day

secretaries but they do not evaluate them.

work

of

their

own

They serve on various

administrative and managerial committees but there is no evidence
that they can substantially influence district policies concerning
wages, hours or working conditions of other employees.

The deans do

not have the "Type 75" certificates held by other administrators in
the district.

Based on these facts, the IELRB affirmed the decision

of the Hearing Officer that the deans had only minimal managerial
responsibilities

and

did not meet

the statutory requirements

for

managerial exclusion.
In order to overcome the fact that the deans had historically
not been part of the bargaining unit the IELRB engaged in a balancing
exercise.

It weighed the fact of historical exclusion against the

factors favoring a finding of a community of interest.

Those factors

included the facts that there is a substantial interchangeability of
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job

duties,

identical

certification

requirements,

comparable

benefits, similar hours and wages, shared job purposes, and shared
authority to discipline students.

The conclusion was that the shared

community of interest outweighed the fact of historical exclusion.
The case indicates that the IELRB intends to heed the
expressed legislative intent that these exclusions are to be narrow.
It also indicates a willingness to allow a shared community of
interest to overcome historical patterns of recognition.
It may be of interest that this decision was delivered six
weeks before the Four Rivers-Jacksonville decision.
be

drawn

is

that

the

"quasi"

exclusion

The inference to

fashioned

in

Four

Rivers-Jacksonville is only applicable in cases where there is truly
potential for tension or conflict.
At this point, there are no reported decisions dealing with
the

confidential

employee

exclusion

and

professional

units.

Presumably, this is because any professional employee dealing with
confidential matters is excludable on another basis.
are

many

cases

dealing

with

confidential

However, there
employees

non-professional units.

Three cases to be discussed are:

Occupational

Center,

Technical

1 PERI

1041,

Plainfield

and

Vermillion
Community

Consolidated School District No. 202, 1 PERI 1157, and Avon School
District 176, 2 PERI 1072
Vermillion Occupational Technical Center arose out of a unit
clarification petition filed by the VOTEC Education Association.
petition

sought

to

include

the
178

administrative

secretary,

The
Mona

Collins, as a member of the unit on the basis that she is not a
confidential employee.

Collins is the secretary to Paul Wasser, the

Director of VOTEC.
The record shows that Wasser is involved in the formulation,
determination and effectuation of management labor policies.

The

record also shows that Collins types and maintains minutes, agendum,
and records, for VOTEC 's

Board of Control.

However, confidential

labor related matters are given to the secretaries of the Board of
Control chairman and negotiator for the Board of Control.

Wasser

expressed an intent to expose Collins to confidential labor related
matters in the future.
The IELRB concurred with the Hearing Officer's finding that
although

Collins

works

for

a

manager

handling

labor

relations

policies, she does not act in a confidential capacity regarding such
matters.

Although Wasser expressed an intent to use her in a

confidential capacity she was not working in that way at the time of
the petition.

Decisions dealing with confidential exclusions must

deal with the employee's present activities.
The case is significant for three reasons.

The first is the

ruling that an employee working for a manager handling labor related
matters must act in a confidential capacity to that manager.

The

second item of note is the ruling that the exclusion must be based on
the employee's present activity rather than what might later develop.
The third noteworthy aspect of the case is the IELRB's stated
intention to "adhere to a very narrow definition of confidentiality."
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(Id. at p. 204.)
Plainfield arose out of a representation petition filed by
the Plainfield Association of Clerical and Secretarial Support Staff.
The

petition

regularly

sought

employed

District.

recognition
secretaries

for

a

unit

consisting

by

Plainfield

employed

of

all

School

The only secretary excluded by the petition was the

secretary to the superintendent.

The district sought to exclude the

secretary to the assistant superintendent.
The
involved

in

record
the

shows

that

the

determination,

assistant

formulation,

management policy regarding labor relations.
secretary is
matters.

not

superintendent

and

effectuation

is
of

It also shows that the

regularly exposed to confidential labor related

However, on occasion she does handle the overflow work and

is then exposed to confidential labor related matters.
The IELRB established a two step analysis for determining
when an employee can be considered as confidential.

The first step

is to determine whether the person for whom the employee in question
works does in fact determine,

formulate and effectuate management

policy regarding labor relations.

The second step is to determine

whether the employee in question acts in a confidential capacity to
that person.
Using that analysis, the IELRB held that the assistant
superintendent is a confidential employee but that his secretary is
not because she does not regularly handle matters which, if divulged,
would give bargaining unit members advance notice of the district's
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policies with regard to labor relations.

The principals in this

district, however, are not confidential in this sense because their
role in labor relations is not at the level of determining and
formulating the policies.
policies.

At best, their role is in effectuating the

The IELRB left unanswered the question of whether the

secretary to a principal on the bargaining team could be excluded.
This decision by the IELRB was recently reversed by the
Fourth District of the Illinois Appellate Court.

(494 N.E.2d 1130.)

The court held that the secretary should be deemed confidential since
her

regular

duties

include

handling

the

overflow

work

of

a

confidential nature.
Avon arose out of a representation petition filed by the IEA.
The petition sought recognition of a unit composed of all full-time
and part-time certified and non-certified staff.

The important issue

for the purpose of this discussion is whether the secretary to the
district

superintendent

is a confidential employee.

The Hearing

Officer found that the secretary is a confidential employee.
Wayne Buhlig, the superintendent, also acts as the part-time
elementary school principal.

Besides acting as chief administrative

officer, he has the primary responsibility for labor relations in the
district.

Approximately ten to fifteen per cent of his time is spent

handling labor related matters.
Zella Whistler is Buhlig' s secretary and is the part-time
grade school secretary.

She spends approximately fifty per cent of

her time assisting Buhlig.

Her duties include typing his official
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correspondence,

typing

his

responses

to

school

board

inquiries

regarding personnel matters, filing personnel documents and typing
personnel evaluations.
The !EA argued that Buhlig can not be considered an employee
who determines, formulates or effectuates policies with regard to
labor policies because he only spends ten to fifteen per cent of his
time on labor related matters.
argument,

stating that

The Hearing Officer rejected this

"there is no requirement

in the Act

that

Buhlig spend a majority of his time in labor relations matters." (Id
at P• 210.)
The Hearing Officer found the Whistler could, in the regular
course of her duties, gain and convey information that could have
potential

impact

on the bargaining relationship.

could be excluded from the bargaining unit.

Therefore,

she

He distinguished this

situation from Vermillion by noting that her regular duties involved
much more than mere access to confidential personnel data.
The

legislative

history

makes

it

supervisory exclusion is to be very narrow.
shaped a

quasi-supervisory exclusion

exclude department

chairmen.

very

clear

the

However, the IELRB has

that may make

In order

that

it easier to

to satisfy the statutory

exclusion,

the chairman will have to satisfy the preponderance of

time test.

In order to qualify for the quasi-supervisory exclusion

the chairman will have to face the clear potential of tension or
conflict with other members of the bargaining unit.

It is unlikely

that a department chairmen in most schools will satisfy either
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requirement

if

his

primary

responsibility is managing

curricular

supplies, curriculum development and scheduling testing.
Mere membership on administrative committees will not satisfy
the statutory requirements for exclusion.

In order for an academic

dean to be excluded he will have to engage in supervisory acts such
as hiring, evaluating and terminating employees.
be a result of his independent judgment.

Those actions must

If those actions are

subject to review, the possibility of exclusion is enhanced if his
decisions are rarely if ever reversed.

If different certification is

required for the position, that will also increase the possibility
that he will be excluded from the bargaining unit.

Other factors

that work in favor of exclusion are different work schedules,
different salary schedule and different fringe benefits.
Niles

Township makes it very clear that deans whose only

sphere of independent judgment is the discipline of students, and
whose certification is no different than a teacher will not be
excluded from the bargaining unit.

However,

if his duties also

include evaluations and he differed from the members in terms of
salary, work schedule and fringe benefits he may be excluded on the
basis that there is a lack of a community of interest.
CONCLUSIONS
There are six general conclusions that can be drawn at this
point.
The first is that the IELRB intends to consider and weigh
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nine factors when faced with deciding what constitutes an appropriate
unit.

Those factors are: (1) Historical pattern of recognition; (2)

Employee skills;

(3)

Employee functions;

(4) Degree of functional

integration; (5) Interchangeability; (6) Contact among employees; (7)
Common supervision, wages, hours and other condition; (8) Desire of
employees; and (9) The fact that nothing shall interfere or negate
the current representation rights or patterns and practices of
employee organizations which have historically represented employees
for the purposes of collective bargaining.
The second is that a stated objective of the IELRB is to
carry out

the legislative intent to have a very narrow scope of

exclusions.
The third is that despite the objective of providing a narrow
scope of exclusions, the IELRB significantly broadened the exclusions
when it shaped the quasi-supervisory and quasi-managerial exclusions.
The fourth general conclusion to be drawn is that the IELRB
will

not

concern itself with finding

the most appropriate unit.

Rather, it will be concerned that the unit simply be appropriate.
The fifth general conclusion is that the IELRB is unwilling
to broaden the definition of "professional employee."
that

employees

meet

the

statutory

requirement

It will insist
of

holding

a

certificate issued under Article 21 or Section 34-83 of the School
Code.
The sixth conclusion is that the IELRB will give great
deference to the expressed wishes of the employees if the statutory
184

requirements have been met and the employees can demonstrate that the
unit sought is appropriate.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
This chapter briefly summarizes the nature of the study and
the conclusions which developed from the findings.

Recommendations

for further study concludes the chapter.

Illinois is a relatively late addition to the ranks of states
which have adopted statutes governing the employment rights of public
school teachers.

However, although there are many states with

existing statutes, the Illinois statute is unique enough that it will
have to be interpreted by its own administrative agency and court
system before teachers,

administrators and other school employees

will truly understand how it will be applied in the workplace of
public schools.
The legislative history and the decisions of the IELRB make
it

clear that although the IELRB will look to t;he body of private

sector labor law and to the decisions of other states for guidance,
the IELRB should not and will not be bound by those decisions.

The

IELRB will interpret the statute in light of what the legislative
intent was and by applying with particularity,

the words of the

Illinois statute.
In

order

interpretation

of

to

develop

selected

a

basis

provisions
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for
of

discussing

the

IELRA,

probable
the

study

combined an analysis of the legislative history, the consideration of
published IELRB decisions, relevant court decisions from other states
and appropriate law from the private sector.

These analyses lead to

the conclusions discussed in the next section.

toiicius:ions
The sections in each chapter have conclusions dealing with
the subject discussed in that section.
referred

to

However,

for

conclusions

Those conclusions should be

regarding

those

particular

topics.

in addition to those conclusions, there are some general

conclusions that can be drawn.
First, it is apparent that the IELRB is not going to be
hesitant about going beyond the actual words of the IELRA to create
law that it believes accurately reflects the intent of the statute.
This

is

most

clearly

quasi-supervisory

apparent

status

when

in

there

its
is

decision
no

to

mention

of

create

a

such

a

classification in either the statute or in the legislative history.
Second, the IELRB will certainly be willing to look to the
body of the law under the NLRB and other states for approaches and
analytical tools.

However, the IELRB will not consider itself to be

bound by those approaches or by the substantive law of other agencies
or states.
Third, the IELRB is going to be particularly sensitive to the
expressed

desires

bargaining unit

of

the

employees

is appropriate.

in

determining

whether

a

This attitude is reflected most
187

clearly

in

the

Alton

decision

and

has

been

substantiated

in

subsequent decisions.
Fifth, a considerable length of time will elapse before there
is a comprehensive list of what topics are mandatory subjects of
bargaining.

After fifty years of collective bargaining under the

NLRA, the list is still not final for the private sector.

Because

the IELRB has made i t clear that it is not bound by the decisions
under the NLRA, and because of the unique nature of collective
bargaining

in

public

education,

the

determination

of

what

is

mandatorily bargainable will likely be determined on a case by case
basis.
Sixth, the legislature is clearly sensitive to how the
statute is being applied and is willing to take legislative action to
correct

perceived

shortcomings.

Evidence

of

this

willingness

includes the amendment of the statute to allow an individual to file
an unfair labor charge and the amendment proposed in the 1987 session
to require binding arbitration i f a strike is not resolved by the
fifteenth day of the strike.
Recommendations for Further Study
The first recommendation is obvious.

There needs to be a

continued reading of IELRB decisions in the areas discussed to
determine if the statute is, indeed, interpreted as it is suggested
it might be.

Because the statute does not provide a comprehensive

list of unfair labor practices or mandatory topics of bargaining, a
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student or practitioner must be aware of

the pronouncements by the

IELRB in these areas.

A second recommendation is that there needs to be an analysis
of what must be bargained under the category of impact bargaining.
It

is clear that matters of inherent managerial policy need not be

bargained but the impact of those decisions must be bargained.
not

so

clear,

"impact."

however,

As

this

what

body

of

must
law

be

bargained

grows,

it

under

will

It is

the

be

of

term
major

significance in those situations where a decisi.on was found to be a
matter of inherent managerial policy.
The third recommendation is that an analysis be made of what,
precisely, are the factors
when

determining

whether

that
a

the
unit

IELRB will weight most heavily
is

appropriate.

The

early

indications are that the desires of the employees will count heavily
but there is no clearly discernible trend yet regarding how the IELRB
will weight other factors.
The
determine

fourth
patternc

recommendation is
of

decisions

that

rendered

a

study be conducted
by

individual

to

hearing

officers. That was he yo rid the scope of this study but it is likely
that there is a pattern to the processes and decisions of individual
hearing officers.
very helpful

to

A determination of what those patterns are will be
~·racti

tioners who present

officers.
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their cases before those

IELRB DECISIONS
ALTON COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 11, Case No. 85-RC-0012-S,
Hearing Officer's Decision 1 PERI 1118 (1985).
BARTONVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 66, Case No. 84-CA-0054-S, Decision
of Illinois ELRB, 1 PERI 1180 (1985).
BALYKI COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 125, Case No. 84-CA-0018,
IELRB Decision, 2 PERI 1047 (1986).
BERKELEY

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 87, Case
Decision, 2 PERI 1066 (1986).

No.

84-CA-0057-C,

IELRB

BETHALTO COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Case No. 84-RC-0086, Decision of
ELRB Executive Director, l PERI 1027 (1984).
BISMARCK COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Case No. 85-CA-0024-S,
Hearing Officer's Decision, 1 PERI 1163 (1985).
BISMARCK COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Case No. 85-CA-0024-S,
IELRB Decision, 2 PERI 1045 (1986).
BLOOM

TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 206, Case Nos. 84-CB-0017,
84-CA-0068-C Executive Director's Decision, 1 PERI 1068
(1985).

BOARD OF EDUCATION SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.I, LAKE COUNTY, Case No.
84-CA-0046-C, Hearing Officer's Decision, 2 PERI 1029
(1986).
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES, Case No.
84-CA-0032-A, Decision of IELRB, 1 PERI 1175 (1985).
BROWN

COUNTY COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Case
85-CA-00-57-S, IELRB Decision, 2 PERI 1096 (1986).
COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
84-CA-0057-S,
84-CA-0058-S
through
Officer's Decision, 2 PERI 1001 (1985).

No.

CARBONDALE

165, Case No's.
0068-S,
Hearing

CARBONDALE

COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 165, Case No's.
84-CA-0057-S through 84-CA-0068-S, IELRB Decision, 2 PERI
1067 (1986).

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

190

CATLIN . UNIT DISTRICT . NO. 5, Case Nos. 85-FS-0023-S, through
85-FS-0030-S, Hearing Officer's Decision, 2 PERI 1023.
CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION, Case No. 84-CA-0087-C, IELRB Decision, 2
PERI 1089 (1986).
CHICAGO TEACHER UNION, Case No. 85-CB-0015-C, Executive Director's
Decision 1 PERI 1172 (1985).
CITY COLLEGES OF CHICAGO, Case No. 86-CA-0021-C, Hearing Officer's
Decision (1986).
CITY OF CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION, Case No. 84-CA-0002, Executive
Director's Decision, 1 PERI 1043 (1984).
COMMUNITY CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 59, Case Nos. 85-CA-0007,
85-CB-0006-C, Decision of IELRB, 1 PERI 1158 (1985).
COMMUNITY CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 59, Case No. 86-CA-0012,
Complaint and Notice of Hearing (1986).
COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 4, Case No. 84-CA-0015-S, Hearing
Officer's Decision, 2 PERI 1086 (1986).
COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 218, Case No. 84-UC-0011, IELRB
Decision, 2 PERI 1087 (1986).
CRYSTAL LAKE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 47 & 155, Case No.
Decision of IELRB, 1 PERI 1076 (1985).
SCHOOL DISTRICT 155,
Officer's Decision, 2

84-RC-0162,
Case No.
PERI 1073

CRYSTAL

LAKE COMMUNITY HIGH
86-CA-0014-C, Hearing
(1986).

CUSTODIAL

EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, Case
Decision, 1 PERI 1107 (1985).

DOWNERS

GROVE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
58, Case No.
84-UC-0001-C, Decision of ELRB Executive Director, 1 PERI
1 928 (1984) •

No.

85-CB-0006-C,

IELRB

DOWNERS GROVE COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 99, Case No.
84-RC-0067, Decision of Illinois ELRB, 1 PERI 1105 (1984).
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